





Methodology for the Application of the IMO Polar 




Mohamed Daboos, MSc (Marine Engineering), BTech (Marine Engineering) 
 
 
National Centre for Maritime Engineering and Hydrodynamics 




Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy 










Authority of Access 
This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in 
accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
Declaration of Originality 
This thesis contains no material accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other 
institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis. To 
the best of my knowledge and belief, no material previously published or written by another 
person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis 
contain any material that infringes copyright. 





The Antarctic and the Southern Ocean region are well known for environmental fragility and 
harshness, which may pose unprecedented risks to shipping traffic. However, novel and 
innovative technologies continue to prepare vessels better than ever to cope with harsh polar 
conditions. The Antarctic and the Southern Ocean are also coupled with the abundance of 
marine resources and possibilities for economic activity, which has led to considerable 
international attention and the implementation of rules and guidelines in an effort to conserve 
and protect both human life and the polar ecosystem. Most prominent amongst these is the 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, adopted by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), in order to better regulate the operation of vessels within the Antarctic 
region. 
This thesis considers the winterisation process of the MV-Bluefin’s, a research vessel, in the 
context of the vital seawater (SW) cooling system, which transfers waste heat away from the 
operating systems to better assist the vessel in withstanding the harsh climatic conditions. 
Calculated for a grid of two-dimensional weather vectors - SW temperature as the first 
coordinate and air temperature as the second - the MV-Bluefin’s power demand may exceed 
the generators’ available power supply as a direct result of the extreme temperature 
fluctuations. The aforementioned failure probability is added to the vessel’s standard failure 
risk.  
Two models have been developed as part of this thesis for assessing such risk. The first model 
distributes the extreme weather vector according to a truncated bi-normal distribution. The 
power risk is analytically derived as the integration of the probability density function (PDF) 
over the critical region, identified as the weather vector area where the power failure is expected 
to occur. Conversely, the second model divides the vessel’s mission into an arbitrary number 
of segments. Each segment consists of several days with the daily weather vector distributed 
according to a segmented truncated bi-normal distribution. Thus, the power risk is derived 
through a computer simulation of 10,000 pseudo-missions and is only considered successful if 
all weather vectors fall outside the critical region.  
iv 
The power risk is calculated for both models as a function of ambient temperatures. It estimates 
the level of risk according to the specific vessel dynamics, human factors within a confined 
space, and a variety of operational and environmental factors, thus providing an early warning 
for vessel operators and being used to assist in real-time decisions throughout vessel missions. 
In the case of the MV-Bluefin, the simulation observed the probability of the system indicating 
a warning which increased concurrently with the likelihood of the vessel experiencing a power 
risk, thus allowing for appropriate preventative and mitigative measures to be taken.  
v 
Acknowledgements 
Peace be upon you all. I would like to thank the Almighty God for giving me the time and the 
strength and enabling me to complete this work.  
I have had three excellent navigators, Associate Professor Michael Woodward, Professor Kiril 
Tenekedjiev and Dr Christopher Chin, at the Australian Maritime College to help me on this 
collision-free journey. A special thanks to my primary supervisor, Associate Professor Michael 
Woodward, for the opportunity to conduct this research and for all his inspiration, support and 
guidance. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Kiril Tenekedjiev from 
NCMEH for his advice and excellent guidance. I also thank Dr Christopher Chin for working 
with me on every step of my research through his kind support and encouragement.  
Thanks to my colleagues at the AMC, friends and family for invaluable help and support. 
Special thanks to Professor Nataliya Nikolova, Dr Nagi Abdussamie and Dr Al-Amin Baksh 
for several inspiring discussions and suggestions.  
Last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my beloved family, who has 
been supporting and encouraging me all the time.  
The National Centre for Maritime Engineering and Hydrodynamics (NCMEH) of Australian 
Maritime College (AMC) financially supported this research project, and this support is 
gratefully acknowledged. I also thank the Graduate Research at the University of Tasmania for 
their financial and relevant support. 
vi 
Table of Contents 
Declarations ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... v 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ x 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... xii 
Nomenclature .......................................................................................................................... xiii 
Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... xiv 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research Gap.................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 2 
1.4 Aims and Objectives ........................................................................................................ 2 
1.6 Methodology .................................................................................................................... 3 
1.7 Novelty and Contribution ................................................................................................. 6 
Chapter 2: The International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) and the 
Operation of Vessels in Antarctica ............................................................................................ 7 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Search and Rescue Operations in Antarctic Waters ......................................................... 8 
2.3 Overview of Polar Waters ................................................................................................ 9 
2.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 3: A Review of the Accidents Occurring in the Antarctic Region ............................. 14 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 14 
3.2 History of Antarctica Research Vessels ......................................................................... 15 
3.3 Accidents in the Antarctic Region ................................................................................. 19 
3.4 Incidents in Polar Waters from 2007 to 2015 ................................................................ 23 
3.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter 4: The Harsh Environmental Conditions of the Antarctic Region ............................. 25 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 25 
4.2 Background of Winterisation in the Polar Waters ......................................................... 25 
4.3 The International Code for the Safety of Ships Operating in Polar Waters ................... 28 
4.4 Locations, Destinations, and Routes Taken when Visiting Antarctic Regions .............. 29 
vii 
4.5 Environmental Conditions Data Relating to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic Region
 .............................................................................................................................................. 32 
4.6 Salinity and Temperature of Seawater in a Variety of Oceanic Areas ........................... 37 
4.7 Stakeholders and a Definition of Relationships and Dependencies ............................... 39 
4.8 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 41 
Chapter 5: Critique of Polar Code for the Operation of Vessels in the Antarctic ................... 42 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 42 
5.2 Systems affected by the harsh polar environment .......................................................... 43 
5.3 DNV Class Requirements Relating to Polar Vessels ..................................................... 44 
5.4 Statutory Navigation Requirements for Polar Vessels ................................................... 45 
Stability and Subdivision .................................................................................................. 46 
Stability Under Normal Conditions .................................................................................. 47 
Stability Under Dangerous Conditions ............................................................................. 47 
Waterproofing Considerations .......................................................................................... 48 
Safety of Navigation ......................................................................................................... 48 
Passage Plane .................................................................................................................... 48 
Prevention of Pollution ..................................................................................................... 49 
5.5  Recommendations and Checklist for the Winterization of Polar Vessels ..................... 50 
5.6 Technical Details of Seawater Cooling System ............................................................. 50 
Seawater Cooling System Background and Information ................................................. 50 
The Seawater Cooling System .......................................................................................... 51 
5.7 Description of a Seawater Central Cooling System ....................................................... 52 
5.8 Selecting the Methodology for MV-Bluefin Research Vessel the SWCCS .................. 54 
5.9 Identified Weak Points of the MV-Bluefin Vessel Seawater Central Cooling System 
Chest ..................................................................................................................................... 56 
5.10 Overview of the Heat Exchangers for the Cooling Water ........................................... 56 
5.11 Winterization of the SWCS .......................................................................................... 58 
5.12 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 6: MV- Bluefin Research Vessel: A Case Study for Operation in Polar Waters ....... 61 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 61 
6.2 An Overview of the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel ........................................................ 63 
6.3 Recommended Ice Class Notations of the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel ..................... 64 
6.4 System Identification and Critical Equipment List ........................................................ 67 
Machinery Systems .................................................................................................................. 67 
Navigation Equipment ...................................................................................................... 68 
viii 
 
Emergency Response Equipment ..................................................................................... 68 
Manoeuvring and Propulsion............................................................................................ 69 
Steering Gear .................................................................................................................... 69 
6.5 MV-Bluefin’s Main System Specifications ................................................................... 70 
Cooling Seawater System Aboard the MV-Bluefin ......................................................... 70 
Freshwater System ............................................................................................................ 70 
Sewage Pump System ....................................................................................................... 71 
Fire Main Pump (Water on Deck) .................................................................................... 72 
Bilge Pump System .......................................................................................................... 72 
Bilge Pump System Components ..................................................................................... 73 
Fish Handling Room ......................................................................................................... 74 
Seawater Cooling System Modification for MV-Bluefin Winterisation .......................... 74 
Sewage System Modification for MV-Bluefin Winterisation .......................................... 74 
Fuel Oil System ................................................................................................................ 76 
Lubrication of Oil System ................................................................................................ 76 
6.6 Comparison of the MV Bluefin Systems with the Polar Code Methodology and 
Guidelines............................................................................................................................. 77 
6.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 7: Developing the Numerical Risk Analysis Model in the Case of the MV-Bluefin 
Research Vessel ....................................................................................................................... 82 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 82 
7.2 Seawater Cooling System............................................................................................... 82 
7.3 Lubrication Oil System .................................................................................................. 85 
7.4 Fuel Oil System .............................................................................................................. 86 
7.5 Accommodation Insulation and Heat Tracing ............................................................... 87 
7.6 The Development of a Numerical Model in Maintaining an Ambient Internal 
Temperature of 18°C ............................................................................................................ 88 
7.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 89 
Chapter 8: Derivation of the Additional Risk Model and Risk Analysis for the Winterisation 
of the MV-Bluefin ................................................................................................................... 90 
8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 90 
8.2 Power Demand-Supply Model ....................................................................................... 92 
8.3 First Power Risk Model.................................................................................................. 94 
8.4 Second Risk Analysis Model ......................................................................................... 97 
8.5 Third Power Risk Model .............................................................................................. 101 
8.6 Mission power risk against the hypothetical power supply ......................................... 102 
ix 
8.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 104 
Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions................................................................................. 106 
9.1. Summary of Work ....................................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 2......................................................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 3......................................................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 4......................................................................................................................... 107 
Chapter 5......................................................................................................................... 108 
Chapter 6......................................................................................................................... 109 
Chapter 7......................................................................................................................... 110 
Chapter 8......................................................................................................................... 111 
9.2. Discussion and Findings ............................................................................................. 112 
9.3. Future Work ................................................................................................................ 113 
9.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 113 
References .......................................................................................................................... 115 
Appendix A: Power Demand and Supply .............................................................................. 123 
Appendix B: Function and Output for the First Power Risk Model ...................................... 130 
Appendix C: Function and Output for the Second Power Risk Model ................................. 142 
Appendix D: Function and Output for the Third Power Risk Model .................................... 152 
Appendix E: Power Supply Risk Curve ................................................................................ 154 
x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Thesis objectives and associated tasks. ...................................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Maximum extent of the Arctic (left) and Antarctic (right) waters [22]. .................. 10 
Figure 3: Rescue timeframe as a function of human vulnerability in the polar environment [28].
.................................................................................................................................................. 13 
Figure 4: The 1870 icebreaking vessel Pilot [36]. ................................................................... 16 
Figure 5: The Yermak icebreaking vessel [35]. ....................................................................... 16 
Figure 6: The Nimrod is moored in an ice footing  [35]. ......................................................... 17 
Figure 7: Edgeworth David with sleds and a motorised vehicle [37]. ..................................... 17 
Figure 8: First Australian Antarctic expedition led by Sir Douglas Mawson (1882 - 1958) [30].
.................................................................................................................................................. 18 
Figure 9: The research vessel Polarstern [39]. ......................................................................... 18 
Figure 10: New generation icebreaker RSV Nuyina [40]. ....................................................... 19 
Figure 11: The Aurora Australis ran aground in 2016 [29]. .................................................... 20 
Figure 12: The Xue Long collided with an iceberg [41]. ........................................................ 20 
Figure 13: The US coast guard icebreaker [42]. ...................................................................... 21 
Figure 14: Global-scale ship casualties between 2011 and 2018 [44]. .................................... 21 
Figure 15: Different type of vessels lost between 2011 and 2018 [43, 44]. ............................ 22 
Figure 16: Human error related cases between 2011 and 2018 [43, 44]. ................................ 22 
Figure 17: Seasonal and localised air temperature distributions in Southern Ocean areas [69-
78]. ........................................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 18: Average wind speed in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region during the summer 
season [69-78]. ......................................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 19: A cruise liner route originating from Ushuaia in Antarctica regions. .................... 31 
Figure 20: Distribution of mean wave height of areas 103 and 104. ....................................... 34 
Figure 21: Number of vessel trips to the Antarctic region between 2016 and 2019 [85, 86, 88, 
89]. ........................................................................................................................................... 36 
Figure 22: Number of trips across several Antarctic destinations [85-87]. ............................. 36 
Figure 23: Seasonal and locational probability distributions of humidity for summer seasons 
[69-78]...................................................................................................................................... 37 
Figure 24: Surface salinity of the global scale ocean as represented in parts per thousand (ppt).
.................................................................................................................................................. 38 
Figure 25: Mission and routes for cruise vessels. .................................................................... 39 
Figure 26: Major stakeholders. ................................................................................................ 39 
Figure 27: Winterization requirements for vessels operating in Antarctica. ........................... 46 
Figure 28: Seawater Cooling Intake System (SWCIS) diagram [120]. ................................... 51 
Figure 29: FW and SW centralised cooling system. ................................................................ 52 
Figure 30: Centralised seawater cooling system chest [119]. .................................................. 53 
Figure 31: Shell and tube heat exchanger [121]. ..................................................................... 57 
Figure 32: Inner workings of the plate heat exchanger [55]. ................................................... 58 
Figure 33: Principles of the plate heat exchanger [121]. ......................................................... 59 
Figure 34: Winterization systems of polar vessels [125]. ........................................................ 59 
Figure 35: Market share of icebreaker and ice-capable research vessels owned by different 
society [22]............................................................................................................................... 63 
xi 
Figure 36: DNV Class notations that may be used to demonstrate that the risks of Antarctic 
operation have been accounted for and mitigated. ................................................................... 64 
Figure 37: Trade-off between icebreaking and summer re-supply and survey. ...................... 65 
Figure 38: General arrangement of the MV-Bluefin vessel. .................................................... 67 
Figure 39: Measurement of the bridge winds as length, breadth, and size. ............................. 68 
Figure 40: MV-Bluefin plate heat cooling system exchanger [127]. ....................................... 70 
Figure 41: FW hydrophone pump [127]. ................................................................................. 71 
Figure 42: SPS aboard the MV-Bluefin [127]. ........................................................................ 71 
Figure 43: Water on deck aboard the MV-Bluefin [127]. ....................................................... 72 
Figure 44: Bilge Pump System (BPS) aboard the MV-Bluefin [130]. .................................... 73 
Figure 45: Components of the SWCS aboard the MV-Bluefin when preparing for winterisation.
.................................................................................................................................................. 74 
Figure 46: Sewage system modification for the MV-Bluefin. ................................................. 75 
Figure 47:  MV-Bluefin propulsion system [131]. .................................................................. 75 
Figure 48: MV-Bluefin FOS components [33]. ....................................................................... 76 
Figure 49: LOS aboard the MV-Bluefin [132]. ....................................................................... 77 
Figure 50: Relationship between the power demand (W) and the SW temperature of intake 
(ΔT) °C. .................................................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 51: Relationship between the mass flow rate (W) and the SW temperature of intake (ΔT) 
°C. ............................................................................................................................................ 84 
Figure 52: Relationship between the SW temperature at intake (°C) and the power demand of 
the motor (W). .......................................................................................................................... 85 
Figure 53: Relationship between SW temperature at intake (°C) and power demand (W). .... 86 
Figure 54: The relationship between the air temperature at intake (°C) and the power demand 
(W) for the heating of the vessel. ............................................................................................. 87 
Figure 55: Relationship between the heating energy demand (Q; kW) and temperature 
difference (tsw and tair; °C)........................................................................................................ 89 
Figure 56: (a-d) Model risk between the Hypothetical Power Supply (kW) and Mission Power 
Risk (%): (a) with 50 pseudo realities; (b) with 100 pseudo realities; (c) with 1000 pseudo 
realities;  (d) with 10000 pseudo realities .............................................................................. 104 
xii 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Examples of recent fishing vessels and other non-SOLAS ship losses and incidents in 
polar waters [45]. ..................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 2: Information of an early-season mission (November) for itinerary routes with different 
destinations from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula 
and then return in Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. .......................... 32 
Table 3: Information of a mid-season mission (January) for an itinerary route with different 
destinations from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula 
and then return in Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. .......................... 33 
Table 4: Information of the late-season mission (March) for an itinerary route with different 
destinations from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula 
and then return in Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. .......................... 33 
Table 5: Wave height of areas 103 and 104 from December to February. .............................. 34 
Table 6: Scatter diagram for observations of significant wave height and zero-up-crossing 
period for worldwide trade. ...................................................................................................... 35 
Table 7: Salinity and temperature of seawater in various oceanic areas [90, 91]. ................... 37 
Table 8: Stakeholders and a Definition of Relationships and Dependencies. ......................... 40 
Table 9: Major components and equipment affected by the harsh polar environment [115]. . 44 
Table 10: DNV class requirements for the operation of vessels in polar regions [114]. ......... 44 
Table 11: Components of the seawater central cooling system SWCCS, with Codes and 
Descriptions [119]. ................................................................................................................... 53 
Table 12: Conventional MV-Bluefin research vessel SWCCS FMEA [119].......................... 55 
Table 13: Heat exchanger comparison [122]. .......................................................................... 57 
Table 14: Specifications and requirements for the MV Bluefin research vessel [127]. .......... 66 
Table 15: Type of electronic hydraulic with automatic overload control. ............................... 69 
Table 16: Standardised BPS components. ............................................................................... 73 
Table 17: The winterisation methods for MV-Bluefin systems............................................... 77 
Table 18: Potential issues arising on the MV-Bluefin as a result of polar temperatures. ........ 79 
Table 19: Justifications for the assessment of winterisation systems aboard the MV-Bluefin.
.................................................................................................................................................. 80 
Table 20: System properties of the MV-Bluefin research vessel. ........................................... 83 
Table 21: Inputs for the above calculation for motor power demand. ..................................... 83 
Table 22: Inputs for the above calculation for the mass flow rate of coolant. ......................... 83 
Table 23: Calculation inputs for the power demand of the LOS. ............................................ 85 
Table 24: Inputs for the calculation of power requirements of the FOS. ................................ 86 
Table 25: Inputs for the power demand calculation of the heating of the vessel. .................... 87 
Table 26: Relationship between temperatures (°C) to estimate the heating energy requirement.
.................................................................................................................................................. 88 
Table 27: Consumption of energy derived from the generator. ............................................... 91 
Table 28: Constant power used by the consumer. ................................................................... 91 
Table 29: Power used by consumers that depends on the air temperature. ............................. 92 
Table 30: Power used by consumers that depends on the seawater temperature. .................... 92 
xiii 
Nomenclature 
Area Metres Squared [m2] 
Deadweight Tonne [t] 
Different Temperatures ∆TM [
°C] 
Distance  Metres [m] 
Horsepower [hp] 
Mass Flow Rate of Coolant Kilogram per Second [kgs-1] 
Motor Efficiency [ηm] 
Motor Power [W] 
Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient Watts per Square Metre Kelvin [W/(m2K)] 
Power Kilowatt [kW] 
Pump Efficiency [ηp] 
Revolutions per Minute [rpm] 
Salinity Parts per Thousand [t/m] 
Shaft Power [W] 
Speed Knots [kn] 
Specific Heat Capacity Joule per Kilogram Kelvin [J kg-1 K-1] 
xiv 
Abbreviations 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping 
ARV Antarctic Research Vessel 
ATCM Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
ATCP Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party 
ATS Antarctic Treaty System 
BANZARE British, Australian, New Zealand Research Expeditions  
CCAMLR Convention of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
CBM Condition-Based Maintenance 
CP Centrifugal Pump 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency 
FSC Flag State Control 
FW Freshwater system 
IAATO International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators 
IACS International Association of Classification Societies 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
USCGC United States Coast Guard Cutter 
HSC High Sea Chest 
LOS Lubrication Oil System 
LSC Low Sea Chest 
LTFWCL  Low-Temperature Freshwater Cooler  
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MEPC Marine Environment Protection Committee 
MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre 
MSC Maritime Safety Committee 
PoF Probability of Failure 
RCC Rescue Coordination Centres  
SAR Search and Rescue 
SARS Search and Rescue Service 
SCPP Sea Cooling Pump 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
SS Sewage System 
STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
SW Seawater 
SWCCS Seawater Central Cooling System 
SWCCSC Seawater Central Cooling System Chest 
SWCIS Seawater Cooling Intake System 
SWCS Seawater Cooling System 
SWCSM Seawater  Cooling System Modification 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The operation of vessels in and around the Antarctic and Arctic regions has always been a 
matter of concern for the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a result of harsh and 
inhospitable weather conditions, a distinct lack of infrastructure, remoteness and isolation from 
land, darkness and the distinct lack of accurate charts relative to other areas of the globe, as 
well as the challenges presented by communication systems and other navigational aids. The 
aforementioned challenges increase the risks involved in Search and Rescue (SAR) and make 
clean-up operations demanding and expensive. The hostile weather conditions and reduced air 
temperatures have been seen to decrease the effectiveness of a number of vessel components, 
including deck machinery and equipment required in emergency scenarios. The presence of ice 
poses a unique obstacle in that it may impose additional loads on the vessel as a whole, 
especially on the hull and propulsion system. 
Despite the risks, the demand for resources and tourism has presented a unique market for the 
merchant, cruise and offshore vessels to operate in polar regions. Maritime transportation has 
revolutionised inter-continental trade and overseas tourism industries. Regulated by the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) [1] and the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) [2], vessels operating in 
international waterways and the high seas still face a significant threat of accidents and injuries. 
Although several regional and international bodies control shipping operations, there are many 
accidents reported annually, which is valid for vessels operating in the polar and sub-polar 
regions, as they are more prone to accidental loss or emergency due to extreme weather 
conditions. To mitigate such accidents, a number of regulatory authorities have introduced 
guidelines and amendments aimed at shipping practices in certain geographical areas. An 
example of this is the polar code that aims to regulate vessels moving through the ice-covered 
regions of the Arctic and Antarctica. The Arctic council’s annual report identifies shipping 
related accidents and their causes, in addition to a discussion on the prospects of shipping in 
the region and its brief history. 
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1.2 Research Gap 
The research gap identified by this work are: 
1. The number of accidents involving vessels traversing through the Antarctic region is 
not well documented, despite causing human casualties in some cases; the research 
into polar vessel safety is limited. 
2. The harsh environment of the Antarctic region is not yet quantified. 
3. The lack of public-domain data presents a key challenge in compiling a 
comprehensive Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) into polar vessel operations’ 
safety. 
4. Performing a complete QRA study for ship safety and operations in Antarctica 
remains challenging due to a lack of data in the public domain. 
5. Considerable uncertainty still exists when engaging experts in the development of 
QRAs. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions answered by this work are: 
1. How can a rational method of identifying critical vessel systems be developed better 
to understand winterisation requirements and at what level? 
2. How can a power risk model (as proposed in Q1) apply to external and internal factors 
that may affect a polar vessel? 
3. How to identify the crucial systems’ safety performance indicators onboard a polar 
vessel and calculate power failure probability? 
4. What are the implications and limitations of applying the sixth chapter of the polar 
code, namely machinery installations, to vessel systems? 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
This thesis investigates the research questions in Section 1.3 to develop a numerical model that 
may help crew members identify power failure indicators early to avoid casualty in the harsh 
Antarctic environment. This model may also assist in providing recommendations for the level 
of winterisation required for crucial systems by determining the vessel’s ability to cope with 
frigid seawater (SW) and air temperatures. Finally, the findings will be applied to the 
Australian Maritime College’s flagship research and training vessel, the MV-Bluefin, to 
understand better the limitations posed by the inhospitable polar regions. 
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As shown in Figure 1, the flow chart demonstrates the relationship between this thesis’s 
objectives and all the tasks associated with producing this research. 
 
Figure 1: Thesis objectives and associated tasks. 
1.6 Methodology 
This thesis will evaluate the additional risk of winterisation in the Antarctic regions in the form 
of a risk analysis, calculated on a two-dimensional weather vector grid where the first 
coordinate relates to SW temperature. The second relates to ambient air temperature, which is 
The Application of 
IMO’s Polar Code 
to the MV-Bluefin 
Case Study: A 
Methodology 
Understand the most common 
vessel models and their routes 
throughout the Antarctic region. 
✓ Identify the most common routes for vessels to 
take during the three-month summer season, as 
well as the locations visited. 
✓ Distinguish between Antarctic and Arctic polar 
vessels. 
✓ Identify trends across summer seasons. 
✓ Identify distinctive 103 and 104 areas within the 
region. 
✓ Determine the relative salinity of Antarctic 
waters. 
Collect environmental data 
throughout the Southern Ocean 
and Antarctic region. 
Understand the differences in 
maritime accidents and 
casualties. 
✓ Identify trends across summer seasons. 
✓ Differentiate between vessel types and the 
associated accidents. 
✓ Determine whether the harshness of the 
environment was a contributing factor in the 
accident. 
Identify the components of the 
vessel’s systems that may be 
adversely affected by cold 
temperatures and icing 
conditions. 
✓ Identify crucial systems aboard the MV-Bluefin 
research vessel. 
✓ Understand the application of the polar code with 
specific reference to the MV-Bluefin. 
✓ Provide recommendations for the winterisation of 
polar vessels. 
Provide readers with an 
understanding of the 
requirements for winterisation in 
harsh conditions. 
✓ With reference to the MV-Bluefin, identify the 
failure mode and effect analysis methodology and 
the application of the FMEA and associated 
recommendations. 
✓ Identify weak points in the MV-Bluefin’s 
Seawater Central Cooling System Chest 
(SWCCSC). 
• Develop a numerical analysis 
of the MV-Bluefin’s 
winterisation. 
• Provide an analysis of the 
risks posed to the MV-
Bluefin in polar regions. 
✓ Create a two-vectored numerical model for the 
winterisation of the MV-Bluefin, including sea and 
air temperature. 
✓ Calculate the power risk posed to the vessel as a 
function of energy supply. 
Investigate the winterisation of 
the MV-Bluefin and provide a 
justified assessment. 
✓ Determine whether the MV-Bluefin adheres to the 
guidelines set out by the polar code. 
✓ Determine whether the winterisation of the MV-
Bluefin is effective and provide justification. 
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calculated as an addition to the MV-Bluefin’s standard failure risk. The probability of power 
failure is denoted as power risk, which would be modelled using MATLAB. 
 
The first model distributed extreme weather vectors according to a truncated bi-normal 
distribution. The power risk is analytically derived as the integration of the truncated bi-normal 
PDF over the critical region, denoted as the weather vector region where power failure will 
occur. The second model divided the vessel’s route into an arbitrary number of segments, 
where each segment consists of several days with the daily weather vector distributed according 
to a segment truncated bi-normal distribution. The power risk is derived using a computer 
simulation of 10,000 pseudo-missions. A pseudo-mission consists of daily weather vectors 
being randomly generated according to the known specific segment truncated bi-normal 
distributions. The mission is considered a success if all the weather vectors are outside the 
critical region. For both models, the power risk is calculated as a function of the provided 
energy supply. Power risk is calculated of the mission with the same parameters as the one 
described at the end of section 8.4. The Riskmodel3 was 0.3703. The output of the software is 
shown under the function in Appendix D. The power risk for each of the segments is given in 
Appendix D after the function. As evident, the third power risk model results practically 
coincide with those from the second power risk model. However, the function 
Risk_simulate_eval_dist.m. with 10000 pseudo realities calculated the results for 8.37 
seconds, while the Risk_generalized_model.m. calculated the results for 0.074 seconds, 
which is more than 100 times faster. 
 
Using the second and third power models, which can be calculated the mission power risks for 
several different values of the hypothetical power supply. In that way, we can obtain the 
mission power risk as a function of the hypothetical power supply, which is useful to determine 
the investment in a separate mission. 
 
To estimate the probability of power risk, the models consider a wide range of factors, 
including vessel dynamics, operational and environmental factors, and human factors, and is, 
therefore, able to provide an early warning. As such, the proposed methodology may assist in 
real-time decision-making and allow for appropriate preventative measures to enhance the 





Chapter 2 will review the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) [3], 
an organisation founded by private-sector operators to promote ecologically sustainable and 
environmentally responsible tourism in the Antarctic region. This review was done in light of 
the legislation set out by the Antarctica Treaty System (ATS) [4], the IMO and POLAR VIEW 
(which is a chapter of the Polar code) [5-9],  and the International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) [10, 11].    
 
Chapter 3 will review the literature, published statistical data, and reported accidents to 
determine the number of accidents and the type of accidents occurring, the vessel most likely 
to be involved in an accident, as well as any casualties resulting in such accidents.  
 
Chapter 4 will review the operations, routes, and winterisation of a variety of polar vessels in 
the Antarctic region and the frequency and duration of their missions in an effort to assist 
vessels in transit through the harsh Southern Ocean. 
 
Chapter 5 will critique IMO’s polar code, which regulates the operation of vessels in polar 
regions. The two stages considered by this thesis are those that identify the critical components 
that are negatively affected by low temperatures and icing conditions and the subsequent 
drafting and implementation of guidelines and the application of safety functions and 
techniques for both machinery space and auxiliary machinery. 
 
Chapter 6 will provide an overview of the MV-Bluefin’s capacity to transport passengers, 
operate in polar regions, demonstrate the heat tracing and insulation system, preserve or 
increase the pipes’ temperature. This was performed to evaluate the various winterisation 
systems best onboard the vessel and ensure compliance with the polar code. 
 
Chapter 7 will evaluate the power requirements of the MV-Bluefin to safeguard against system 
failure in the face of hostile polar temperatures and identify potentially vulnerable systems. 
This chapter develops an innovative numerical model to classify the effects of harsh 
temperatures on various systems. 
 
Chapter 8 will evaluate the additional risk of winterisation in the Antarctic regions in the form 
of a risk analysis, calculated on a two-dimensional weather vector grid where the first 
coordinate relates to SW temperature. The second coordinate relates to ambient air 
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temperature. It was calculated as an addition to the MV-Bluefin’s standard failure risk; the 
probability of power failure is denoted as power risk, modelled in MATLAB. 
1.7 Novelty and Contribution 
This study includes the following novelties: 
➢ No model has previously been developed to estimate the risk power demand and the 
probability of failure (PoF) for MV-Bluefin research vessel systems winterising in low 
air temperature in the Antarctic. 
➢ No previous model has been able to predict the probability of such power failure, which 
is additional to the standard failure risk of the MV-Bluefin vessel and update the results 
in real-time for ship systems operating in the Antarctic. 
➢ Previously, there was no methodology or techniques that could calculate risk power for 
a grid of two-dimensional weather vectors (first coordinate SW temperature and second 
coordinate air temperature) for winterisation of MV-Bluefin vessel systems to operate 
in the Antarctic regions. 
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Chapter 2: The International Association of Antarctica Tour 
Operators (IAATO) and the Operation of Vessels in Antarctica 
2.1 Introduction 
When considering the risks facing vessels traversing the Antarctic region, weather and 
temperature-related hazards can be named. However, several lesser-known risks exist mostly 
in the form of an increasing number of vessels in the region leading to higher traffic, continental 
shelf creating subsurface hazards, sea-ice cover decline, navigation through previously 
uncharted regions, and the growing presence of tourists.  
  
To mitigate the effects of such risks, the IMO adopted the polar code for marine vessels 
operating in polar waters [6], which entered into force on the first of January 2017. The 
effectiveness of the code was seen when a number of amendments mandated its use under the 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW) [12], as well as under the SOLAS [1]  and MARPOL [13]. 
 
The implementation of the polar code, along with support from POLAR VIEW [5-9], the 
IAATO [3], and the IACS [14] has driven continued support for the work of vessel operators, 
as well as for the development of tools which can assist in implementing the requirements of 
the code effectively, including an ice and temperature database and Risk Index Systems [15]. 
This chapter aims to review IAATO’s regulation of permanent tourist facilities in the Antarctic 
region and legislation set out by the ATS [4]. 
 
The objectives that can be achieved are:  
➢ The identification of ATS legislation which currently regulates all activities conducted 
below 60°S; 
➢ The review of POLAR VIEW, as well as IACS and IAATO; and  
➢ IAATO undertakes the SAR exercise evaluation with the Maritime Rescue Co-
ordination Centre (MRCC) based in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This was conducted to 
mitigate the distinct lack of infrastructure in regions where the polar code is highly 
applicable. 
 
Founded in 1991, the IAATO regulates permanent tourist facilities in the Antarctic region to 
promote safe and environmentally responsible practices in the private sector. Coupled with the 
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legislation set out by the ATS, all regulated activities, including that of tourism operators, 
conducted below 60°S, are prohibited from any military action or other, more obscure 
operations. Furthermore, tourist activities are not prohibited under the Madrid Protocol, as they 
are classified as non-governmental activities. 
 
Developed under IAATO, the original guidelines regarding visitors and tour operators formed 
the basis of Recommendation XVIII-1 of the ATS, which provides guidance for visitors and 
non-governmental tour organisers to the region, and assisted in developing the high standards 
and best practises which aim to protect the fragile Antarctic environment. Furthermore, IAATO 
has been represented at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs)  and presents an 
overview of the annual tourist activities and associated statistics, all of which can be found on 
IAATO’s website. 
2.2 Search and Rescue Operations in Antarctic Waters 
Subsequent to the SAR development, IMO divided the Antarctic region into five distinct 
maritime regions―Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and South Africa―all of which 
are managed through seven Rescue Coordination Centres (RCC) [8, 15]. This aims to promote 
the safety of vessels operating in Antarctic waters regarding all activities being undertaken. As 
a result, safety has played a vital role in the discussions of the ATCM since 1961. While human 
activity in the Antarctic is expected to increase in fishing, national program operations, 
shipping and tourism, so too will the challenges and risks associated with SAR operations in 
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region. As a result,  discussions regarding the SAR facilities, 
procedures, and contingency plans can be improved upon in the Antarctic [8].       
 
In an effort to increase the success and effectiveness of SAR operations in the Southern Ocean 
and Antarctic region, the ATCM adopted Resolution 4 (2013). It was recommended that all 
Antarctic Treaty parties commit to sharing their best SAR practices related to SAR and improve 
their international cooperation in an effort to promote effective implementation of SAR 
protocols that would prove to be beneficial in the context of the Antarctic region. It was further 
recommended that all parties support COMNAP [16].  
 
Operational guidelines for polar vessels dictate that the ship should only be operated within the 
intended weather conditions and all design limitations. These guidelines mentioned also apply 
for all passenger ships operating in polar waters, including tourist’s vessels, as well as taking 
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into account the distance between the vessel and the closest SAR facilities, outlined as part of 
the “Enhanced contingency planning guidance for passenger ships operating in areas remote 
from SAR facilities” (2006, MSC.1/Circ.1184) [8].        
 
The entry into force of the polar code marked a historic milestone in the work of the IMO to 
protect both the seafarers and the passengers aboard marine vessels in the harsh and volatile 
polar environments surrounding Antarctica and the Arctic, respectively, as well as preserving 
the ecosystems themselves [17, 18]. This chapter provides an overview of the code, including 
the requirements and provisions regarding maritime safety and marine environment protection 
and the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCPs) decision to develop guidelines regarding 
Antarctic shipping and related activities.  
 
Despite an ATCP meeting in 2000, where a panel of Antarctic treaty experts was consulted 
[19] on developing and implementing Antarctic guidelines was slow. Improvement was 
eventually made when the 2004 ATCM moved forward with new recommendations for ships 
operating in the Arctic and Antarctic regions’ ice-covered waters and aiming to amend the IMO 
Arctic guidelines with the new guidelines [18]. However, significant changes to the IMO 
guidelines regarding both the Arctic and Antarctic regions occurred between 2008 and 
December 2009 [20], with all amendments entering into force from 1 January 2011 [19]. The 
mandated training and certification for officers and crews serving on polar vessels under the 
STCW have also been described in this chapter. This chapter concludes by examining and 
discussing further measures that could be taken to ensure the safety of polar shipping, taking 
into consideration the ongoing discussions being held at the IMO.  
2.3 Overview of Polar Waters  
The difference between the two poles is illustrated in Figure 2, which can be made in that the 
Arctic, or the North Pole, is a frozen ocean surrounded by continents. Simultaneously, the 
Antarctic, or the South Pole, is a frozen continent surrounded by oceanic waters. Due to the 
harsh climate and weather conditions, both polar regions face extreme isolation from the rest 
of the world, which results in an ecosystem and environment that is vulnerable to external 
influences and susceptible to negative impacts, particularly human activity. As such, the polar 
code aims to ensure that vessels’ operation within the environmental conditions is safe, 
sustainable, and has minimal impact. However, the cruise and tourist industries may benefit 
from the warmer temperatures caused by climate change, where polar waters become less 
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hazardous due to a lack of floating ice packs. Perhaps this part of shipping has been the least 
affected by the last few years’ financial and economic turmoil. 
Only vessels that intend to operate within the Arctic and Antarctic areas defined in the polar 
code must comply [21]: 
➢ Arctic: Generally, north of 60°, and limited by a line from Greenland; South at 58° 
north of Iceland, southern shore of Jan Mayen - Bjørnøya - Cap Kanin Nos. 
➢ Antarctica: South of 60°. The polar code’s safety part applies to ships certified under 
SOLAS, i.e. cargo ships of 500 GT or more and all passenger ships. 
 
 
Figure 2: Maximum extent of the Arctic (left) and Antarctic (right) waters [22]. 
As a result of the Arctic containing vast oil reservoirs and the Antarctic being rich in various 
other resources, rapid growth is expected in several industries, including transit shipping, oil 
and gas industries, and producing oil gas transport by type of ship. However, this expansion in 
production and extraction will result in increased emissions. Unfortunately, the substitute for 
oil as a transportation fuel is difficult to find, and massive gas resources are more climate-
benign than coal. Arctic resources, specifically crude oil, are dispersed unequally throughout 
the region, which is predicted to play a growing role in the global economy. However, rapid 
growth in oil and gas transportation has resulted in increased emissions released into the 
atmosphere [23]. As resource accessibility becomes more effortless, new challenges emerge 
for accident response, polar engineering, extraction and harvesting, SAR, transport [24], and 
planning and prediction difficulties resulting from weather changes and global warming. As a 
result of the aforementioned challenges and high costs associated with hazardous weather 
conditions,  Arctic oil and gas production’s prospects remain unclear [19, 23]. 
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However, Ice-strengthened vessels require that all machinery installations provide 
functionality under hostile environmental conditions and consider loads imposed directly by 
ice interaction. The polar code also dictates that machinery installations and associated 
equipment must be protected against the aforementioned effects. For more details, see chapter 
6 of Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 68/21/Add.1Annex 10. Further 
chapters relating to the risk posed to the environment by vessel operations, as well as the risk 
posed to vessel operations by extreme environmental hazards, will be developed by Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV), including the ban of heavy fuel oil, which has been introduced in the Antarctic 
region [5, 25].       
 
Tourist activities in the form of cruise vessels predominantly occur in the ice-free waters of the 
Arctic summer season, the heaviest traffic occurring around Iceland, the western Greenland 
coast, Northern Norway, and Svalbard. The ice-covered waters of the region are hazardous, 
and as such, the only cruise-like activity that takes place during the winter months is the 
Russian nuclear icebreaker trips between Murmansk and Franz Josef’s Land, which has been 
occurring since the 1990s. 
 
While considered a niche and specialist market, the Arctic cruise industry is fast-growing, with 
big cruise operators undertaking sailing activities to the edge of Greenland and Svalbard ice 
borders [26]. While complete Arctic cruise data is challenging to obtain, indications of future 
development can be seen in Danish and Svalbard data [26], including the construction of 
passenger ship facilities in the Danish seaports of Greenland, leading to a 48.9% increase in 
the number of cruise ship arrivals between 2005 and 2008 [26].     
 
The Arctic sees a variety of vessels in operation in the northern ocean each year, including 
icebreakers which are used to access the extreme north, research vessels that are often 
refurbished to reflect cruise ship comforts, a number of ice-class vessels, ice-strengthened 
vessels, as well as ships with ice capability. Very few purpose-built ice-strengthened cruise 
liners operate in the Arctic; however, a massive number is being used in the Antarctic and the 
Southern Ocean regions. The harsh winter climate in the Arctic drives polar cruise liners to the 
south for the Antarctic summer and vice versa. As a result of the extreme isolation, cruise 
vessels operating in the polar regions act as very much self-contained units, independent of 
land infrastructure. When everything works smoothly, this arrangement suits all stakeholders 
except offers little protection to the cruise ship operators, crew, and passengers in an accident 
or emergency. As a result, coastal states face extreme challenges in providing adequate search 
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and rescue service (SARS) to Arctic cruise activities. The polar code aims to reduce the risks 
above in the Arctic and Antarctic environments. The likelihood of survival in the polar regions 
after an accident or disaster is, according to the polar code, influenced by one of two factors: 
Environmental Exposure – The human body is highly vulnerable to low air and water 
temperatures, exposure to which can result in either  [15]: 
➢ Hypothermia – A reduction in overall core body temperature, as indicated by shivering, 
ultimately results in a loss of cognitive abilities and, in extreme cases, death. 
➢ The freezing of bodily appendages – When experiencing extremely low temperatures, 
frostbite can occur after mere minutes of exposure. As a result of the affected limb’s 
reduced functionality, the probability of survival is again diminished.  
 
Compared to temperate, or even tropical, regions, an individual’s survival time exposed to sub-
zero temperatures is drastically reduced. Several other distinct features are present in the Arctic 
and Antarctic environments, respectively, which represents additional challenges for 
individuals who may need to abandon the ship in case of emergency, including ice and icebergs, 
as well as hostile wildlife. 
 
The IAATO took a SAR exercise with MRCC Argentina in March 2018 and attended the third 
annual for Antarctica /Arctic for the SAR Workshop/tabletop exercise in Iceland in April 2018. 
These initiatives are essential in building relationships, trust and understanding for the SAR 
[3].   
 
Rescue Timeframe – As a result of the lack of infrastructure in the regions where the polar code 
is most applicable, the time taken for SAR to take place is unquestionably long. Most SAR 
operations rely on helicopter evacuation; however, limitations of this method include both the 
highly volatile polar weather and the more critical restricted range and capacity to transport 
survivors. As a result of the limited helicopter range, most polar code areas are inaccessible. In 
helicopter-accessible regions, typically only 10 to 20 persons can be taken aboard at any one 
time [27]. 
 
In case of any marine accidents where the number of casualties is substantial, rescuer access to 
the site is essential. However, the vast distances that the vessels are required to cover coupled 
with relatively low vessel concentrations has resulted in a substantial amount of time necessary 




Figure 3: Rescue timeframe as a function of human vulnerability in the polar environment [28].         
The combination of the factors, as mentioned, presents unique and significant challenges to 
human survival in regions where the polar code is applicable. While considering human 
vulnerability to harsh climates and distances between rescuers and accidents, a significant 
discrepancy exists when comparing the mean number of accidents taking place in polar regions 
and more temperate parts of the world, resulting in a significant forecast lessening survival 
time. This can be prevented in part by polar vessels being self-sufficient, where lifesaving 
equipment, personal and group protective equipment, and appliances are carried onboard, 
thereby providing adequate protection. This applies to all marine ships operating in polar 
waters, including rescue craft [27]. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has concluded that the regulation of tourist activities in the Antarctic region below 
60°S occurs in a number of different ways and through several other bodies, including the 
IAATO, the Antarctic Treaty itself, the Protocol on Environmental Protection (Madrid 
Protocol), which forms part of the ATS, as well as POLAR VIEW (which is a chapter of the 
Polar code). Furthermore, DNV aims to develop environmental sections supplemental to the 
polar code, which would ban the use of heavy fuel oil [5, 25]. The inter-governmental and 
inter-agency management of polar regions presents a unique challenge, and SAR exercises and 
related initiatives are essential in building relationships, trust and understanding. 
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Chapter 3: A Review of the Accidents Occurring in the Antarctic 
Region 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the steam engine’s advent and the invention of various new materials and 
manufacturing processes, vessels were able to voyage further afield than ever before, ultimately 
revolutionising the shipbuilding and shipping world. The icebreaker was a further innovation, 
allowing travel into more hostile climates and ultimately culminating in the Antarctic research 
vessels (ARVs). 
 
This chapter aims to review the number of accidents of vessels visiting the Antarctica areas 
based on literature review, statistic data published, and accidents reported. The objective is to 
identify the most accidental ship types visiting this area and ship casualties caused by the 
Antarctica area’s harsh environment and provide recommendations for good practice when 
applying the polar code to ships operating in Antarctic waters.  
These objectives can be achieved through: 
➢ A review of both the type of vessel involved and the nature of the accident in Antarctic 
waters, including collapse, explosion, foundering or sinking. 
➢ The evaluation of the historical frequency of such accident events; and 
➢ An identification of any vessels which may have been lost as a result of the accident. 
 
Australian scientific organisations are highly regarded worldwide, conducting more than 800 
international scientific activities, many within Australia’s borders, accounting for the top 1% 
of global scientific institutions researching 13 out of 22 research domains. Several 
organisations have been established as a result of Australia’s scientific activity, including the 
Australian Antarctic Division, the Australian Astronomical Observatory, the Australian 
Institute of Marine Science, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the 
Bureau of Metrology, Geoscience Australia, and the National Measurement Institute [29]. 
Australia strives to discover and explore areas of scientific knowledge currently unknown to 
researchers, a legacy that is continued with the work of the Australian Antarctic Division. 
Hobart’s emergence as the gateway to Antarctica is due to Australia being well-positioned for 
missions to the Antarctic region, as the Australian continent is adjacent to the Antarctic and 




The Australian Antarctic Division provides opportunities to nearly all aspects of science and 
ingenuity [30]. Since its conception in 1947, the Australian National Antarctic Research 
Expeditions, a subdivision of the Australian Antarctic Division, has deployed a number of 
ARVs, either purpose-built or redesigned and modified vessels. Ensuring that a vessel meets 
the specifications of scientific research and being equipped for a variety of other activities 
requires that a number of procedures are put in place regarding both the crew and passengers 
to ensure everyone’s safety. This can be seen in the requirements for vessels operating in harsh 
air temperature areas for long periods to be constructed from either steel or other approved 
ductile material due to the variety of stresses and strain factors that occur at lower temperatures. 
This class would have been put together with all the experiences from previous ships travelling 
to the polar regions generating a better understanding of how the ship’s material works better 
in the known environment.  
 
Over time, polar vessels have seen an exponential increase in equipment and system 
innovation; examples include the novel seawater cooling system, which plays the vital role of 
transferring heat away from the operating system. Innovation is limited in polar environments 
due to the presence of ice and low temperatures, thereby affecting the operation of the vessel’s 
systems. This is particularly rampant in vessels navigating between warm and polar climates. 
3.2 History of Antarctica Research Vessels 
Significantly different in design from other vessels, icebreakers are used to transverse ice-
covered waters at temperatures less than -2°C in the Antarctic and Arctic regions. Icebreakers 
are constructed with a thicker material or hull in order to withstand the impact of the floating 
ice rafts, so it can crush the ice directly in its path, as well as push the shards out of the way of 
the vessel to overcome any damage to the vessel’s propellers and rudders. The earliest use of 
icebreakers is thought to be in the 11th century [31]. However, it was not until the advent of the 
steam engine in the 16th century that the vessels were able to plough into the ice with a fixed 
pitch and a screw-type propeller. Before steam, exploratory ships were not powerful or durable 
enough to crush through floating sea ice. This limitation was mitigated by an open water hull 
shape with sloping bows, creating enough vertical force to break the ice without restricting 
movement [32].       
 
Early icebreaking vessels were constructed with wood reinforced by steel beams to strengthen 
the bows and stern. Heavy steel sheeting was also used to line the vessel to protect the relatively 
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vulnerable timber hull. Modern-day polar vessels are constructed from steel though it requires 
specifically designed reinforced stiffening, which allows the ship to plough through the ice 
without being crippled under the engines’ force [33]. As a result of global warming, the ice is 
also not as thick compared to 100 years ago, making it easier for icebreaking vessels to 
transverse polar regions [34].  
 
Scientific readings and observations in meteorological and biological studies were previously 
undertaken through cracks in the Antarctic region’s ice. The 1870 Pilot icebreaking vessel was 
the first to attract attention and was vital in communicating between Kronstadt and St. 
Petersburg (Figure 4). The Yermak has constructed under naval commander Makarov’s 
supervision and moved to 81⁰21’N north of Spitsbergen in 1899. As shown in Figure 5, this 
was later exceeded when the Yermak moved to 83⁰06’N north nearly 40 years after 
construction [35].  
 
Figure 4: The 1870 icebreaking vessel Pilot [36].  
 
 
Figure 5: The Yermak icebreaking vessel [35].        
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The first expedition to Antarctica was led by Ernest Shackleton in 1901, who unfortunately fell 
ill with scurvy, and the voyage was aborted earlier than expected. Shackleton led a second 
expedition in 1907 on the vessel Nimrod. The crew set sail for New Zealand to gather supplies 
before commencing the isolated and arduous voyage to the Antarctic. However, the Nimrod 
was not an ideal vessel; it was chosen to fit within the voyage budget. During the voyage, the 
Nimrod came into contact with pack ice. To save coal, the Koonya was used to tow the Nimrod 
for a proportion of the voyage, illustrated in Figure 6 [35]. In the same year, Edgeworth David 
led an Antarctic party travelling 1260 miles with sleds and a motorised vehicle, as shown in 
Figure 7. They reached the southern magnetic pole on January 15, 1909 [35]. 
 
Figure 6: The Nimrod is moored in an ice footing  [35].        
 
Figure 7: Edgeworth David with sleds and a motorised vehicle [37]. 
Sir Douglas Mawson (Figure 8) led the first Australian Antarctic Expedition between 1911 and 
1914. Mawson had been a part of the Nimrod expedition of 1907 and intended to undertake 
scientific research on behalf of the British government. This provided the momentum for the 
collaboration between the British, Australian and New Zealand governments to undertake 
exploratory voyages in the Commonwealth’s name. Collectively known as the British, 
Australian, New Zealand Research Expeditions (BANZARE), Mawson laid the foundation for 





Figure 8: First Australian Antarctic expedition led by Sir Douglas Mawson (1882 - 1958) [30].        
The first icebreaker was explicitly designed for scientific research expeditions in the polar code 
regions. The research vessel Polarstern (Figure 9) was first commissioned in 1982 [39] and 
conducted almost 300 expeditions between Arctic and Antarctic regions allocated for working 
in the polar area. Polarstern is still one of the most sophisticated polar research and supply 
vessels global scale, even though it has been operated in the polar area for over 35 years [37]. 
Besides, the other research vessel Healy accommodating a maximum of 50 researchers, was 
commissioned in the US in 1998, which set a precedent for specifically commissioning 
research vessels with icebreaking capacity, ultimately leading to the modern Australian 
icebreaker, the Nuyina [40].  
 
Figure 9: The research vessel Polarstern [39].     
The Australian research vessels with the ANARE banner survey the Antarctic coastline, 
resupply Antarctic continental and sub-Antarctic stations, oceanography, and marine science. 
This is administered through the department of agriculture as the main push for marine science 
in the Antarctic. The challenges associated with research and resupply have been mitigated by 
recent technological advancement and better ship design for the Antarctic conditions. Since 
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1947, about fifteen ARVs have been deployed to serve with the Canadian built HMALST 3501. 
The Aurora Australis, the flagship Australian Antarctic vessel, was launched in 1989 and is 
still in operation. The Nuyina [40] is part of the new generation of icebreakers demonstrated in 
Figure 10, which will further strengthen Australia’s Antarctic capabilities [39]. Additionally, 
it will form part of the most significant investment in the Australian Antarctic Division to the 
tune of $1.9-billion and would allow Australians to conduct research within highly volatile 
weather areas, as well as enable passage through the sea ice problem, and ensuring that all 
persons aboard will survive the coldest Antarctic sea desserts for extended time periods. The 
Nuyina stands apart from other icebreakers as a result of its 
… greater icebreaking and cargo capacity, increased endurance and operational 
flexibility, a high standard of environmental performance, and state-of-the-art 
research, rescue and resupply capabilities [40].      
 
 
Figure 10: New generation icebreaker RSV Nuyina [40].       
3.3 Accidents in the Antarctic Region 
Similar to an oil tanker, a bulk carrier, or even a cargo carrier, icebreakers are explicitly 
designed for the task of navigating the icy waters of polar regions. However, this does not make 
the icebreaker immune to the challenges, accidents, and hazards faced by the general shipping 
industry. The challenges can be split into three categories: weather, geographical, and 
technological. The aforementioned weather hazards exist in the form of strong storms, such as 
squalls, typhoons, hurricanes, and tsunamis. The Aurora Australis (Figure 11) ran aground in 
2016 when she experienced extreme wind gusts of 130 km/hr. As a result, she broke free from 





Figure 11: The Aurora Australis ran aground in 2016 [29].       
Geographical hazards can acquire any structure that sits above the water or submerged in 
shallow enough water that the ship may interact with, including reefs or sandbars. This may 
also include weather hazards, with most incidents generally occurring due to a combination of 
hazards. Under heavy fog conditions in 2019, the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long collided with 
an iceberg travelling at 5.5 miles per hour, damaging the hull and inundating the deck with 250 
metric tonnes of ice accumulated (Figure 12). The vessel and her passengers were otherwise 
fine and were eventually rescued. 
 
Figure 12: The Xue Long collided with an iceberg [41].        
Technological hazards can occur when the onboard equipment, such as the engine, fails. The 
US Coast Guard icebreaker experienced technical issues in 2011 when the engine failed and 
flooded due to an electrical system error (Figure 13). This refit cost the government $62 million 




Figure 13: The US coast guard icebreaker [42].      
Only a small number of vessels sail in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region due to the 
presence of unique hazards in the Antarctic. As discussed earlier, most ships are incapable of 
travelling into the region without specialised equipment and costly insurance. Without the 
assistance of icebreakers, traditional vessels sail through such water. In 2019, the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) reported 23,073 casualties [43], including all victims of polar 
accidents, as well as ranging from low rated casualties to high rated casualties [43, 44]. As 
demonstrated in Figure 14, about 68.5% of shipping incidents occur globally scale due to 
human error, and 20% can be accounted for by system and equipment failure. It is difficult and 
costly to avoid technological incidents with regular maintenance and continually upgrading 
gear and equipment. The number of incidents is minimal in the context of the global scale of 
shipping, as shown in Figure 14. It shows the number of ship casualties from 2011 to 2018. 
There was a significant increase in the number of human action, about 2600 causes of most 
ship casualties [44]. The system equipment failure had 950 ship casualties, and other vessel 
had 500 ship casualties; however, the lowest of ship casualties had 300 between the year 2011 
and 2018 [43]. 
 
Figure 14: Global-scale ship casualties between 2011 and 2018 [44].    
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Figure 15 shows the number of accidents in Antarctica from 2011 to 2018. There is an increase 
in the number of fishing vessels lost, which is about 125. The majority of vessels lost at sea are 
fishing vessels, which generally require a small crew. However, the number of lost cargo vessel 
is about 39, and other types of vessels lost is about 37 in the Antarctic regions. 
 
Figure 15: Different type of vessels lost between 2011 and 2018 [43, 44].  
Figure 16 shows the most forms of error caused by weak social and safety awareness. Most 
crew members are not aware of their environment and surroundings, which has been the most 
significant liability. It is also vital that crews and staff should practise good ethics. As shown 
that human error can be prevented through proper training of crew and staff members; however, 
this does not prevent all incidents. Working crew and staff onboard polar vessels spend a long 
period of time at sea, a job that can be straining on both the individual and their families on 
shore.  
 
Figure 16: Human error related cases between 2011 and 2018 [43, 44].  
Icebreakers belong to the title of other categories. The Australian icebreaker Nuyina fits under 
the title of all categories as she carries her trawling equipment, stores cargo for the supply of 
Antarctic research bases, and carries many passengers and acts as a service ship. As a result, 
the Nuyina may pose a higher risk of a casualty due to a wide range of activities being carried 
out both internally and externally. While most icebreakers operate in a number of capacities, 
each ship’s capabilities differ from one to another. In the case of an icebreaker, the best way to 
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mitigate casualties in an emergency or accident is to learn from past events and apply the most 
current and appropriate knowledge and expertise to prevent further casualties in the future. 
3.4 Incidents in Polar Waters from 2007 to 2015 
Table 1 shows some examples of recent fishing vessel incidents and other non-SOLAS ship losses 
and incidents in polar waters [45]. 
Table 1: Examples of recent fishing vessels and other non-SOLAS ship losses and incidents in polar 
waters [45]. 
Vessel and flag Incident, location, and date Further information available 
Argos Georgia, UK  
(fishing vessel)  
Loss of power in the Ross Sea, Dec. 2007; spare 
parts airdropped to vessel.  
ATCM XXXI IP52: Report of Main 
Engine Failure of FV Argos Georgia in 
the Ross Sea on 24 December 2007. 
Submitted by the United Kingdom. 
In Sung 22, Republic of 
Korea (fishing vessel)  
Fire onboard, Scotia Sea; SAR involved, June 
2009.  
 
CCAMLR XXVIII 30: Fire on Board 
The In Sung 22 in CCAMLR Statistical 
Subarea 48.3. Submitted by the United 
Kingdom.  
Insung No 1, Republic 
of Korea (fishing 
vessel)  
Sank with loss of 21 lives; fuel oil sank with ship 
north of Ross Sea; SAR involved, Dec. 2010.  
CCAMLR XXX BG 34: Follow-up 
Information Regarding the Capsizal 
Incident of the Insung No.1. Submitted 
by Korea.  
Berserk, Norway  
(yacht)  
Lost, presumed sunk with three fatalities in the 
Ross Sea; would have carried some oil; SAR 
involved, Feb. 2011.  
 
ATCM XXXIV IP18: The Berserk 
Incident, Ross Sea, February 2011. 
Submitted by New Zealand, Norway and 
the United States.  
ATCM XXXIV IP75: The Legal Aspects 
of the Berserk Expedition. Submitted by 
Norway.  
Sparta, Russia (fishing 
vessel)  
Holed in ice, Ross Sea, Antarctica; SAR 
involved, Dec. 2011.  
 
ATCM XXXV WP 49: ATCM Response 
to CCAMLR Fishing Incidents. 
Submitted by New Zealand.  
ATCM XXXV IP 17: SAR Incidents in 
the 2011/12 Season: FV SPARTA and 
FV JEONG WOO. Submitted by New 
Zealand.  
Jeong Woo 2, Republic 
of Korea (fishing 
vessel)  
Fire, loss of three lives; presumed sunk with fuel 
oil, though possibly consumed by fire in the Ross 
Sea, Antarctica; SAR involved, January 2012.  
 
ATCM XXXV WP 49: ATCM Response 
to CCAMLR Fishing Incidents. 
Submitted by New Zealand.  
ATCM XXXV IP 17: SAR Incidents in 
the 2011/12 Season: FV SPARTA and 
FV JEONG WOO. Submitted by New 
Zealand.  
Brazilian oil barge, 
Brazil (oil barge)  
Capsized and sank with 10,000 litres of diesel on 
board, South Shetland Islands, Feb. 2012; the 
barge was later recovered intact.  
 
ATCM XXXV IP65: Comandante Ferraz 
Station: Oil Barge Incident. Submitted 
by Brazil.  
 
Endless Sea, Brazil  
(motorised yacht)  
Beset in ice and sank at King George Island, 
South Shetland Islands in April 2012 while 
carrying around 8,000 litres of fuel; SAR 
involved.  
 
ATCM XXXV IP64: Brazilian Yacht 
Accident. Submitted by Brazil.  
 
Kaixin, China (fishing 
vessel)  
Caught fire and sank, in the Scotia Sea, in April 
2013; fuel oil possibly all consumed by fire; SAR 
involved. The casualty investigation report in 
IMO’s GISIS system refers to faulty wiring as the 
cause of the fire. 
CCAMLR XXXII/BG/10: Summary 
report on the fire incident of the fishing 
vessel Kaixin. Submitted by the People’s 
Republic of China.  
 
Polonus, Poland  
(sailing yacht)  
Sailing yacht was stranded in bad weather on 
King George Island, near a protected area 
(Antarctic Peninsula). All crew rescued and all 
fuel removed. December 2014.  
ATCM XXXVIII_bp009 Polish Sailing 
Yacht Accident at King George Island 
(Antarctic Peninsula). Background paper 
submitted by Poland.  
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Antarctic Chieftain,  
Australia (fishing 
vessel)  
Trapped in pack ice consisting of thick multi-year 
ice. Ice had contacted the propeller, resulting in 
damage to three of four blades that had no 
immediate threat to life’s safety. A two-stage 
rescue was required – the nearest ice breaker was 
430nm away. United States Coast Guard Cutter 
(USCGC) Polar Star arrived on the scene 3 days 
after the fishing vessel became trapped and 
commenced breaking the ice pack, following 
which the fishing vessel was towed/escorted clear 
of the ice. Stage 2 – fishing vessel escorted back 
to port in New Zealand, arriving 20 days after 
becoming trapped. February 2015.  
ATCM38_ip051_e SAR Incident: 
Antarctic Chieftain (2015) at 
Christchurch in New Zealand area. 




The unique challenges presented by the polar regions require highly specialised equipment, 
experienced and knowledgeable crew members, and expensive and comprehensive insurance. 
Despite taking all precautions, the harsh environment presents an almost insurmountable 
hazard resulting in a vast number of accidents, with 68.5% global scale occurring due to human 
error or direct human action and 20% occurring as a result of system or equipment failure. 
Human error may be compounded onboard on an icebreaker such as the RSV Nuyinya with a 
wide range of activities. Such type of vessel participates in several internal and external 
missions, thus increasing the risk of an accident. In order to mitigate the risk, additional training 
is required to staff members and crew to reduce human error. 
25 
 
Chapter 4: The Harsh Environmental Conditions of the Antarctic 
Region 
4.1 Introduction 
Best known for its plethora of both living and mineral resources, the Antarctic region's 
harvesting and exploitation operations face considerable challenges and safety risks. In order 
to mitigate these environmental challenges, additional design and operational arrangements are 
required to reduce disruptions and potential hazards. When comparing Antarctic systems to the 
same system operating in a more temperate or tropical region, it can be seen that conditions 
such as extreme weather and remoteness [46] negatively affects the mental attitude and work 
efficiency of the personnel, thereby labelling human error as a contributing factor to accidents 
and emergencies [47]. Risk factors unique to the Antarctic environment make resilience 
assessments a higher priority than risk assessments [47]. 
 
This chapter aims to review the type and frequency of vessels visiting the Antarctica areas, 
their routes, operations, and the winterisation of different Antarctica vessels. The objective is 
to identify the most common ship types which are visiting this area with their missions and 
assisting them in the harsh environment of the Antarctica area. 
 
These objectives can be achieved through: 
➢ A review into the most common routes taken by vessels throughout the region, as well 
as differentiating between destinations across three summer seasons, with the most 
common destinations including the Antarctic Peninsula, the Ross Sea, South George, 
the Weddell Sea, and the Southern Ocean; 
➢ The survey of vessel types travelling throughout the region between 2016 and 2019; 
➢ The analysis of statistical data collected during the 2016 summer season regarding 
vessel accidents and casualties in the Southern Ocean; 
➢ The identification of accident trends within the Southern Ocean, specifically within the 
predefined areas 103 and 104 respectively; 
➢ The identification of key stakeholders, and the subsequent mapping of relationships and 
dependencies in the Antarctic region; and 
4.2 Background of Winterisation in the Polar Waters 
The IMO has adopted the international code for ships operating in polar waters (polar code) 
[6], as well as all related amendments, thus making its enforcement mandatory under the 
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SOLAS [48, 49], as well as the MARPOL. After entering into force in 2017, the polar code 
marked a historic milestone in protecting vessels operating in polar waters and all passengers 
and crew aboard. Adopted at the November 2014 session of IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC) [50], the polar code and SOLAS provisions were further amended as part of the 68th 
session of the MEPC in May of 2015 [51]. 
 
In order to protect the Antarctic and Arctic regions and keep safe,  several risk-based 
approaches for the polar code regions [52] were developed by IMO and available to-date, 
including the 2002 and 2010 voluntary guidelines. These guidelines also include existing 
treaties regarding safety, and environmental protection, such as the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea or (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL), 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. 
 
The shipping regulation framework developed by IMO maps the transition from authoritarian 
to development approaches. The polar code was initially developed to cover all manner of 
considerations regarding vessels’ operation in polar waters, including construction, design, 
environmental protection, equipment, operation, training, and SAR; however, it wasn’t 
included vessels entitled to sovereign immunity, fishing crafts, and weighs less than 500GT. 
While several environmental protections are currently in place in the Antarctic region, many 
are not yet in practice for the northern Arctic region. For example, a 2010 protective measure 
adopted by the MEPC restricts the use and pollution of heavy grade oils in the Antarctic region, 
though it does not apply to pollution in the Arctic [51].  
 
The IMO workshop on the environmental aspects of the polar code was held in Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, in September 2011 as part of the ongoing international workshop on shipping 
safety in polar regions. All reports and presentations related to the workshop can be found on 
the IMO’s website. The MSC [53] released a 2012 report which detailed all work and 
advancement on the polar code. The MSC decided, as of 2012, to “keep any decision on 
environmental requirements to be included in the code in abeyance, pending further 
consideration at DE 57 [54]”. The MSC finally approved the polar code in November 2014; 
however, it only came into effect in 2017 and 2018 for new and existing ships, respectively 
[55]. The first ship to be certified as part of the code was the Russian shuttle tanker, the 
Shturman Albanov, in December of 2016. Many industry bodies and environmental groups 
regarded the code as being “too weak” and “diluted” due to the pollution requirements being 
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particularly lax, allowing ships to dispose of waste overboard so long as the vessel remains 12 
miles from the Arctic ice. The structural requirements were also thought to be incredibly 
lenient, as vessels making passage through the Arctic were not required to be ice-classed. 
Polar certification does not require a separate physical survey, and the polar code allows this 
to be simply sent ahead. Furthermore, the code does not address several vessels fitting certain 
specifications, such as those less than 500GT, and not mentioning emissions and air pollution. 
While the polar code does list recommendations regarding ballast water management and anti-
fouling paint, the choice of whether or not to comply is left to the vessel operators rather than 
an independent party. 
 
To resolve the lack of regulation in the Arctic, the IMO developed and implemented guidelines 
in 2002, which only apply to vessels in the region [55]. These guidelines were expanded in 
2004 after a request from the ATCP [56]. The significance of mandating certain guidelines was 
seen while the IMO attempted to expand their reach to Antarctic waters [53], in that sinking of 
the M/V Explorer in the Antarctic waters [57] and the sinking of the M/S Explorer in the Arctic 
waters [58] may have been prevented. As a result of the accident, the MSC instructed the 
development of mandatory regulations for those vessels operating in both polar regions [55]. 
This concluded with the establishment of the “International Code of Safety for Ships Operating 
in Polar Waters” in February 2010 by the DE sub-committee, as well as an inter-sessional 
correspondence group [54, 59].    
 
To better ensure the safety of polar vessels, the polar code addresses issues related to 
construction, design, equipment, maintenance, and operations as well as environmental 
protection in the form of guidelines regarding the controlled use of oil, invasive species, 
sewage, garbage and chemicals [60]. As dictated by chapter 6 of the polar code manual, 
machinery installations require the specific application of the guidelines. This can be seen in 
all machinery installations that must prove to be functional under a wide range of anticipated 
environmental conditions, including ice and snow accretion or accumulation, ice and snow 
ingestion from seawater, the increased viscosity of liquids as a result of various freezing stages, 
and the temperature of seawater intake. The functionality of all machinery in hostile 
environments includes the cold and dense inlet air, as well as any loss of performance regarding 
an installed battery or other energy storage device. The polar code further states that the 
materials used are required to be suitable for operation at the ship’s polar service temperature 
(PST). All these requirements and guidelines, however, unable to stave off an accident as 
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illustrated by the CLIA report to IMO, which concluded that a range of factors might be 
involved in an accident or emergency, including poor weather conditions, poor charting, 
impediment of vision in the case of darkness or fog, equipment failure, and human error [60]. 
 
Ice-strengthened vessels require that all machinery installations must provide functionality 
under hostile environmental conditions and consider loads imposed directly by ice interaction. 
The polar code also dictates that machinery installations and associated equipment must be 
protected against the aforementioned effects. For more details, see chapter 6 of MEPC 
68/21/Add.1Annex 10. Further chapters relating to the risk posed to the environment by vessel 
operations and the risk posed to vessel operations by extreme environmental hazards would be 
developed by DNV, including the ban of heavy fuel oil, which has been introduced in the 
Antarctic region [60]. 
4.3 The International Code for the Safety of Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
The operation of vessels in and around the Antarctic and Arctic regions have always been a 
matter of concern for the IMO, as a result of harsh and inhospitable weather conditions, a 
distinct lack of infrastructure, remoteness and isolation from land, darkness and the distinct 
lack of accurate charts relative to other areas of the globe, as well as the challenges presented 
by communication systems and other navigational aids [61]. The aforementioned challenges 
increase SAR risks [62, 63] and make clean-up operations demanding and expensive. The 
hostile weather conditions and reduced air temperatures have been seen to decrease the 
effectiveness of a number of vessel components, including deck machinery and equipment 
required in emergency scenarios. The presence of ice presents a unique obstacle in that it may 
impose additional loads on the vessel as a whole, especially on the hull and propulsion system. 
 
Despite the risks, the demand for resources and tourism has presented a unique market for the 
merchant, cruise and offshore vessels to operate in polar regions. Maritime transportation has 
revolutionised inter-continental trade and overseas tourism industries [64]. Regulated by  
SOLAS and the MARPOL, vessels operating in international waterways and the high seas [65] 
still face a significant threat of accidents and injuries. While several regional and international 
bodies control shipping operations, there are many accidents reported annually. This is 
especially true for vessels operating in the polar and sub-polar regions, as they are more prone 
to accidental loss or emergency due to extreme weather conditions. To mitigate such accidents, 
a number of regulatory authorities have introduced guidelines and amendments aimed at 
shipping practice in certain geographical areas [26, 65]. For instance, the polar code aims to 
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regulate vessels moving through the ice-covered regions of the Arctic and Antarctica [27, 65]. 
The Arctic council’s report [17] identifies shipping related accidents and their causes, in 
addition to a discussion on the prospects of shipping in this region and its brief history. 
Winterisation guidelines have identified that vessel systems have been negatively affected 
through general operation in harsh environments. Therefore, it has been suggested operation 
by different sources to identify interface systems and sub-systems that may be influenced by 
the winterisation process [6, 66], such as the following: 
➢ RMRS’ (Russian Classification Society) Requirements for Ship Equipment to Ensure 
Long-term Operation at Low Temperature; 
➢ DNV’s (Norwegian Classification Society) Ice Class Rules– Sections 5,6 and 7, 
Winterization and Design Ambient Temperature (DAT); 
➢ ISO 19906: Petroleum and natural gas industries—Arctic offshore structures 
(International Arctic Offshore Structures Standard); and 
➢ IMO’s Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar waters.  
 
The above-published works focus primarily on establishing the requirements for winterisation 
associated with shipping operations in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, allowing for the review 
of a vessel’s compliance with the guidelines to avoid or mitigate the problems listed. The 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the Norwegian Classification Society (DNV) have 
provided guidance for vessels operating in low-temperature environments [6, 67]. Several 
shipping industries operate within the Northern Arctic region, including bulk carriers, general 
cargo operations, offshore oil and gas extraction, oil tankers, and LNG carriers that can be 
operated in various environmental conditions. Kum and Sahin [68] have analysed the causes 
of Arctic marine transportation accidents, which includes poor weather conditions, lack of 
communication and navigational aid, sub-zero temperatures coupled with some root causes for 
the collision or grounding of vessels, machinery failure as well as fires or explosion. 
4.4 Locations, Destinations, and Routes Taken when Visiting Antarctic 
Regions 
A number of vessels outside of transportation industries operate within the Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean region, including cruise liners, research vessels, and numerous species-
specific fishing vessels. For the purpose of this thesis, missions originating from Ushuaia 
before making the journey through the Falkland Islands and the Georgia Islands and arriving 
at the Antarctic Peninsula and heading back to Ushuaia will be analysed as part of the case 
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study [69-78]. In Figure 17, the average air temperatures during November, January and March 
in the annual summer season is represented as a function of the environmental conditions across 
six Antarctic destinations, which is distributed both seasonally and locally in the Southern 
Ocean based on weather reports collected between 1985 and 2015 [69-78]. From Figure 17, it 
is clear that the average air temperature in January is higher than both November and March in 
Falklands-Malvinas. Furthermore, while most temperatures were recorded as positive, 
however, in the Antarctica Peninsula, both November and March recorded negative average 
air temperatures, -2.5°C and 1.5°C, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 17: Seasonal and localised air temperature distributions in Southern Ocean areas [69-78]. 
 
Figure 18 shows the average wind speed across the six destinations during the annual summer 
season, considering seasonal and locational distributions based on weather reports collected 
between 1985 and 2015 [69-78]. It can be seen that the Falklands region experienced greater 
wind speeds across all three months―an approximate increase in wind speeds of 32% in 
Falklands-Malvinas and also in November, a 28% increase e in wind speeds in January, and a 
27% increase in March in wind speeds at the same destination―while South Georgia 
destination experienced slower wind speeds in November based on weather reports collected 




Figure 18: Average wind speed in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region during the summer season 
[69-78]. 
Figure 19 demonstrates the route taken by the majority of cruise ships, with missions 
originating from Ushuaia before making the journey through the Falkland Islands and the 
Georgia Islands, arriving at the Antarctic Peninsula and then heading back to Ushuaia which 
will be analysed as part of the case study. It also demonstrates the most frequent route 
undertaken by cruise vessel when visiting the Antarctic region, travelling to four destinations 
denoted by numbers one through four. Table 2-4 in the next section would demonstrate 
environmental conditions data collected during such trips as described above. 
 
 
Figure 19: A cruise liner route originating from Ushuaia in Antarctica regions.  
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4.5 Environmental Conditions Data Relating to the Southern Ocean and 
Antarctic Region 
This thesis aimed to identify the harsh environmental conditions that may affect vessels 
operation in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region, including cruise liners, research vessels, 
and numerous species-specific fishing vessels. In the following section, Table 2-4 has provided 
environmental conditions encountered by vessels based on weather reports collected between 
1985 and 2015 [69-78]. Thus, the specific conditions relating to unique missions may be 
identified. 
Table 2: Information of an early-season mission (November) for itinerary routes with different 
destinations from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula and then 
return in Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. 
Activities Days 
spent 
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Table 3: Information of a mid-season mission (January) for an itinerary route with different destinations 
from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula and then return in 
Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. 
Activities Days 
spent 
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Table 4: Information of the late-season mission (March) for an itinerary route with different destinations 
from Ushuaia to Falklands-Malvinas to South Georgia to the Antarctic Peninsula and then return in 
Ushuaia, including the environmental season conditions. 
Activities Days 
spent 
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Figure 20 illustrates a bar graph that depicts the probability distribution, P(H) of mean wave 
height H (m) during summertime from December to February in the Southern Ocean. Table 5 
represents the wave height of areas 103 and 104 from December to February. The data source 
of significant wave height, Hs (m) and Zero cross wave period, Tz (s), is derived from the sea 
state source [83, 84]. Hence, a scatter diagram has been plotted, as shown in Table 6 using this 
data. The Hs and Tz values are class midpoints. 
 
Figure 20: Distribution of mean wave height of areas 103 and 104. 
Table 5: Wave height of areas 103 and 104 from December to February. 
Wave height, H (m) Number of wave height 
recorded (n) 
Wave height average 
(m) 
Hmean = H¯ 
(m) 
0-1 56 0.5 28.0 
1-2 286 1.5 429.0 
2-3 277 2.5 692.5 
3-4 170 3.5 595.0 
4-5 93 4.5 418.5 
5-6 51 5.5 280.5 
6-7 28 6.5 182.0 
7-8 16 7.5 120.0 
8-9 9 8.5 76.5 
9-10 5 9.5 47.5 
10-11 3     10.5 31.5 
11-12 2 11.5 23.0 
12-13 1 12.5 12.5 
13-14 1 13.5 13.5 
14-15 1 14.5 14.5 
 



















Mean wave height, H (m)
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• Mean wave height Hmean = H¯  
       = (0.5 × 56 + 1.5 × 286 + 2.5 × 277 + 3.5 × 170 + 4.5 × 93 + 5.5 × 51 + 6.5 × 28 + 7.5 × 16 
+8.5 × 9 + 9.5 × 5 + 10.5 × 3 + 11.5 × 2 + 12.5 × 1 + 13.5 × 1 + 14.5 × 1)/999 
         = 2.95 m 
 
• Significant wave height, Hs = H1/3 
=
16 × 7.5 + 9 × 8.5 + 5 × 9.5 + 3 × 10.5 + 2 × 11.5 + 1 × 12.5 + 1 + 1 × 13.5 + 1 × 14.5
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               = 3.24 m 
 





































0 - 1 311 2734 6402 7132 5071 2711 1202 470 169 57 19 6 2 1 0 
1 - 2 20 764 4453 8841 9045 6020 3000 1225 435 140 42 12 3 1 0 
2 - 3 0 57 902 3474 5549 4973 3004 1377 518 169 50 14 4 1 0 
3 - 4 0 4 150 1007 2401 2881 2156 1154 485 171 53 15 4 1 0 
4 - 5 0 0 25 258 859 1338 1230 776 372 146 49 15 4 1 0 
5 - 6 0 0 4 63 277 540 597 440 240 105 39 13 4 1 0 
6 - 7 0 0 1 15 84 198 258 219 136 66 27 10 3 1 0 
7 - 8 0 0 0 4 25 69 103 99 69 37 17 6 2 1 0 
8 - 9 0 0 0 1 7 23 39 42 32 19 9 4 1 1 0 
9 - 10 0 0 0 0 2 7 14 16 14 9 5 2 1 0 0 
10 - 11 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 6 6 4 2 1 1 0 0 
11 - 12 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 
12 - 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
13 - 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure 21 demonstrates the number of vessels traversing the Antarctic region between 2016 
and 2019 during the summertime from December to February in the Southern Ocean regions. 
Overall, an increase can be seen in the number of trips made by a large number of vessels, aside 
from the research expeditions in 2018, which undertook the lowest number of trips in 2019. It 
should be noted that this is not yet a full year’s data. Also, Figure 22 demonstrates the number 
of trips by vessels in order to reach specific destinations within the Antarctic region in the 
summer season in three months between November, January, and March, also named the 
Antarctic Peninsula, the Ross Sea, South George, the Weddell Sea, and the Southern Ocean. It 
can be seen that the Antarctic Peninsula was the most attractive destination to tourists, with 
more than 300 trips undertaken. The second most popular destination was the Ross Sea, where 
most trips (100) were undertaken by research vessels in the summer season. South Georgia and 
the Weddle Sea were much less attractive in comparison. Based on the information provided 
in Figure 22, it can be concluded that the key destination for Antarctic travel is the Antarctica 
Peninsula summer season, with a yearly total of 322 trips made by a variety of vessels. On the 
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other hand, the Ross Sea region was the most common destination for research and resupply 
vessels (with more than 100 trips) and fishing vessels (47 trips) [85-87]. 
 
Figure 21: Number of vessel trips to the Antarctic region between 2016 and 2019 [85, 86, 88, 89]. 
 
Figure 22: Number of trips across several Antarctic destinations [85-87]. 
The bar chart in Figure 23 demonstrates the humidity (%) in the summer season between 
November, January, and March for the six destinations in the ocean areas. Based on the case 
study provided, information was collected for six destinations in the ocean areas [69-78]. It can 
be seen that Ushuaia, Greg Mortimer and Falklands had an increase in humidity over the 
summer. On the other hand, South Georgia had a significant increase in January (approx. 77%) 
compared to November and March. Furthermore, the Antarctica Peninsula saw a significant 
























Figure 23: Seasonal and locational probability distributions of humidity for summer seasons [69-78]. 
4.6 Salinity and Temperature of Seawater in a Variety of Oceanic Areas 
In Table 7, the salinity and temperature of seawater in a variety of oceanic areas have been 
included. From the table, it can be seen that a number of areas in the Antarctica region had a 
salinity range between 33.8 ppt and 34.7 ppt, such that the Antarctic bottom water had a salinity 
of 34.7 ppt at a temperature of -0.4°C, the Antarctic circumpolar water had a salinity range of 
34.6-34.7 ppt at a temperature range of  0-2.0°C and also had a salinity range of 33.8-34.7 ppt 
at a temperature range of 3-7°C. 
Table 7: Salinity and temperature of seawater in various oceanic areas [90, 91].      
Water Temperature (oC) Salinity (ppt) 
North Atlantic Central Water 8.0 – 19.0 35.1-36.5 
Antarctic Circumpolar Water 0.0 – 2.0 34.6-34.7 
Antarctic Intermediate Water 3.0 – 7.0 33.8-34.7 
North Pacific Intermediate Water 4.0 – 10.0 34.0-34.5 
North Atlantic Deep Water 2.0 – 4.0 34.8-35.1 
Antarctic Bottom Water -0.4 34.7 
 
The surface salinity (ppt) of the global scale ocean shown in Figure 24 demonstrates a regular 
pattern that depends on latitude emerges, with maximum values found in each ocean basin's 





Figure 24: Surface salinity of the global scale ocean as represented in parts per thousand (ppt). 
Wind speed is an important attribute of the environment. While wind cannot cool an object 
below the ambient temperature of the surrounding environment, it will reduce the rate of heat 
loss to the surrounding environment, thereby providing a cooling effect. The concept of wind 
chill is a measure of the combined effect of the lowered temperature and wind [93]. Also, 
humidity has to be humidity/water for the icing to occur. Seaspray is the major source of 
humidity/water to vessel systems. Spray icing has been an important research subject for many 
years [94], and researchers have studied the salinity and growth rate of spray ice. A model for 
generating the spray resulting from ship-wave collisions was used to determine the maximum 
height of the spray source above the ship deck [95]. The Southern Ocean regions are divided 
into two areas such as 103 and 104 as shown in Figure 25 which is critical for the operation of 
a cruise ship in the Antarctic area [92, 96]. This figure also shows a number of environmental 
conditions that may be encountered by a cruise vessel, namely the Greg Mortimer-Aurora 
Expedition, while travelling along identified Antarctic routes [87]. Based on the literature 
review, common routes and destinations need to be across six Antarctic destinations during the 
annual summer season in the Southern Ocean regions and must focus on these areas that can 




Figure 25: Mission and routes for cruise vessels. 
4.7 Stakeholders and a Definition of Relationships and Dependencies 
According to Figure 26 and Table 8, IACS provides stakeholders with a number of services 
both in classification and statutory and assistance to the maritime industry and regulatory 
bodies in regard to marine safety and pollution prevention.  This is based on the accumulation 
of current marine knowledge and modern technology, which provides information for the 
stakeholders who intended to operate their vessels in the Antarctic/Arctic regions. 
 
 








Table 8: Stakeholders and a Definition of Relationships and Dependencies. 
The Antarctic and the Southern Ocean regions face increasing demands for tourism activities, 
and several other activities also grow exponentially as well [112, 113]. The most common 
vessels undertaking an Antarctic voyage include fishing and cruise ships.  
Stakeholders Reason References 
Class The IACS provides a number of services, including classification 
and statutory, and assistance to both the maritime industry and 
regulatory bodies regarding marine safety and pollution 
prevention, based on the accumulation of current marine 
knowledge and modern technology. 
[96] 
Clubs (P&I and 
H&M) 
Marine insurance aims to reduce financial loss as a result of 
possible loss of cargo. 
[97] 
Chief Engineer Holds total responsibility for all machinery maintenance onboard 
the vessel and heading up the engine room. 
[98]  
First Engineer Acts as an assistant to the Chief Engineer (above) regarding 
technical operations onboard the vessel and specific tasks 




The supervision of the daily operations and the maintenance and 
upkeep of all machinery. 
[100]  
Third Engineer Supervision of several systems, including the boilers, fuel, 




A junior position, where the individual is undergoing training to 





Provides directives for the upkeep, operation, and maintenance 





Second in command to the Captain and manages deck duties as 
well as general maintenance. 
[104] 
Second Officer A qualified OICNW watch stander, who manages and directs the 




Responsible for the navigation and safe passage of the ship. [106] 
Owner or 
Organisation 
Commonly known as the Operator, the individual or board in 





The designated person or agency responsible for the handling of 
shipments and cargo as required.  
[108] 
Ship Charterers An owner of a vessel who hires out the use of the craft. [109] 
IMO A specialised agency under the banner of the United Nations. 
Responsible for guidelines protecting vessels in polar regions, as 




The state in which a vessel is registered. [111] 
Port State 
control (PSC) 
The verification body in a national port undertake inspections of 







Understanding of climate change across Antarctica and the 
Southern Ocean, and the impacts on the terrestrial and marine 
biota and ecosystems, builds on the material included in the 
Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment (ACCE) report, 
published by SCAR in 2009 (Turner et al. 2009), with an update 





Thus, it may be concluded that, despite the hazardous conditions posed by the region, the 
Antarctic Peninsula is the most attractive tourist destination, with a yearly total of 322 trips 
made by a variety of vessels, while the Ross Sea is the most common destination for research 
vessels, resupply vessels and fishing vessels. Comparatively, South Georgia and the Weddle 
Sea are much less attractive to all sectors. The harsh physical conditions that the vessels have 
endured have been documented in this chapter. It has been found that the environmental 
conditions may not influence the characteristics of the subsurface formations. However, the 
delicate elements involved in the operation of the vessel could be adversely affected by both 
salinity and temperature. In the predefined areas 103 and 104, the Antarctic region’s salinity 
ranges between 33.8 ppt and 34.7 ppt. However, the Antarctic bottom water has a salinity of 
34.7 ppt at a temperature of -0.4 oC. In comparison, the Antarctic circumpolar water has a 



















Chapter 5: Critique of Polar Code for the Operation of Vessels in 
the Antarctic 
5.1 Introduction 
The operation of vessels within the Antarctic region has been improved over years of ongoing 
research, resulting in safer passage through the hostile and inhospitable polar environment. In 
turn, it has to promote increased scientific activity and discovery. While polar voyages are 
certainly safer because of ice breakers, accidents still occur as a result of either equipment 
failure or human error, or a combination of both. This chapter provides a detailed revision of 
icebreakers sailing under the Australian national flag. It includes both the past and present 
status of all Australian ARVs, as well as critiquing the polar code method developed by DNV 
regarding the operation of vessels in the Antarctic region [114, 115]. 
 
The objectives of this chapter include being the first to identify the critical components which 
are negatively affected by low-temperatures and icing conditions, as well as demonstrating the 
application of the polar code in regard to safety functions, as well as inherent safety techniques 
for the installation of both machinery space and auxiliary machinery. 
 
The above objectives can be achieved through: 
➢ A review into DNV’s classification of vessels undergoing winterisation, which applies 
to all stages of the commission, design, construction, and operation; 
➢ An evaluation of the guidelines that are established as part of the polar code, as well 
as all additional requirements regarding the structural integrity of the hull and 
machinery space; 
➢ A review into the statutory navigation requirements for polar vessels [116];  
➢ A description, including technical details, of the Seawater Cooling System (SWCS) 
and the Seawater Central Cooling System (SWCCS); 
➢ The use of the Failure Mode and the Effect Analysis (FMEA) [117] methodology in 
providing recommendations for the operation of the MV-Bluefin research vessel in 
polar climates; 
➢ The analysis of the Seawater Central Cooling System Chest (SWCCSC) aboard the 
MV-Bluefin, and the identification of weak points; and 




As a result of operating in hostile polar environments, icebreakers face a number of unique 
risks, which the IMO aims to mitigate through the implementation of the polar code and all 
associated amendments. DNV supports all regulations and requirements associated with 
protective polar guidelines [114] and further develops the polar code to better suit particular 
flag state requirements. This is extended through the utilization of a number of associated 
guidelines, including SOLAS and MARPOL, both of which focus primarily on the hull material 
of the structure as well as auxiliary components and machinery space [114].      
 
The guidelines for ARVs, as outlined by the DNV [114], reference navigation in the region, 
emergency procedures, the design and structure of the vessel, communication technology and 
equipment, as well as the management of various pollutants. 
5.2 Systems affected by the harsh polar environment 
Based on the literature that has addressed the winterisation of ship systems between 2014 and 
the present, most of the research conducted in the Arctic ocean regards the harsh environmental 
conditions and the resulting adverse effects on machinery installations. As such, this thesis 
aims to detail the worst effects of the environmental conditions that may affect the winterisation 
of vessels and subsequently provide recommendations for making contingency plans. 
 
Table 9 provides an overview of the main and auxiliary machinery and equipment found aboard 
vessels that may be exposed to harsh climatic conditions, namely sub-zero temperatures and 
icing. Machinery installation is often divided into the main/propulsion and auxiliary 
engines, electrical generation, systems such as electrical, piping, refrigeration and air 
conditioning, firefighting and protection, deck machinery and cargo handling equipment, bow 
thrusters and stabilizers, instrumentations and control, safety equipment, and other auxiliary 
machinery and equipment. The auxiliary machinery may be in support of the machinery space 
for main propulsion engines systems and include heat exchangers and compressed air, deck 
equipment or cargo handlings such as propellers and shafting, steering gear and deck cranes, 
or in support of ship services such as ballast water arrangements and sewage systems (SS). The 
principal propulsion devices, including fixed pitch propellers, ducted propellers, 
podded propulsors, contra-rotating propeller, controllable pitch propellers, these components 
for ship systems are subjected to freezing and low air temperature in winterization. 
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Turbocharger ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
Centrifugal pump ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
Oil pump/hydraulic 
pump 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fuel pump ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
Air compressor ✓ ✓ × × × × × 
Electric Motors ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓ 
Seawater tank  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓ 
Freshwater tank  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sea chest ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × 
Water Cooling 
system 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × ✓ 
heat exchangers ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
Refrigerator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
Central air 
conditioning 
✓ ✓ ✓ × × × × 
Electric cables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Piping and fittings ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
overboard discharge 
valves 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × 
LO and FO Purifiers ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ×  ✓ 
Alarm & detection 
sensors 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Oil separators ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
5.3 DNV Class Requirements Relating to Polar Vessels 
The DNV society classification for polar code winterisation of vessels applies to all stages of 
the commission and use of polar vessels, including design, construction and operation (see 
Table 10) [114].     
Table 10: DNV class requirements for the operation of vessels in polar regions [114]. 
Section  Requirements 
A As a general rule, both the structure of the vessel as a whole, as well as all components and 
machinery, are required to have the capacity to perform in the environment anticipated in polar 
regions. Table A1   displays the polar class notation and relates closely to nominal ice strength and 
thickness. 
The capacity of the vessel is ensured through the reinforcement of the hull against local ice loads, 
requiring that all sections of the hull be adequately strengthened according to the interaction of that 
segment with the surrounding ice. In localized sections of the overloaded hull in figure 4 [36], this 
reinforcement allows for minimal structural failure. Also, ships have specified the ice-reinforced 
areas of the vessel. 
B Sections of the vessel exposed to low-temperature seawater over extended periods of time are 
required to be constructed from either steel or pre-approved ductile material. The structural strength 
of the material can be classified according to the following four categories, which are dependent 
on both functions and anticipated loading. The wear-resistant coating is required on all external 
surfaces, which are ice-reinforced in an effort to prevent the abrasion of vessel components. 
According to Figure 4 depicts the steel grade for plating material located above the ballast waterline 
for the design temperatures of various categories. Forged or cast materials in structural members 
must pass impact and energy test, as shown in Sec.6 Table C1 item C1001 Table C1001[114].       
C-F Sections C through to F ensures the local and global strength, as well as icebreaking effectiveness, 
through the design and construction of the vessel and her components. It is a requirement that the 
bow of polar class vessels has the ability to break the ice in an effective and consistent manner, 
while maintaining continuous speed. The design of the bow should allow for the vessel to ride onto 
the ice, as well as include an ice knife allowing for the ramming of particularly thick ice, thereby 
avoiding excessive beaching of the vessel, as well as the submersion of the deck aft. The addition 
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Section  Requirements 
of the ice knife also allows for the distribution of broken ice across both the port and starboard, 
thus creating a navigable channel. 
Ice horns are also required to be fitted abaft each rudder for astern icebreaking, in an effort to 
protect the rudder within two degrees to each side of its mid-position and prevent the occurrence 
of wedging between the rudder and hull. The structural integrity of all equipment, substructures, 
and supporting structures cannot be negatively affected as a result of icebreaking accelerations. 
In order to calculate the loads encountered in various areas of the vessel, a number of equations 
have been developed, focussing primarily on the vertical force loads experienced by the bow, as 
well as the compression loads experienced by the amidships as a result of inward acting line loads 
due to the movement of ice floes. The aforementioned calculations allow for the assessment of 
longitudinal, transverse and fore ship strength. 
Pt.3 Ch.1 Sec.13[114] provides methods for checking the buckling strength of web plates and 
faceplates in girders/stringers that are subject to ice loads. 
H This section describes the minimum throat thicknesses for continuous double welds in structures 
with high shear and tensile stresses. 
I The mitigation of potential failure of systems and components is achieved through the 
implementation of removable hard and canvas covers, as well as the heating of pipes and cables. 
The design conditions of the components and mechanisms require that a surface temperature of at 
least 3°C is maintained. However, in situations where icing occurs, the use of hot water is 
recommended whilst considering and protecting all electrical components. 
It is also required that the design for the sea cooling water inlet and discharge take into account the 
potential blockage caused by ice. It is also a requirement that the cooling water tank volume is 
equal to >0.01 of the main and auxiliary engine output (kW), as well as all seawater cooling, pumps 
either connecting to a shared priming system or being able to self-prime. 
Ice separation and ventilation can be achieved through the arrangement and repurposing of a 
minimum of two sea chests as iceboxes. In an effort to mitigate situations where sea chests may be 
blocked, ballast piping allows for the circulation of cooling tank water through ballast tanks when 
spare cooling capacity is required. The ballast system is required to meet certain specifications in 
order to prevent freezing. 
In situations where the ambient temperature is 20°C colder than the design specifications, and the 
vessel is considered to be in a dead-ship condition, it is required that main machinery must restart 
after half an hour. As such, all ancillary and auxiliary machinery must have ice tolerant capabilities, 
as well as allow for ice-induced acceleration. 
J, K Azimuth and tunnel thrusters account for the main methods of propulsion. While tunnel thrusters 
require no ice strengthening, azimuth thrusters do encounter ice block strikes along the body, 
thereby requiring ice strengthening in order to withstand the loads incurred. As a general rule, all 
non-retractable thrusters require strengthening in areas where ice encounters are expected to occur, 
thereby resulting in special design considerations, including implementing a means for heating, as 
well as the circulation of hydraulic oil and lubricant. It is vital that the hydraulic oil maintains 
viscosity within an appropriate range in order to avoid freezing. 
While the performance of the vessel may be enhanced in polar conditions, the implementation of 
the aforementioned design features may reduce the engine output; however, this theory requires 
further testing. 
Propeller blades, propeller hub and blade bolts must have an elongation greater than 15% on a test 
piece of five times smaller diameter. An equation has been designed in order to calculate the 
minimum continuous output of propulsion machinery, which takes moulded breadth, polar class 
number, rule draught and stem angle into consideration.  
5.4 Statutory Navigation Requirements for Polar Vessels 
The polar vessels navigation requirements are a need for binding shipping regulations for the 
safety of navigation and protection of the Antarctic marine environment conditions. Related to 
the various maritime, geopolitical and legal issues raised by the IMO guidelines for ships 
operating in Antarctic ice-covered waters are analysed and discussed [114]. The IMO's 
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mandatory regulations supplemented by various guidelines and nonmandatory codes or 
conventions are illustrated in Figure 27 [22]. 
 
Figure 27: Winterization requirements for vessels operating in Antarctica.  
Stability and Subdivision 
➢ Waters, where both sea and land ice density is equal to <10%, are referred to as iceberg 
waters. 
➢ A vessel with a high level of icebreaking capability, accompanying another vessel or vessels 
with lower icebreaking capability, is known as an escort. 
➢ Any activity in which a vessel is accompanied by an escort is known as an escort operation.  
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➢ A well-ventilated environment, protected from inhospitable surrounding conditions, is 
known as a liveable environment. 
➢ Any vessel whose operations include the escort of another, ice management, the undertaking 
of activity in ice-covered water, as well as providing a liveable environment is known as an 
icebreaker. 
➢ The mark provided to a vessel by either a competent authority or organization that indicates 
the capacity to safely conduct navigation under sea ice conditions is known as an ice grade.  
➢ The time frame for survival systems to give support is referred to as the maximum 
anticipated salvage time. This is not less than five days. 
➢ All machinery, equipment, and associated piping and cables required for the safe operation 
of the vessel are known as mechanical equipment. 
➢ The daily temperature lows over a period of ten years minimum are averaged to find the 
average daily low temperature. In cases where the data is insufficient, an average daily low 
temperature may be provided by a competent authority or organization. 
➢ The polar code level means that the competent authority or the organization recognized by 
the competent authority complies with the uniform requirements of the IACS [14]. 
➢ Set below a daily low temperature of -10°C, the operating temperature specified by the 
design of polar vessels is known as the polar operating temperature. 
➢ Vessel operating in regions where the daily low temperature is less than -10 °C are known 
as vessels intended to operate at low temperatures [114].     
Stability Under Normal Conditions 
➢ The side projection area of both sides of the ship above the water surface is 7.5kg /m2. 
➢  An exposed area of greater than or equal to 30 kg/m2 of open deck and gangway. 
➢ The total projected area of the continuous surface shall be increased by 5%, and the static 
moment of such area shall be increased by 10% for the calculation of the side projection 
area on the discontinuous surface of the ship without sails, various booms, masts (except 
masts) and rigging, as well as the side projection area of other small objects. 
Stability Under Dangerous Conditions 
➢ If the centre is located before the maximum width on the high ice zone waterline, the 
longitudinal range shall be 4.5% of the high ice zone waterline length. Otherwise, 1.5% of 
the increased ice zone waterline length shall be assumed to be at any longitudinal position 
along with the master. 
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➢ The full range of damage measured perpendicular to the hull's transverse penetration range 
is 760 mm.  
➢ The vertical range is 20% of the high-water line draft in the ice area or the longitudinal 
range, whichever is smaller, and any upright position between the keel and the 120% high 
water line draft in the ice area shall be assumed [114].      
Waterproofing Considerations 
➢ The removal of accumulating snow and ice, particularly in high-traffic areas such as doors 
and hatches, is a safety requirement. As such, a means for removal shall be provided. 
➢ In the case of a vessel operating in polar regions, it is required that measures be taken in an 
effort to prevent the freezing of hydraulic door or hatch systems.  
➢ Any water- or weather-tight door or hatch not leading to or exiting from a habitable 
environment shall be operated by individuals wearing heavy winter clothing and heavy 
gloves, thereby requiring special design considerations. 
Safety of Navigation 
➢ All firefighting and safety equipment installed in the vessel's exposed areas are required to 
keep it free of ice and snow accumulation. 
➢ All mechanical controls and equipment are required to be maintained to avoid the 
accumulation of snow and ice and be kept in a specified location at all times. 
➢ All fire system protection equipment and systems require special design consideration to 
take into account the needs of individuals wearing heavy winter clothing and heavy mittens. 
➢ The removal of accumulating snow and ice, particularly in high-traffic areas such as doors 
and hatches, is a safety requirement. As such, a means for removal shall be provided. 
➢ The method of extinguishing a hazard may require special considerations, including the 
selection of a suitable medium. 
Passage Plane 
➢ Procedures required by the manual on the operation of polar waters.  
➢ Any restrictions on hydrological data and available navigational aids.  
➢ Available information on the extent and type of ice and icebergs expected near the route.  
➢ Statistics on ice and temperature in previous years.  
➢ Shelter.  
➢ Current information on the density of marine mammals in known areas, including areas of 
seasonal migration, and measures to be taken when encountering marine mammals.  
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➢ Current information on relevant ship routing systems, speed recommendations and ship 
traffic services for known areas, including the density of marine mammals in seasonal 
migration areas.  
➢ National and international protected areas on air routes.  
➢ Operate in areas away from SAR facilities. 
Prevention of Pollution 
➢ The polar vessels navigation requirements shall be designed to reduce the possibility of 
polluting the Polar environment from oil pollution C807 Pollution prevention arrangements 
in table C1 and A4,5 polar are requirements for winterized notation to the protection of the 
Antarctic marine environment conditions.  
Category (A) : 
➢ All vessels built either on or subsequent to the first of January 2017, all fuel tanks of class 
A and class B ships with a total fuel loading capacity of less than 600m shall be separated 
from the hull shell at a distance of no less than 0.76m. This provision does not apply to small 
fuel tanks with a maximum capacity of no more than 30m.  
➢ For vessels that fit into the aforementioned categories, as well as not being classified as oil 
carriers, all oil-containing cargo holds require separation at a distance of greater than 0.76m 
from the shell of the hull.  
➢ For vessels that fit into the aforementioned categories although that weigh less than 5,000 
deadweight tons require that all residual oil and oil tank bottom water be stored at a distance 
of greater than 0.76m from the shell of the hull. This provision, however, does not apply to 
small tanks with a maximum single capacity of no more than 30 m3. 
Category (B): 
➢ The keel-laying stage, or similar, is referred to as construction.  
➢ A floating sheet of ice of considerable thickness that is exposed to the coast from 2 to 50 m 
above sea level is known as an ice shelf. 
➢ Any sea ice that has formed, and has fixed itself to the coast, as well as sea ice that is 
connected to the shore in the form of ice walls, ice cliffs, and shallow or grounded icebergs, 




5.5  Recommendations and Checklist for the Winterization of Polar Vessels 
Prior to the transit of a vessel to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, the owner or organization 
is encouraged to review their winterization procedure, and ensure the following: 
➢ Check the operation of both projectors and deck lighting. 
➢ Check the operation of navigation equipment. 
➢ Check the operation of communications equipment. 
➢ Check the operation of clearing and heating systems of bridge windows. 
➢ Check the operation of the respective whistle and horn heating systems. 
➢ Check the operation of equipment heaters, including control equipment, electric motors, 
radar scanners, the reader gearbox, as well as in the steering gear room. 
➢ Check the readiness of the lifeboat and davit. 
➢ Check deck lines liable to freeze are drained dry. 
➢ Check that a sufficient amount of salt, sand and equipment is on board the vessel for the 
expedition. 
➢ Check the readiness of firefighting equipment and life-saving appliances, and that all safety 
equipment is protected from polar temperatures. Unless the interior of the lifeboat is heated, 
all portable water shall be placed in close by and heated compartments to prevent freezing. 
➢ Check the steam supply and ensure that dead legs are drained in order to prevent freezing in 
polar temperatures. 
➢ Check the operation of interior ventilation, reducing the interaction of freezing polar air 
coming into direct contact with equipment. 
➢ Check the operation of steam injections and ensure that a switch occurs to the lower sea 
chest. 
➢ Check the deck hydraulic systems, ensuring that they are free of moisture and water. 
➢ It is recommended that regular checks and inspections of equipment take place. 
5.6 Technical Details of Seawater Cooling System 
Seawater Cooling System Background and Information 
The SWCS is a fundamental system in that it allows for the removal of waste heat produced 
from the combustion process and is therefore required to withstand the hostile temperature of 




The Seawater Cooling System 
In order to cool the main engines, the flow and transport of a cooling medium being facilitated 
to draw heat away from the vessel's systems. The use of SWCS is entirely costless, although 
its destructive behaviour is highly problematic. As such, freshwater and lubricating oils are 
utilized to cool vital components of the main engine system. These are then cooled themselves 
by a separate seawater SW cooling system.  
 
Figure 28 shows the typical Seawater Cooling Intake System (SWCIS), which consists of a 
lower suction valve to prevent air entry into the cooling system while the vessel is pitching and 
rolling. An upper valve is utilized to avoid sand or mud entry into the system while the vessel 
is either in port or in shallow waters. Connected to a sea chest, acting as an SW reservoir, the 
intake filters water to capture unwanted solids before entering the pump [119]. 
 
Figure 28: Seawater Cooling Intake System (SWCIS) diagram [120]. 
As the SWCIS enters through the pump, as seen above, the SWCS acts as a centralized cooling 
system. This can be seen in Figure 28, where seawater is fed through a number of coolers, 
including piston water, jacket water, lubricating oil, as well as line to the charge air if required. 
Newer vessels consist of one large seawater cooler rather than a number of individual coolers 
as listed above. According to Figure 29, the seawater cooler cools an FW circuit and then goes 
on to cool the other coolers. This is known as the central cooling system and reduces the amount 




Figure 29: FW and SW centralised cooling system. 
5.7 Description of a Seawater Central Cooling System 
The Seawater Central Cooling System (SWCCS) can be seen in Figure 30. This type of system 
design has seen more frequently on polar vessels, components of which can be seen inTable 
11. The SWCCS is an open-loop system, where the SW cooling pump, either sea cooling pump 
one (SCPP1) or sea cooling pump two (SCPP2), pumps water past the low-temperature FW 
cooler, either in service low-temperature FW cooler one (LTFWCL1) or low-temperature FW 
cooler two (LTFWCL2), absorbing the heat in the process. The heated SW is then discarded 
overboard, once leaving either in low service temperature FW cooler LTFWCL1 or in-service 
low-temperature FW cooler LTFWCL2. While passing through the system, all foreign matter 
is filtered from the SW through the sea chest strainers, the sea cooling pump 1 SCPP1 or sea 
cooling pump 2 SCPP2 strainers, and finally through the internal in-service low-temperature 
FW cooler LTFWCL1 or in-service low-temperature FW cooler LTFWCL2 strainers ISTR1 
or ISTR2 [119]. The high sea chest (HSC) and the low sea chest (LSC) networks are kept below 






Figure 30: Centralised seawater cooling system chest [119]. 
Table 11: Components of the seawater central cooling system SWCCS, with Codes and Descriptions 
[119].  
Codes Descriptions Codes Descriptions 
EJPP Ejector pump LTC1Vo LTFWCL1 outlet valve 
EJPPVi EJPP pump inlet LTC1BFVi LTFWCL1 Backflushing inlet valve 
EJPPVo EJPP outlet valve LTC1BFVo LTFWCL1 Backflushing outlet valve 
EJPPSTR EJPP strainer LTFWCL2 Low-temperature FW cooler 2 
GSPP General service pump LTC2Vi LTFWCL2 inlet valve 
GSPPVi GSPP inlet valve LTC2Vo LTFWCL2 outlet valve 
GSPPVo GSPP outlet valve LTC2BFVi LTFWCL2 back flush inlet valve 
GSPPSTR GSPP strainer LTC2BFVo LTFWCL2 backflush outlet valve 
HSCS High sea chest starboard OBNRV Non-return overboard valve 
HSCSVi HSCS inlet valve OBV Overboard valve 
HSCSVo HSCS outlet valve SCPP1 Sea cooling pump 1 
HSCSBFLV HSCS back flush valve SCPPVi SCPP1 inlet valve 
HSCP High sea chest port side SCPP SCPP1 outlet valve 
HSCPVi HSCP inlet valve SCPP1STR SCPP1 strainer 
HSCPVo HSCP outlet valve LSCSBFLV LSCS backflushing valve 
HSCPBFLV HSCP backflushing valve LTFWCL1 Low-temperature FW cooler 1 
LSCP Low sea chest port side LTC1Vi LTFWCL1 inlet valve 
LSCPVi LSCP inlet valve SCPP2 Sea cooling pump2 
LSCPVo LSCP outlet valve SCPP2Vi SCPP2intlet valve 
LSCPBFLV LSCP backflush valve SCPP2Vo SCPP2outlet valve 
LSCS Low sea chest starboard SCPP2STR SCPP2 strainer 
LSCSVi LSCS inlet valve SW Seawater 
LSCSVo LSCS outlet valve V1-V2-V3-V4-V5 Interconnection valve 
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The low-temperature freshwater (LTFW), which is not subject to our study, works in a closed-
loop [119] and is cooled in the service LTFWCL1 or service LTFWCL2 before being passed 
through a number of different components and absorbing the unwanted heat, thereby allowing 
for the systems to operate within the design thresholds, and then back to the low service 
temperature FW LTFWCL1 or in the low service temperature FW LTFWCL2 to be cooled 
down. Valves are fitted at the inlet and outlet of each system's component to isolate it in case 
of routine maintenance. In the case of dirty SW, i.e. in port, or the river, it happens that the sea 
chests grids might be clogged. The backflushing system might resolve the problem temporarily 
of sea chest clogging by pushing back to the sea the dirt and foreign matters, waiting for a final 
cleaning by a diver. 
 
The operation of an autonomous ship, for example, must operate without failure for a minimum 
period of 500 hours, or 21 days, without any external human intervention. Crew interference 
may only occur whilst undertaking repairs or when arriving at the harbour [119]. It is vital to 
identify potential risks, their root causes, as well as any failures modes to perform an adequate 
system improvement. The failure modes and effects analysis methodology (FMEA) has been 
identified by many experts in the literature supporting the vessel's system. 
5.8 Selecting the Methodology for MV-Bluefin Research Vessel the SWCCS  
When applying the FMEA method to the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel, SWCCS is selected as 
a part of the marine machinery risk assessment. It can be applied to each component of the 
system, thereby allowing for the systematic identification of potential failure modes, causes, 
and impact and allowing for the proposal of a preventative solution.  
 
Table 12 presents the FMEA of the SWCCS. At the same time, Figure 30 identifies and 
demonstrates the potential faults of the system’s components as a result of the polar weather 
conditions and tracing root causes and assessing their effects on the operation of the vessel's 
system. This is to identify consequences ahead of time and avoid failure, a method is known 
as early failure detection, thereby improving the reliability of the design. Future work includes 
the adoption of intelligent condition-based maintenance (CBM) techniques and ensuring good 






Table 12: Conventional MV-Bluefin research vessel SWCCS FMEA [119]. 
Items Designation Failure 
Mode 
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5.9 Identified Weak Points of the MV-Bluefin Vessel Seawater Central 
Cooling System Chest 
The system shown in Figure 30 presents a number of weaknesses of the MV-Bluefin’s 
(SWCCSC) that render it unsuitable for installation. To enhance its appropriateness, a redesign 
is recommended, along with the implementation of a new general arrangement (GA) for the 
two seawater cooling pumps (SCCPP), where one is in use whilst the other is on standby. The 
connection to another available pump system onboard may enhance the redundancy without 
increasing the cost and reducing the engine space, such as the general service pump or the fire 
pump. The utilization of the same pipe for both SCCPP may result in unexpected issues, 
including icing and other environmental hazards resulting from the operation in a polar region. 
Damage to the solitary pipe may cause engine room flooding, which is why this paper 
recommends that a reconfiguration of the piping arrangement is necessary and required to avoid 
disasters whilst also providing cooling capabilities. 
 
Another issue that may be encountered is the plugging of the sea chest due to ice or foreign 
materials that were not filtered from the water. This may be particularly true as a result of the 
harsh environmental conditions in the Southern Ocean and the particularly abundant 
biodiversity. As a result, it is recommended that both sea chests, and associated backflushing 
systems, should avoid running into or through another system. 
5.10 Overview of the Heat Exchangers for the Cooling Water 
The heat exchanger utilizes SW, which has been cooled, to reduce the other liquids' temperature 
(FW or LO) while remaining separate and not mixing with them. The heat exchanger can be 
differentiated into either shell, tube, or plate, as shown in Table 13. The shell and tube 
exchangers are illustrated in Figure 31, where fluid enters through the tube inlet and moves 
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throughout the system. A second fluid enters the shell and remains separate from the first by 
flowing around the tubes rather than throughout. To maximize the fluid flow and cooling 
efficiency, baffles are used to redirect the shell inlet fluid and hold the tubes in place [121].   
Table 13: Heat exchanger comparison [122]. 
 Plate Type Shell and Tube Type 
Advantages 1. Compact and simple design. 
2. Efficient heat transfer.  
3. Easy cleaning. 
4. Dismantling requires no extra space. 
5. The introduction of paired plates 
increases capacity. 
6. Removal of leaking plates does not 
require replacement. 
7. Simple maintenance procedures. 
8. Deposits are reduced as a result of the 
turbulent flow, increasing heat transfer 
efficiency. 
1. Cheap when compared to plate heat exchangers. 
2. Allows for higher temperatures and pressures in 
the operation of the system. 
3. The pressure drop across a tube cooler is less. 
4. Ease of locating and remedying a leaking tube. 
5. Tubular coolers in a refrigeration system can act 
as the receiver also. 
6. The entire system is protected from erosion as 
a result of sacrificial anodes. 
7. Tube coolers may be preferred for lubricating 
oil cooling because of the pressure differential. 
Disadvantages 1. Initial costs are high due to the 
expense of titanium. 
2. Pressure tests are not simple, 
increasing the difficulty in identifying a 
leak. 
3. The operational temperature is limited 
by the bonding material between plates. 
4. The pressure drop experienced is 
higher than that of the tube and shell 
cooler. 
5. Dismantling and assembly are 
difficult. 
6. An increased pressure drop results 
from over-tightening of the clamping 
bolts. 
7. The operating conditions may lead to 
joint deterioration. 
8. The cooling system is highly 
susceptible to corrosion, as titanium is a 
noble metal. 
1. Lower heat transfer efficiency compared to 
plate coolers. 
2. Difficult cleaning and maintenance. 
3. The capacity cannot be increased, i.e. limited 
capacity. 
 4. Requires more space in comparison to plate 
coolers. 
        
 
Figure 31: Shell and tube heat exchanger [121].          
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Alternatively, the plate cooler seen in Figure 32 circulates two fluids throughout a stack of 
stainless-steel or titanium plates, with rubber sealing alternating each fluid being able to run 
down the gap between plates. Strength and surface area are increased due to the corrugated 
plate design, thereby resulting in an efficient heat transfer. 
 
Figure 32: Inner workings of the plate heat exchanger [55].       
5.11 Winterization of the SWCS 
The intended work carried out in polar regions presents a number of unique challenges to the 
design of the vessel's systems, including the presence of ice and slush which may result in SW 
inlet and piping blockages with little to no warning. This is mitigated by placing SW inlets as 
close to the centreline as possible while also being as far aft and low as possible, thereby 
reducing the risk of ingesting ice, snow, or slush. This also requires that the high and low inlets 
be placed as far apart as possible. 
 
The following design characteristics are required by sea bays and sea boxes: 
➢ Reduce ice, snow, or slush ingestion with the implementation of a strainer plate at the 
inlet with 20 mm diameter perforations. 
➢ Be as deeply emerged as possible. 
➢ Locate both sea bays and boxes on either side of the ship, respectively. 
➢ The suctions from the sea bay should equal 20% of the total open area to the sea. 
➢ Clear sea inlets through the use of low-pressure steam or air system.  
➢ Ensure that a vent with a cross-sectional area greater than or equal to the pipes is open 
to the atmosphere. 
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Ice blockages can be prevented further by implementing a vertical plate weir, which allows 
entering ice to float and thereby reduce the risk of ingestion through the strainer, described in 
Figure 33. This, however, does result in ice accumulation at the top of the tank, requiring a 
method and means of clearing it [123].  
 
Figure 33: Principles of the plate heat exchanger [121].         
As a result of the hostile environment of the polar regions, vessels that do not have the design 
specifications to operate in icy conditions will experience blockages in suctions systems as a 
result of supercooled SW freezing in pipes. As seen in Figure 34, polar vessels with specifically 
designed systems utilize heated SW, which is separated from the overboard discharge in the 
last stage of the seawater system to melt the accumulated ice that has blocked sea inlets and 
strainers, as well as to increase the water temperature in the sea box. As such, the entire system 
accounts for decreased SW temperatures allowing for the machinery to operate as efficiently 
as in other regions, avoiding mechanical failure [124]. 
 




It may be concluded that the safety of polar vessels relies on the guidelines laid out in the polar 
code, including those related to construction, design, equipment, maintenance, and operations 
of the vessel as well as the overarching environmental protections. Such guidelines and 
regulations have allowed for human activity and ARVs in previously inaccessible, 
inhospitable, and hostile polar regions. While still undergoing development, the requirements 
outlined by all relevant and authoritative bodies have ensured that vessels operating in the polar 
areas are fit for their intended use, thereby reducing the rate of accidents or failures. This can 
be seen that all machinery installations must prove to be functional under a wide range of 
anticipated environmental conditions, including ice and snow accretion or accumulation, ice 
and snow ingestion from seawater, the increased viscosity of liquids as a result of various 




















Chapter 6: MV- Bluefin Research Vessel: A Case Study for 
Operation in Polar Waters 
6.1 Introduction 
A number of design methods have been implemented into the structure and mechanics of polar 
vessels to achieve effective operation in inhospitable climate conditions. These design 
methodologies and the systems that they influence have been selected and created due to 
practical experiences in the polar regions [126]. The first winterisation notations were written 
and published by DNV and Lloyd’s Register (LR) and issued in 2006. Thus, the classification 
societies’ interest in the topic is considerably new sciences for keeping additional research in 
this field [126]. 
 
This chapter investigates the MV-Bluefin’s capacity to transport passengers, operate in polar 
regions, demonstrate the heat tracing and insulation system, preserve or increase the 
temperature of the pipes. This was in an effort to evaluate the various winterisation systems 
best onboard the vessel and ensure their compliance with the polar code. 
 
This will be achieved as part of the following objectives. The first objective is to provide an 
overview system of the MV-Bluefin research vessel to transport passengers to operate in polar 
waters. The second objective is to demonstrate the heat tracing and insulation system, aiming 
to preserve or raise the pipes’ temperature and ultimately the vessel as the whole through heat 
tracing cables. The final objective is to investigate the winterisation process and justify the 
assessment of winterisation systems aboard the MV- Bluefin research vessel. 
 
The above objectives can be achieved through: 
➢ The evaluation of the critical equipment aboard the MV-Bluefin and their application to the 
polar code; 
➢ A comparison of the vessel’s specifications with the guidelines laid out in the polar code to 
determine whether the MV-Bluefin meets the requirements for winterisation; 
➢ The identification and assessment of potential issues arising aboard the MV-Bluefin as a 
direct result of the hostile polar temperatures; 




➢ A review of the onboard systems whether they align with the polar code and other related 
guidelines. 
 
In the past, all classification societies, such as ABS, DNV and Lloyd’s Register, have created 
individual thresholds for the definition of winterisation levels for the various systems utilised 
by polar vessels and recently implementing the polar code, which presents several guidelines 
regarding the operation of vessels in harsh polar conditions. A number of emerging vessel 
owners and operators aim to work in the regions surrounding the Antarctic and Arctic regions 
[126], however many lack sufficient experience for the safe and effective operation of vessels 
in the inhospitable and harsh polar conditions. As such, many vessel owners and operators rely 
heavily on the polar code and other such regulatory guidelines when making decisions on 
winterisation which should be developed for new buildings or the construction of a new vessel. 
A recognised difficulty in having a number of classification societies design and implement 
individual thresholds is that requirements vary, resulting in a lack of universal solutions when 
problems arise. 
 
The major issue with the various winterisation notations and also to some extent with the polar 
code is that mostly they provide a current ship system to be winterised; however, very rarely 
offer a clear method in polar code on how to secure the operational capability in desired 
ambient environment conditions [126]. Further issues are caused by the definition of design 
such as structures, and machinery installation, ambient in low temperatures, and corresponding 
certification in low temperatures for the ship systems since the application of design in low 
temperatures under -30°C is the main effect on the availability and cost of various ship systems. 
This is especially the case when the designer temperature is set under -40°C. 
 
The majority of winterisation thresholds and notations currently active are suited for polar 
vessels' operation in climates where the air temperature often falls below -30˚C. However, these 
vessels’ operation is often in open water, high seas areas, where sea spray's freezing causes 
issues for all the open-air mechanical structures and systems located on an open deck. 
 
An alternative method exists for the assessment of winterisation impacts on polar vessels and 
the various systems onboard. This approach is practical, thereby creating suitable solutions for 
case-by-case situations in the polar regions, as demonstrated and justified in Tables 17-19. 
Previous versions of similar methods have existed, all with the same aim of basing the required 
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level of winterisation for polar vessels on both designers and operators' prior experience. This 
process, governed by the principles of risk-based evaluation, stands to be standardised and 
streamlined, thus creating more clear reason-consequence pairing for the vessel’s systems and 
operational requirements. 
6.2 An Overview of the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel 
The MV-Bluefin, certified for offshore operations and passengers’ transport, is a 35m long 
domestic, commercial vessel operating as a research vessel. The vessel is currently supported 
at a fleet base, located near the mouth of the River Tamar at Beauty Point, Tasmania. Originally 
designed and built-in 1981, the MV-Bluefin doubled as both a coastal seafaring and fishing 
training vessel, demonstrating her flexibility and adaptability through modular mission systems 
and supporting marine science research and hydrographic surveys for mine countermeasures 
systems trials. She also provides opportunities for applied learning, taking onboard maritime 
engineers to conduct ship performance trials and design studies [127].  
 
The majority of research vessels operating in polar regions are either ice breakers or ice-capable 
ships. The main purpose of this research is to collect old data of icebreaker and ice-capable 
research ships (greater than 500GT) from 2013 to 2019. These data were collected based on 
the literature review from different sources such as journal article, thesis, book, report and 
website and was validated. According to Figure 35 [22], DNV occupies the largest market share 
of icebreaker and ice-capable research vessels.  
 




















To select a suitable ice-class for the MV-Bluefin vessel operating in polar regions 
recommended by DNV, cold climate expertise has unique experience working in the polar 
areas with over 1,700 vessels with several ice-class notations represent above 30% of the DNV 
classed fleet. At present, DNV has in class up to 30 vessels with high ice class, including 19 
ice breakers. 
6.3 Recommended Ice Class Notations of the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel 
DNV has developed several classifications that can be used to mitigate unwanted risks and 
several issues highlighted in this study. These classifications follow internationally recognised 
standard within the shipping community and ensure an individual ship is independently 
verified. DNV can issue statutory certificates for vessels operating in the Antarctic and may 
work on behalf of the flag administration. These notations/classifications are best summarised 
in Figure 36, which is best suited to vessels operating in Antarctica. According to the figure, 
the following notation would be recommended as a minimum requirement for the icebreakers 
operated by the Antarctica government.   
 
Figure 36: DNV Class notations that may be used to demonstrate that the risks of Antarctic operation 
have been accounted for and mitigated. 
• 1A1 Icebreaker PC-3 WINTERISED COLD SPS COMF-V(2)C(2) HELDKSHF 
RPS DYNPOS-AUT NAUT-OSV(A) CLEAN DESIGN E0 
The polar class level (21) should be chosen based on the areas of navigation. For details, please 
see reference [128]. Classes 1 – 2 are better suited to Arctic operation with 3 – 5 for Antarctic 
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operation in winter. For a summer resupply vessel, the following class notation is 
recommended as a minimum: 
• 1A1 PC-7 WINTERISED BASIC SPS RP CLEAN DESIGN E0 
Full details of all the class notations can be found in Part 1, Chapter 2 of the DNV Rules for 
Classification of Ships [129]. 
 
Most nations send off resupply vessel to Antarctica during summer. During that time 
(November, January and February), ice conditions are reduced significantly. As a result, 
vessels with a lower ice capability are more often operated in Antarctica. However, there are 
some incidents of seeming trapped on ice by those vessels. For full-year access in this region, 
vessels with the capability in breaking thick ice are recommended. Sometimes Antarctic 
resupply vessels’ are operational for alternate purposes, such as oceanographic research, 
geographical survey, patrolling, and security operations when not resupplying Antarctic bases. 
However, these multiple roles may conflict with another due to the vessel’s specific design and 
requirements and could cause operation challenging. For instance, the balance between 
icebreaking capabilities and other open water tasks may create the most significant challenges, 
as illustrated in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Trade-off between icebreaking and summer re-supply and survey. 
Carrying a total of 25 members of crew and students combined, the MV-Bluefin conducts 
training sessions at sea, ranging between two days to two weeks. These applied learning 
voyages include habitat monitoring, fish stock sampling, fishing technology research, 
operation and maintenance of the engine room and associated machinery, undertaking 
environmental condition assessments, oceanographic instrument mooring lines, as well as ship 
design and function. The vessel also conducts training voyages for coastal masters, including 
training for pre-sea deck, integrated rating, as well as shipboard operations. The MV-Bluefin 
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has also been chartered as part of the offshore industry through a number of maritime 
companies, for the purpose of underwater ROV pipeline work as well as hydrographic 
surveying [29], the rescue of stranded Antarctic scientists and crew, trials for minesweeping 
activity on behalf of the Royal Australian Navy, the survey of undersea cables located in the 
Bass Strait, as well as environmental surveys on behalf of a number of Australian marine 
organisations and also more information and specifications and requirements for the MV 
Bluefin Research Vessel shows in Table 14. 
Table 14: Specifications and requirements for the MV Bluefin research vessel [127]. 
MAJOR DIMENSIONS 
Length OA  34.50 m  
Length BP  32.00 m  
Breadth   10.00 m  
Freeboard to Working Deck 1.20 m  
Maximum Draft  4.40 m  
Deadweight  53.60 t  
ELECTRICAL DEVICES AND SYSTEM  
AC Voltage 415V, Total 96kVA 3 Phase 50 Hz. 
AC Voltage 415V, Total 96kVA 3 Phase 50 Hz. 
AC Voltage 24V, Total 30kW. 
Stabilisation of the system for effective use of scientific equipment. 
Voltage 240 VAC, Total 60 AMP 50. 
DESIGN MATERIALS  
Hull   Steel 
RESEARCH FACILITIES  
Marine Biology Wet Lab 9 square metres  
Research Office, with computers and microscopes 10 square metres  
Sheltered deck space with work- tables  
SPEED, ENDURANCE, AND OVERALL RANGE 
Range when Cruising 2,500 Nm  
Speed when Cruising 10.0 knots  
Maximum Speed  10.5 knots  
Endurance  15 Days  
CAPACITIES AND WORKING SPACES  
Gross Tonnage  387 GRT 
No. 1, Dry Cargo Hold 4 cubic metres  
Fuel   46 cubic metres  
Fresh Water  30 cubic metres  
Ballast Water  20 cubic metres  
Total Area of Wet Laboratories 
   9 square metres  
Total Area of Dry Laboratories 
   10 square metres  
Fresh Fish Hold  5 cubic metres  
Frozen Fish Hold   3 cubic metres  
Free Working Deck Area 20 square metres  
Container Laboratory Space 6m x 6m  
ACCOMMODATION  
Officers and Crew  5 People  
Scientists and Trainees 20 People 
Air Conditioned 
Accommodation is designed to cater for lecturers and 
students, ensuring comfortable accommodation in 
comparison to fishing vessels. 
MAIN ENGINE 
Power (BHP) Caterpillar  850 HP at 1,200 rpm  
Diameter and Maximum rpm Propeller 2.20 m at 240 rpm  
Harbour and Emergency Set  180 KVA 2 x 80 KW 
Total Power Auxiliary Diesels are Excluded.  
 
 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
AC Voltage /415V Total 96kVA 3 Phase 50 Hz 
AC Voltage /415V Total 96kVA 3 Phase 50 Hz  
DC Voltage 24V Total 30kW DC.  
Voltage 240 VAC Total 60 AMP 50 Hz  
Main Engine  Caterpillar C4.4  
Model DITA 129hp/93.6 kw at 1500rpm 24 volt Starting 
Fitted with fresh water cooled inter coolers 
Governor   ECU (Electronic) 
Reduction Gear  Ulstein  
Type 220 GSC Ratio 4.94 – 1 




6.4 System Identification and Critical Equipment List  
An evaluation of the winterisation efficiency for the systems and operations aboard the MV-
Bluefin is required, which is achieved through the review of the general arrangement (GA) of 
the vessel, seen in Figures 38 and 39 also Table 15 [127]. Once the identification and evaluation 
of the MV-Bluefin systems and operations have been undertaken, as well as their respective 
location determined, it is possible to estimate the risk related to operational capabilities of the 
target systems in relation to defined environmental conditions. After defining the risk value, 
the initial design approach for the target can be selected. This selection is based on previous 
solutions, the operator’s experience or a completely new solution. If the design is developed 
further, a more detailed evaluation of system cost and performance can be conducted further 
[127]. 
 
Figure 38: General arrangement of the MV-Bluefin vessel. 
Machinery Systems 
➢ Main Engine. 
➢ Generators, Both 1 and 2. 
➢ Electrical Distribution 
Board. 
➢ Propulsion System. 
➢ Main Steering Gear. 
➢ Emergency Steering Gear. 
➢ Bilge Pumps and System. 
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➢ Main and Emergency  
Fire Pump. 
➢ Derrick.  
➢ Fire Detection System. 
➢ Windlass Cable 
and Anchors. 
Fire Pump. 
➢ Derrick.  
➢ Fire Detection System. 
➢ Windlass Cable 
and Anchors. 
Navigation Equipment 
➢ Navigation Charts. 
➢ Magnetic Compass. 
➢ Radar. 
 
Figure 39: Measurement of the bridge winds as length, breadth, and size. 
Emergency Response Equipment 
➢ Firefighting Equipment.  
➢ First Aid Equipment. 
➢ A Range of Lifesaving Appliances. 





Table 15: Type of electronic hydraulic with automatic overload control. 
Items (electronic hydraulic) Automatic overload control 
Propeller Make Ulstein, Rotation RH 
Model 4 Blade Diameter 2.2m Variable Pitch 
Forward Power Take-Off Make Twin Disc 
Governor Woodward Electronic 
Generators Leroy Somers, Model LSAM442S7, Power 
86EKW, 107 KVCA, 3 Phases 
Model SP 214 PM T1 Triple Output, 
Rating 38.5 HP/100 RPM 
471.62/1,225 RPM 
Auxiliary Engines Caterpillar Electric Start 24V DC 
Voltage Regulators Genuas ayr 380 
Model SBO 242 
Controllers Deep Sea Electronics, Model 8610 Auto 
Synchronise 
An Excitation Support System Basler 




Manoeuvring and Propulsion  
➢ C.P. Propeller 
➢ Bow Thruster 
➢ Bow Anchor, Anchor Cable Length: 150m 
Steering Gear 
➢ Wagner Electric Hydraulic Twin Ram  
➢ Model T-15-35-EB2. Full follow up. 
➢ Automatic Change Over to hand Steering in the Event of Power Loss 
➢ Setting Relief Valve at 1,000PSI 
➢ Balanced Rudder Type 
➢ Angle 37 ½° or 75° total 
➢ Hard over to hard time – 11/22 seconds 
 
A model MAB-103B Alfa Laval Separator, assembled with a solid retaining bowl, was 
installed in 1985. This served a dual purpose; to maintain the clean and satisfactory condition 
of the hydraulic oil, as well as to remove all contaminant from the fuel. This assembly ensures 
the safe transfer of fuel at sea from the double-bottom tanks to the daily service tank, as well 
as circulating the fuel within individual tanks. The liquid contained in the separator bowl is 
subjected to an estimated 7,000 times the gravity on Earth.  
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6.5 MV-Bluefin’s Main System Specifications 
The MV-Bluefin consists of a number of systems, initially converted from the original fishing 
vessel to systems required by a research vessel, thereby reducing costs [127]. 
 
Cooling Seawater System Aboard the MV-Bluefin 
As demonstrated in Figure 40, the cooling seawater system (CSWS) for the main and auxiliary 
engines is circulated through the Caterpillar engine driven. This applies to both the freshwater 
system FW and the seawater SW cooling system. The air-conditioning refrigeration plant 
condenser is seawater cooled using a Stalker centrifugal pump (CP) with a similar relief valve 
working at a pressure of 200 KPA. 
 
 
Figure 40: MV-Bluefin plate heat cooling system exchanger [127].    
Freshwater System 
Two double bottom tanks, as well as aft side tanks, make up the FW, weighing a total of 56 
tonnes. The water is pumped from the respective tank into a pressure vessel, which is controlled 
by a pressure switch. The FW is distributed throughout the MV-Bluefin from the pressure 
storage through a filtering system, as seen in Figure 41. 




Figure 41: FW hydrophone pump [127]. 
Sewage Pump System 
The sewage pump system (SPS) found aboard the MV-Bluefin allows for water in the toilets. 
Situated in the engine room forward, as seen in Figure 42, the sewerage tank collects sullage 
water from the lower deck. From here, it is pumped into an Ecomar 6AC sewerage treatment 
unit, which includes an inbuilt macerator where the waste products are chemically treated. The 
Econmar unit is both Lloyd’s and IMO approved. 
 
 




Fire Main Pump (Water on Deck) 
Manufactured by Kelly & Lewis and supplied by an electrically driven CP type of 1 ¼ -9, the 
fire main pump (FMP) draws saltwater from the main seawater, thereby feeding the main fire 
switch. Figure 43 demonstrates this, which doubles as a general service pump. An additional 
fire pump for the event of an emergency is powered by an independent diesel motor found in 
the steering flat. This doubles as a 3-cylinder self-priming Yanmar to Stalker pump. 
 
Figure 43: Water on deck aboard the MV-Bluefin [127]. 
Bilge Pump System 
Divided into a multitude of compartments, the MV-Bluefin is equipped with a bilge suction 
pipe that leads to a valve chest, ultimately all connecting to the bilge pump section chest. The 
chest utilises a sea injection valve for the purpose of priming, and the self-priming bilge pump 
is a model Pegson 2” B3 Kelly & Lewis. A dual-purpose exists in the pumping of water ballast 
from the aft peaks’ tanks, and all discharge is ejected overboard. This can be seen in Figure 44, 




Figure 44: Bilge Pump System (BPS) aboard the MV-Bluefin [130]. 
Bilge Pump System Components 
The BPS aboard the MV-Bluefin is designed to eject bilge water from vessel compartments, as 
listed in Table 16. The source of the aforementioned bilge comes in the form of leaks in the 
cooling system, hull, or stern tube glands [59]. Adjacent compartments must be kept dry by the 
BPS when the vessel’s hull is filled with water. 
Table 16: Standardised BPS components. 
Component Function 
Pump The self-priming bilge pump draws water from the bilge through 
suction and ejects it at sea. 
Pipes All pipes are required to be constructed from a material that is not 
adversely affected by foreign materials, including fuel and oil. These 
pipes allow for the transport of bilge water through the BPS. 
Strainers Strainers prohibit the contamination of the bilge pump. 
Bilge Pump 
Level Alarm 





Bilgewater is ejected out to sea through the non-return valves which 
stop seawater from entering the vessel. 
Suction Non-
Return Valves 
The transport of water between compartments in the vessel requires 




Fish Handling Room  
Branching from the fire main, seawater is supplied for the washing down and cleaning of the 
fish handing room and fish fillets. The handling room has a large drainage sump on the 
starboard side fitted with a float switch and a high-level alarm. The float switch controls a CD 
60 mono pump situated in the engine room, which pumps the sump contents overboard as 
required [127]. 
 
Seawater Cooling System Modification for MV-Bluefin Winterisation 
Drawn from the seawater main and pumped into a low-temperature pressure vessel, the 
Seawater Cooling System Modification (SWCSM), controlled by a pressure switch, as seen in 
Figure 45. The water is pumped from storage tanks into the vessel’s internal systems for 
cooling as well as a variety of other systems, including the toilet and wash deck systems [127]. 
 
Figure 45: Components of the SWCS aboard the MV-Bluefin when preparing for winterisation. 
Sewage System Modification for MV-Bluefin Winterisation 
Drawn from the SW main and pumped through the low-temperature pressure vessel, the SS is 
controlled by the pressure switch, as seen in Figure 46. Water is pumped from the storage tank 




Figure 46: Sewage system modification for the MV-Bluefin. 
The propulsion system aboard the MV-Bluefin consists of the following components: The 
main engine, a driving device, a marine shaft, and a propeller in Figure 47. The engine 
provides the impulse behind the marine propulsion system, while the driving device 
connects and transfers the energy emitted from the main engine to the shaft, which parts the 
energy to the propeller. The vessel is, therefore, able to sail [131]. 
 
Figure 47:  MV-Bluefin propulsion system [131]. 
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Fuel Oil System  
The fuel oil system (FOS) aboard the MV-Bluefin, shown in Figure 48, consists of two distinct 
segments: the fuel supply and injection systems, respectively. The provision of fuel oil is 
achieved through the fuel supply system, which receives and stores fuel before delivering it to 
settling tanks. This supply system consists of bunkering, storage, transfer, offloading, and 
treatment. Fuel oils are loaded through deck fill connections that have sample connections 
provided to permit the fuel to be sampled a bit taken aboard. Heavy fuel oil is loaded in storage 
tanks fitted with heating coils [33]. 
 
Figure 48: MV-Bluefin FOS components [33]. 
Lubrication of Oil System 
Below the sump, otherwise known as the drain tank, the lubrication oil system (LOS) is stored 
at the base of the crankcase in Figure 49. The oil stored in this system, used to feed the engine, 
is drawn through a number of stages: a Strine, a pump, a fine filter, and finally passed through 
a cooler prior to being distributed through the engine and into various branch pipes. The oil 
originating from the lubrication system will pass through a drilled passage into the crankshaft 
and finally pass from a drilled passage into the connecting rod to the gudgeon pin or crosshead 
bearing [132]. The oil cooler is circulated by seawater, which will be operating at low 
temperature, and the oil will be affected base on that, which is at a lower pressure than the oil. 
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As a result, any leak in the cooler will mean a loss of oil and not contaminate the oil by seawater 
[132]. Special attention is made to this critical system to ensure that it is operating safely to 
avoid the system's failure. 
 
Figure 49: LOS aboard the MV-Bluefin [132].             
6.6 Comparison of the MV Bluefin Systems with the Polar Code 
Methodology and Guidelines 
As shown in Table 17, the MV-Bluefin vessel's systems are compared with the requirements 
for winterisation as dictated by the polar code method. After performing the induction survey 
for the MV-Bluefin research vessel, expert judgement will be provided in order to determine 
whether the systems aboard the MV-Bluefin can operate safely and effectively in polar regions. 
Table 17: The winterisation methods for MV-Bluefin systems. 
Structures/Systems Items Aboard the MV 
Bluefin Y/N 
Potential Winterisation Methods 
Hull Construction Tanks No Heat tracing, air bubbler system, insulation, 
heating coils. 
Equipment Deckhouses Yes Heat tracing, insulation, ice repellent coatings, 
de-icing or anti-icing chemical application. 
Superstructures Yes Heating tracing, insulation, ice repellent 
coatings, de-icing or anti-icing chemical 
application. 
Anchoring arrangements Yes Heating tracing, insulation. 
Vessel System and 
Machinery 
Prime mover   Heat tracing, self-draining piping. 
Combustion air systems Yes Heat tracing, insulation. 
Anchor windlass Yes Heat tracing, ice repellent coatings. 
Cargo handling equipment Yes Heat tracing, ice repellent coatings, insulation. 
Piping systems Yes Heat tracing, insulation, self-draining piping. 
Electric systems Yes Heat tracing, insulation. 
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Structures/Systems Items Aboard the MV 
Bluefin Y/N 
Potential Winterisation Methods 
Fire safety systems Yes Heat tracing, insulation, de-icing or anti-icing 
chemical application, chemical seals. 
Safety Systems Navigational equipment Yes Heat tracing, insulation. 
Launching stations and  
arrangements 
Yes Heat tracing, insulation, de-icing or anti-icing 
chemical application. 
Lifeboats No Insulation, ice repellent coatings. 
Pressure Relief 
System 
Pressure relief valves  No Heat tracing. 
Emergency vapor depressurising 
equipment 
No Heat tracing, insulation. 
Process Equipment Process vessels (Fishing room)  No Heat tracing, insulation, chemical seals. 
Process heat exchangers No 
Process electric heaters No 
Compressors Yes 
Pumps Yes 
Atmospheric storage tanks No 
Process Pipe System Thermal relief valves  Yes Heat tracing, chemical seals. 
Block valves Yes 
Safety System Fire and gas detection 
Emergency shutdown station 
Yes Heat tracing, insulation, de-icing anti-icing 
chemical application, chemical seals. 
Machinery Spaces steering gear room (Yes), emergency fire 
pump room, CO2 rooms (Yes), foam 
rooms (No), battery rooms, and bow 




Lighting Deck lights that do not generate sufficient 
heating to stay ice-free shall be fitted with 
additional heating to make them 
operational 
No Heat tracing. 
Cranes Cranes that are required for essential 
safety functions (e.g., crane used for 
launching the rescue boat. 
No (Heating) or passive (shielding). 
Fuel Oil System Fuel oil heating system (No) shall be 
sufficiently dimensioned to enable 
transfer of fuel under the design 
environmental conditions (Yes) 
Yes/No heat tracing. 
Hydraulic Power 
Systems 
Hydraulic fluid shall either be of a type 
that maintains an acceptable 
viscosity, or the hydraulic system shall 
have heating/circulation 
arrangements to keep fluids at an 
appropriate temperature 
Yes Hydraulic power systems 
Engine Rooms, and 
Dead Ship Restart 
(Yes) 
Machinery may require air intake 
heating, cooling water heating and lube 
oil heating (No), depending on individual 
machinery specifications, to ensure it 
can re-start from a dead-ship condition 
after 30 minutes. 
Yes/No Heat tracing. 
 
The air bubbler system consists of a power cable, air release units, an automation system, 
compressors, and a range of pipes. By introducing air pressure into the vessel’s system, the air 
bubbler detects the pressure required and therefore measures the water level and reduces 
propeller resistance, reducing the fuel consumption rate from 5% to 10% and increases the 
speed. In addition, this system has been approved by classification societies.  
 
Table 18 shows the heat tracing and insulation system, aiming to preserve or raise the 
temperature of the pipes, and ultimately the vessel as a whole through the use of heat tracing 
cables. This occurs as a result of the electrical heating devices, which run along the length of 
the pipes in close physical proximity. This may be used in an effort to protect the pipes from 
freezing in the polar climate while also maintaining a constant flow temperature in hot water 
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systems, as well as the preservation of temperatures in systems where various substances with 
different melting points are being transported. Table 19 represents justification for the 
assessment of winterisation systems aboard the MV-Bluefin. 
Table 18: Potential issues arising on the MV-Bluefin as a result of polar temperatures. 
System or 
Component 
Potential Problems Y/N 
Lubrication 
oil 
It is necessary to confirm all main propulsion and auxiliary prime movers are provided 





The ship will install electric heaters (No) and wipers (Yes) to clean some of the bridge 
windows for de-icing purposes; however, alternate bridge windows will not be 










The bow door and stern ramps are noted as hydraulically operated; it is not clear 
whether these systems are suitable for operations at the MAT (–25oC); it is also 





It is not clear how sanitary waterlines will be protected from freezing on decks and 
equipment; it is noted that the ships fire and wash water lines pass through decks and 
equipment and drawing in Appendix indicates that pipes are exposed to open air low 
temperature. 
No 
Valves It is noted that the ramps and bow doors are hydraulically operated and the control 
valves are located on the surface deck, which is exposed to ambient temperatures; it is 
not clear how they will be protected from freezing in the harsh environment. 
No 




It is not clear whether the heating arrangements will be sufficient to heat the 





It is not clear how the ventilators for the HVAC systems will be kept ice- and snow-
free; they are protected from snow accumulation and icing problem that it may 






The ABS (LTE) Guide/ DNV.GL have required that the auxiliary boiler and its 
controls be operable on the emergency source of power; it is not clear whether 
emergency heating will be provided to space where passengers will stay during a 
blackout; drawing number is indicated that any exposed pipes are to be insulated and 
heat traced even though drawing number does not indicate any heat tracing. 
No 
Engine room The ABS (LTE), Guide/ DNV, have requirements that if any of the engines are to be 
on standby in low temperatures that the automation system includes a low-temperature 
alarm to notify the operator that the temperature is too low to start the machinery; not 




It is not clear whether the lifeboat engine will be able to perform its function at the 




 The ABS (LTE), Guide/ DNV, have required lifeboats be sized at 125% to 
accommodate bulky cold-weather clothing; it is noted that for example the POB is to 




Please confirm that the navigational equipment can operate in conditions the vessel is 
expected to operate at the design service temperature. 
No 
Escape route It is not clear how escape routes will be kept from snow and ice and readily functional. No 
Exterior 
stairs 
The exterior stairs are noted as being steeper than the 35oC required by the LTE Guide 




Switchboard for winterisation systems shall be arranged as required for distribution 
switchboards. A wattmeter or ampere meter, indicating the total load shall be installed 
on the switchboard. Marking on the switchboard shall state the load on each circuit, as 




Table 19: Justifications for the assessment of winterisation systems aboard the MV-Bluefin. 
Systems 
(Bluefin) 




Bridge window Yes Ice/snow accretion often occurred on the bridge windows on the existing (MV-
Bluefin); considering the same bridge window arrangement, winterisation is 
necessary; the new design for ship’s (Bluefin) will have wipers and heaters for the 
de-icing purpose; heating requirements need to be identified; additionally, the new 
design does not have alternate heated windows, which is not in compliance with the 
LTE Guide; we need to consider the risk of reduced visibility when the unheated 
windows are blocked, 
Escape route No Escape routes on the MV-Bluefin are not existing. 
Exterior stairs Yes Ice/snow accretion often occurred on the exterior stairs of the existing Bluefin; the 
stair slopes of the old and new designs are the same; stairs on both designs are 
exposed to a harsh environment condition. 
Lubricating oil Yes The questionnaire feedback showed that at approximately 20 oC the captain needed 
the lubricating oil to run the engine; risk exceeded the acceptable level. 
Anchor 
windlass 
Yes Ice/snow accretion often occurred on the forecastle deck of the existing Bluefin, 
including anchor windlass/mooring equipment on deck; however, the thickness is 
less than 1 inch; this ice build-up on the anchor windlass could adversely affect the 
drop of the anchor in an emergency. 
Bow door and 
stern ramps 
No Bow/stern ramps’ hydraulic systems are not on the existing in the Bluefin. Based on 
the history, most ships never have had any operation problem as a result of low 
temperature; considering the same arrangements on the new bluefin design, hydraulic 
systems do not need to be winterised; however, there will be heaters in the ramps’ 
hydraulic systems of the new design Bluefin; seals for bow doors will remain pliant 
assuming nitrile rubber is used; although the result showed that it may not be 
necessary to winterise the bow and stern ramps’ hydraulic systems, they should 
always be well maintained for a cold environment, e.g., changing filters, check hoses 
and fittings 
Water pipelines Yes Risk exceeded the acceptable level 
Valves No It is noted that the control valves are located on deck, which is exposed to ambient 
temperatures; all hydraulic systems are inside; therefore, there should not be any icing 
problem; they will be functional regardless of hydraulic oil viscosity; the only noted 
hazard could be possible damage of valves caused by manual ice removal by mallets 
or hammers. 
Air vent Yes The existing Bluefin does not have tank air pipes freeze or clog in low temperature 
either as a result of ice accretion or freezing of the ball to seal the vent pipe; if it is 
existing of the existing Bluefin is fully enclosed; the new Bluefin has air vent pipes 
exposed and this needs winterisation, 
Emergency 
generator room 
Yes On the existing Bluefin has not existed the emergency generator compartment. As a 
result of cold temperature, a new design made to the new Bluefin should be 
considered for the winterisation requirements to be fulfilled. 
Ventilators for 
HVAC system 
No On the existing Bluefin, the ventilation inlets have not been  this system; the new 
design is safer than the old design with a higher intake position; it is facing inside, 
which makes it more preventive from spray; there is an option to circulate engine 
room air to provide heating to make it safer which is needed to maintain the engine 
room temperature at 100C; it is greater than the available propulsion machinery 
output (129hp/93.6 kw) 
Engine room Yes The engine room needs to be heated to maintain its room temperature at 10oC 
Lifeboat engine Yes Captain of the existing Bluefin has experienced difficulties starting the lifeboat 
engine as a result of low temperature 
Navigational 
equipment 
Yes No information regarding navigation equipment on the new design was provided; 
assumptions made for risk assessment; risk exceeded the acceptable level 






Based on expert consultation, it has been concluded that the systems onboard the MV-Bluefin 
vessel do not all align with the recommendations set out by the polar code, with particular 
cause-for-action associated with the temperature-sensitive sea chest systems, the auxiliary 
system required for heat tracing, the SWCS, as well as the SS. Thus, modification is required 
in order to mitigate potential system failure. However, this chapter investigates the MV-
Bluefin’s capacity to transport passengers, operate in polar regions, demonstrate the heat 
tracing and insulation system, preserve or increase the temperature of the pipes. This was in an 
effort to evaluate the various winterisation systems best onboard the vessel and ensure their 
compliance with the polar code. This will be achieved as part of the following objectives 
aforementioned. This research aims to collect old data of icebreaker and ice-capable research 
ships (greater than 500GT) from 2013 to 2019. These data were collected based on the literature 
review from different sources such as journal article, thesis, book, report and website and was 
validated. To select a suitable ice-class for the MV-Bluefin vessel operating in polar regions 
recommended by DNV, cold climate expertise has unique experience working in the polar 
regions with over 1,700 vessels with several ice-class notations represent above 30% of the 
DNV classed fleet. At present, DNV has in class up to 30 vessels with high ice class, including 
19 ice breakers, which identified ice-class for Bluefin vessel can be operated in cold water 
regions. According to the  DNV has developed several classifications that can be used to 
mitigate unwanted risks and several issues highlighted in this study. These classifications 
follow internationally recognised standard within the shipping community and ensure an 
individual ship is independently verified. DNV can issue statutory certificates for vessels 













Chapter 7: Developing the Numerical Risk Analysis Model in the 
Case of the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel 
7.1 Introduction 
Onboard the MV-Bluefin, the Australian Maritime College’s flagship training and research 
vessel, are four major systems―the Seawater Cooling System (SWCS), the LOS, the FOS, and 
the accommodation and bridge insulation of heat tracing (ASI)―all of which are sensitive to 
the harsh environmental conditions of the Antarctic region. 
 
This chapter aims to evaluate the power requirement of the MV-Bluefin in order to safeguard 
against system failure in the face of hostile polar temperatures, as well as identifying potentially 
vulnerable systems. Thus, Chapter 7 developed an innovate numerical model in order to 
classify the effects of harsh temperatures on various systems. 
 
The above objectives can be achieved through: 
➢ The identification of all major systems aboard the MV-Bluefin research vessel; 
➢ The development of a numerical model based on seawater and air temperature 
respectively, which aims to estimate the energy required for the systems aboard the 
MV-Bluefin to maintain an internal temperature of 18°C despite outside temperatures; 
and 
➢ An estimate of the power demand (W) for each system aboard the MV-Bluefin in order 
to identify trends and mitigate future risks. 
7.2 Seawater Cooling System 
The SWCS is one such system that may be adversely affected by the winterisation of the vessel 
in the inhospitable polar climate. This is due to the movement of SW throughout the vessel 
powered by a CP, which aims to draw heat away from the engines of the vessel by circulating 
SW through the sea chest, towards the heat exchanger, and finally to the engine itself [133, 
134]. Table 20 represents the system properties of the MV-Bluefin. In order to determine the 
mass flow rate m' (kg/s) and the power required (W), the following equations [135] aim to 
calculate the system’s demand (W) for each system which highlighted in Table 21 to 26.  
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                            ……………….  (2) 
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Table 20: System properties of the MV-Bluefin research vessel. 
FOS LOS SWCS 
U 170 w/m2.k U 850 w/m2.k U 600 w/m2.k 
A 8 m2 A 12 m2 A 10 m2 
Q 99066 J/s Q 112812 J/s Q 100962 J/s 
Cp, SW 4 J/goC Cp, SW 4 J/goC Cp, SW 4 J/goC 
Cp, Light oil 2.09 J/goC Cp, Light oil 2.38 J/goC Cp, Light oil 2.13 J/goC 
 
Table 21: Inputs for the above calculation for motor power demand. 









Table 22: Inputs for the above calculation for the mass flow rate of coolant. 








Figure 50 shows the relationship between the SWCS power demand where the SW temperature 
ranges (ΔT) from -2 °C to 12 °C, thus demonstrating that the demand for pumping power falls 
in relation to the dropping temperature of the cooling fluid [136]. For the fluid to maintain in a 
liquid state at a temperature of 12°C, 28.25W are required. Thus, it is recommended that the 
fluid not fall below a temperature of -2 °C; the power is assumed constant below that point 
with a power demand of 25W in order to avoid freezing and subsequent systems failure. Further 
work may exist in determining the energy required for the heating of SW inputs below the 
temperature of -2°C. 












Figure 50: Relationship between the power demand (W) and the SW temperature of intake (ΔT) °C. 
Figure 51 shows the relationship between the coolant's mass flow rate (kg/s) and the 
temperature difference (ΔT) ranging from -2 °C to 12 °C. As the coolant's mass flow rate is 
reduced, so too does the coolant temperature from 0.569 (kg/s) at 12°C to around 0.50 (kg/s) 
at 0 °C; the power is assumed constant below that point. In an effort to maintain the liquid state 
of the coolant, the mass flow rate cannot be reduced further than 0.50 (kg/s) at -2°C, as this 
may result in unintended systems failure [137]. 
 
 































































7.3 Lubrication Oil System 
The lubrication oil system (LOS), found inside the vessel's engine room, acts as a large loop 
whereby oil is suctioned from lower tanks to higher tanks by the pump. Much like the SWCS, 
this must remain in a fluid state, and therefore, a heat exchanger is essential to mitigate potential 
systems failure[138]. Table 23 provides inputs for the calculation of the LOS. 
Table 23: Calculation inputs for the power demand of the LOS. 








Figure 52 shows the relationship between the SW temperature at intake and the power 
requirement (W) of the LOS, with temperature difference (ΔT) ranging from -2°C to 12°C. As 
the temperature of the SW decreases, so too does the power demand. It is, however, assumed 
that once the temperature falls below -2 °C, the power is assumed to be constant below that 
point that the demand remains constant at 50W in an effort to ensure that a systems failure does 
not occur. As the temperature increases above 12°C, the power demand of the motor increases 
to 56.70W, although further research is required into the optimum temperature of the SW at 
intake, such that the system does not require excess power nor does the SW freeze. 
 



















































7.4 Fuel Oil System 
The transport of fuel throughout the vessel occurs such that oil housed in different tank 
locations may be transferred by a suction pump. An issue unique to the low temperatures of 
the polar regions, however, is that the viscosity of the fuel oil decreases in line with the ambient 
temperature and thus requires heating. Table 24 provides inputs for the calculation of the FOS 
[139]. 
Table 24: Inputs for the calculation of power requirements of the FOS. 
 
 
Figure 53 shows the relationship between the power demand (W) of the fuel oil heating system 
with the SW temperature at intake (°C), with a temperature difference (ΔT) ranging from -2 °C 
to 12 °C. As the temperature decreases, so too does the demand for power by the heating system 
with the power demand stagnating at -2°C; the power is assumed constant below that point 
with 25.75W. As the temperatures in the region fluctuate, an increased power demand exists at 
12°C and 29.25W. While further work is required into the optimum temperature of SW at 
intake, it is not recommended that the vessel takes on SW below -2°C as this may lead to 
extremely high fuel oil viscosity and the subsequent freezing of the system. 
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7.5 Accommodation Insulation and Heat Tracing  
The extreme temperature fluctuations, coupled with the harshness of the Antarctic region, 
ensures that most, if not all, of the equipment stored on the deck of the vessel are exposed to 
hazardous conditions which may affect function. Equipment, and crew members, housed inside 
the vessel suffer a similar fate in that low air temperatures affect their daily lives and duties. 
Thus, heat tracing is required in order to ensure that adequate heating is provided to areas such 
as the crew accommodation, the cabins, windows, hatch doors, and the navigation equipment 
[140]. Table 25 provides inputs for the calculation of the heating of the vessel. 
 
Table 25: Inputs for the power demand calculation of the heating of the vessel. 









Figure 54 shows the relationship between the ambient air temperature at intake (°C) and the 
power demand (W) for the vessel’s heating systems, with temperatures (ΔT) ranging from 0 
°C to -27°C as the air temperature plummets, so to make the demand for power.  
 
 
Figure 54: The relationship between the air temperature at intake (°C) and the power demand (W) for 






























Air temperature at intake, t1 (°C)
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It can be seen from Figure 54 when the demand for power at 0°C, that equates to 230W, while 
at -27°C, 240W is required by the system. This means the AIS demands power increase when 
the ambient temperature decreases; the power is assumed constant below that point. However, 
further work is required for the optimum power requirement for subzero conditions to avoid 
the all-too-real loss of human life. 
7.6 The Development of a Numerical Model in Maintaining an Ambient 
Internal Temperature of 18°C 
The power requirements in order to maintain an ambient internal temperature of 18°C may be 
determined according to the numerical model developed by this thesis, where two vectors―SW 
temperature and ambient air temperature―are taken into consideration. Table 26 represents 
the relationship between temperatures (°C) to estimate the heating energy requirement. The 
assumptions made by the model include the following: 
 
Thermal efficiency index (haa) = 0.8 
Thermal efficiency index (haw) = 0.7 
Air-air area (Aaa) = 525 m2 
Air-water area (Aaw) = 620 m2 
Air-air interface (U) = 5 W/(m2k) 
Air-water interface (U) =15 W/(m2k) 
Table 26: Relationship between temperatures (°C) to estimate the heating energy requirement. 




















 0 -5 -10 -15 -18 -22 -27 
10 13.02 48.72 59.22 69.72 76.02 84.42 94.92 
8 26.04 61.74 72.24 82.74 89.04 97.44 107.94 
6 39.06 74.76 85.26 95.76 102.06 110.46 120.96 
4 52.08 87.78 98.28 108.78 115.08 123.48 133.98 
0 78.12 113.82 124.32 134.82 141.12 149.52 160.02 
-2 78.12 113.82 124.32 134.82 141.12 149.52 160.02 
 
Figure 55 shows the relationship between the demand for heating energy (Q; kW) and the 
fluctuations in air temperatures (tair; °C) ranging between 0°C to -27°C and SW temperatures 
(tsw; °C) ranging between -2°C to 10°C in an effort to estimate the heating required to maintain 
an internal ambient temperature of 18°C. It can be seen that the heating energy requirement, 
(Q; kW) reached a peak at 225 kW at two temperature vectors, SW and air respectively. Thus, 
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this thesis has determined that the MV-Bluefin cannot operate reliably in polar regions due to 
insufficient power and associated risk to life. 
 
 
Figure 55: Relationship between the heating energy demand (Q; kW) and temperature difference (tsw and 
tair; °C). 
7.7 Conclusion 
In an effort to determine whether the MV-Bluefin was able to operate safely in polar regions, 
this thesis developed a numerical model to estimate the energy requirement for the vessel to 
maintain an internal ambient temperature that was suitable for both the success of the mission 
as well as the safeguarding of lives. As demonstrated in Figure 55, the MV-Bluefin is required 
to exert 225 kW to maintain a safe 18°C internal temperature, as well as requiring 25W to 
operate the SWCS safely, 50W to maintain the LOS, 25.75W to ensure adequate fuel viscosity 
in the FOS, and 240W to ensure adequate heating of the vessel. Thus, the MV-Bluefin is 
adversely affected by SW and air temperature and is ill-equipped to ensure safe passage 
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Chapter 8: Derivation of the Additional Risk Model and Risk 
Analysis for the Winterisation of the MV-Bluefin 
8.1. Introduction 
The operation of vessels in and around the Antarctic and Arctic regions has always been a 
matter of concern for the IMO as a result of harsh and inhospitable weather conditions, a 
distinct lack of infrastructure, remoteness and isolation from land, darkness and the distinct 
lack of accurate charts relative to other areas of the globe, as well as the harshness of the 
climate, the Antarctic region poses unique risks to shipping activity. Climate change, melting 
sea ice, and the enhanced possibilities for economic activity in the polar oceans have led to 
considerable attention in recent years and the implementation of new rules and regulations to 
protect human life and the marine environment. However, this system's winterisation for polar 
vessels must consider the new failure modes in this environment due to the presence of ice and 
reduction in seawater temperature affecting the standard temperature for the operating system. 
This may pose a big issue for the systems that cannot handle the dramatic temperature 
differences when entering from warmer to colder climates. As such, the identification of safety 
and risk power level indications, along with their performance, is crucial. 
 
The chapter aims to develop an additional risk model and risk analysis for the winterisation of 
the MV-Bluefin’s systems when operating in the Antarctica region. The objective is to develop 
these additional models in order to calculate according to two-dimensional weather vectors 
(first coordinate sea-water temperature and second coordinate air temperature). 
These objectives can be achieved by: 
➢ The calculation of power demand as a function of ambient temperatures, through the 
use of randomised temperature measurements; and 
➢ An estimation of power risk probability is identified when power demand exceeds the 
MV-Bluefin generators' power supply. 
 
The power consumed by each system, including the SWCS, the fuel oil system FOS, the LOS, 
and the general heating of the vessel, is entirely reliant on the SW and air temperatures, 
respectively are shown in Table 27-30, and also seen in Appendix A1 – B1.  
 
The MV-Bluefin research vessel relies on two main generators in the engine room, of which 
each produces 86 kW. 
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Total power produced = <172 kW 
It is vital to note that the batteries room consumes an estimated 24 V, which relies on constant 
power. The power, however, is not reliant on the SW or air temperature. Table 27 represents 
the consumption of energy derived from the generator, and Table 28 represents the consumers 
which are using constant power (kW) below a set defined temperature according to the vessel’s 
component. 
  
Table 27: Consumption of energy derived from the generator. 
Consumers of ship electricity 
Main fire pump Hydrophone tank FW 
Fire detection system Boiler 
Bow thruster pump Bilge pump 
Propulsion system fuel purifier 
Derrick Oil separator 
Ventilators for HVAC system Navigational equipment 
Emergency fire pump Alarm system 
Navigational equipment Kitchen lights (CFL) 
Batteries room Living room lights (CFL) 
Accommodation and utilities Bedroom Lights 
Mooring winch Living room AC unit -1.5tons 
Steering gear Bedroom AC unit-1 tone 
Baggage crane Refrigerator 
Crane Electric water heater 
Provision davit Microwave Oven 
Workshop equipment Main Centrifugal pump 
Incinerator Ballast pump water 
Welding equipment Sea chest system 
Starting air compressor Coffee machine 
Control air compressor Electric clothes dryer 
Plasma Tv Desktop computer 
Oil pump Laptop 
Seawater cooling pump Windlass 
Electric motor (Turbocharge) Cargo pump converters 
 
Table 28: Constant power used by the consumer. 
Items Power kW 
Hydrophone tank FW 1.5 
Electric water heater 4.0 
Refrigerator 1.5 
Main steering gear 3.4 
Deck equipment (lifesaving appliances) 3.6 
Bow thruster pump 8.0 
Ventilators for HVAC system 1.5 
Air vessel tank 0.05 
Starting air compressor 2.86 
Navigational equipment 1.9 
Bilge pump 0.5 
Alarm system 0.5 
Electric motor (Turbocharge) 1.5 




Table 29: Power used by consumers that depends on the air temperature. 
Components Air temperatures (°C) 
-27 -22 -18 -15 -10 -5 0 
Provision davit, unit 2.33 2.14 1.98 1.90 1.84 1.75 1.50 
Motor Gangway, unit 1.89 1.80 1.77 1.75 1.66 1.45 1.40 
Electric motor wipers 1.01 1 0.99 0.90 0.86 0.80 0.78 
Workshop equipment 2.3 2.01 1.9 1.87 1.33 1.11 0.99 
Accommodation and 
utilities 
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Mooring winch 7.90 7.55 7.02 6.5 6.33 5.99 5.52 
Kitchen lights  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Living room lights  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Bedroom Lights, unit 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 
Microwave Oven, unit 1.3 1.29 1.25 1.02 1 0.99 0.92 
Plasma Tv, unit 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Coffee machine 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Electric clothes dryer 3.9 3.89 3.82 3.79 3.71 3.69 3.65 
Heat pump 1.99 1.82 1.53 1.44 1.40 1.35 1.30 
Desktop computer 
&Laptop 
1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Total of power (kW) 26.41 25.29 24.03 22.93 21.75 20.73 19.62 
Table 30: Power used by consumers that depends on the seawater temperature. 
Components Seawater temperature (°C) 
-2 0 4 6 8 10 12 
Emergency fire pump 7.33 6.53 6.02 5.88 5.30 4.66 4.11 
Ballast pump water 4.96 4.21 3.45 3.11 3 2.64 2.22 
Sea chest pump seawater 15.25 15.12 14.44 14.30 14.10 13.89 13.75 
Cargo pump converters 11.05 10.95 10.89 10.82 10.77 10.70 10.55 
 Total of power (kW) 38.59 36.80 34.80 34.11 33.17 31.89 30.63 
8.2 Power Demand-Supply Model 
A vector of n seawater (SW) temperatures (°C) may be calculated as follows: 
 ,1 ,2 ,, , ,fixed fixed fixed fixedsw sw sw sw nt t t t=  
where 
,min ,1 ,2 , ,max
fixed fixed fixed
sw sw sw sw n swT t t t T      
Here, the maximum and minimum SW temperatures under consideration are denoted as Tsw, 
max and Tsw, min. A vector of m air temperature (°C) may be calculated as follows: 
 ,1 ,2 ,, , ,fixed fixed fixed fixedair air air air mt t t t=  
where 
,min ,1 ,2 , ,max
fixed fixed fixed
air air air air n airT t t t T      
Here, the maximum and minimum air temperatures under consideration are denoted as Tair, max 
and Tair, min. The weather, in this case, is determined by a combination of SW temperature and 
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air temperature. Let W  be a random two-dimensional weather vector. Its first coordinate is the 
random variable “seawater temperature” Tsw, measured in °C. Its second coordinate is the 
random variable “air temperature” Tair, measured in °C: 
 ,sw airW T T=  
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Define n × m different fixed weather vectors as follows: 




i jw , power demand (kW) may be calculated as: 
,
fixed
i jD   
Let the maximum power supply for the winterized “MV Bluefin” vessel be S kW. 





airt . These midpoints require calculation.  
Define a vector of n+1 seawater margin temperature as follows: 
 ,1 ,2 , 1, , ,margin margin margin marginsw sw sw sw nt t t t +=  
where,   ( )
,min
, , 1 ,
,max
for 1




sw i sw i sw i
sw
T i









A vector of m+1 air margin temperature may be defined as follows: 
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Now, the two-dimensional weather space can be divided into n x m rectangles Ri,j as follows: 
( ) , , , 1 , , 1, | ;  and ;margin margin margin margini j sw air sw sw i sw i air air i air iR w t t t t t t t t+ +   =       




The main assumption is that the power demand in any two-dimensional point of the rectangle 
Ri,j is constant and equal to ,
fixed
i jD kW. That is natural since the “centroid” of the rectangle Ri,j 
is the fixed vector 
,
fixed
i jw . In the three Power Risk Models which follow, we will assume that 
we have calculated and know: 
➢ the rectangles Ri,j for i=1,2,…,n; j=1,2,…,m 
➢ the power demands ,
fixed
i jD for i=1,2,…,n; j=1,2,…,m 
➢ the power supply S 
 
The power grid is calculated using the MATLAB function Power_demand_supply.m, which 
is included in Appendix A. The source of data has been used from sections 7.2-7.5 for this 
function. The power demand ,
fixed
i jD  is calculated for each of the rectangles Ri,j, where n=m=7. 
The output of the function is shown in Appendix A. The centroids of the rectangles, the power 
demand and the power supply for each rectangle are shown in Table A1 of Appendix A. The 
data for Table A1 is taken from the output parameters SeawaterT_m, AirT_m, 
PowerDemand_total_m, PowerSupply, Code_m of Power_demand_supply.m. 
8.3 First Power Risk Model 
It may be assumed that during a mission, the uncertainty about the worst possible weather 
combination is described with a two-dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF) as 
follows [141]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CDF CDF , Prsw air sw sw air airw t t T t T t= =     
Here ( ),sw airw t t=  is an arbitrary point in the two-dimensional weather space. 
The CDF at the point ( ),sw airw t t=  is the probability that the seawater temperature will be less 
or equal to tsw, and at the same time, the air temperature will be less or equal to tair.  
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The CDF is an increasing function of each of its arguments. The two-dimensional probability 
density function (PDF) is the second mixed-partial derivative of the CDF: 
( ) ( )
( )2CDF ,

























Define an area A in the two-dimensional weather space. The definite integral of the PDF over 
A is the probability that the random weather vector will belong to A: 
  ( )Pr , d dsw air sw air
A
W A PDF t t t t =   
The first approximation assumes that the worst possible weather combination can be described 
with a truncated two-dimensional normal distribution. The PDF of this distribution has the 
following form [142]: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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In the above formula: 
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|K| is the determinant of K, equal to  
( )
22 2




K-1 is the inverse matrix of K 
 
The scaling constant U has the reciprocal value of 
( ) ( )
,max ,max
,min ,min
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Here, msw and sw are the mean and the standard deviation of the random variable “seawater 
temperature”, and mair and air are the mean and the standard deviation of the random variable 
“air temperature”. The ,sw airr is the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the two random 
variables (“seawater temperature” and “air temperature”). The mean values are real numbers, 
whereas the standard deviations are positive real numbers, and a correlation coefficient is a real 
number between -1 and +1. The introduced real constant U≥1 ensures that the volume under 
the density surface over the area DomainW is one; that volume represents the probability of the 
weather vector to be in the area DomainW. 
 
Under this assumption, we need to find the probability Pi,j for the weather vector W  to belong 
to the rectangle Ri,j. We can calculate Pi,j using: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , , ,CDF , CDF , CDF , +CDF ,margin margin margin margin margin margin margin margini j sw i sw j sw i sw j sw i sw j sw i sw jP t t t t t t t t+ + + += − − ,  
for i=1,2,…,n; j=1,2,…,m 
 
The Power Risk for the ship of having bad weather condition is to fall in such a rectangle, 















The first model may be formulated given: 
➢ msw, mair, sw , air , and ,sw airr  
➢ The power demand-supply data 
 
Find: The Power Risk, Riskmodel1 
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The analytical calculation to find Riskmodel1 can be performed using the following algorithm: 
Step 1: Calculate the scaling constant U. 
Step 2: Transform the truncated PDF into truncated CDF. 
Step 3: Find probabilities Pi,j for the weather vector W  to belong to the rectangle Ri,j  
for i=1, 2,…, n;  j=1, 2,…, m. 
Step 4: Calculate the Power Risk of the model Riskmodel1. 
 
The Riskmodel1 is calculated using the MATLAB function Risk_norm_dist.m. The source code 
and the function is included in Appendix B. It takes the power demand-supply data as input 
from Power_demand_supply.m as well as the parameters msw, mair, sw , air , and ,sw airr . The 
output of the function is the probability for the two-dimensional temperature vector, which falls 




°C, and ,sw airr =0.5. The power supply was set to 220 kW, and the 
Riskmodel1 was 0.1388. The output of the software is shown under the function in Appendix B. 
The centroids of the rectangles and the probabilities for the two-dimensional temperature 
vector to fall within each rectangle are shown in Table B1 of Appendix B. As expected, the 
sum of those probabilities equals one.  
8.4 Second Risk Analysis Model 
This model is much more elaborate, and the mission is assumed to consist of Q segments. The 
q segment (for q=1,2,…,Q) is cq days, where the uncertainty about the weather combination of 
daily minimum seawater (SW) and air temperatures is described with a two-dimensional CDF 
as follows [143]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CDF CDF , Prq q sw air sw sw air airw t t T t T t= =     
















The two-dimensional PDFq is the second mixed-partial derivative of the CDFq: 
( ) ( )
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PDF =PDF , =
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The Power Risk that the winterized MV-Bluefin vessel will have at least one day of its mission 
without enough power, which will fail its mission, can practically be calculated only with 
computer simulation [144, 145]. 
 
B pseudo-realities (where B is at least 10000) is generated in Figure 56, where each simulation 
shows a full mission of c=c1+c2+…+cQ days. For each day of the mission, a weather vector 
from the relevant segment's known distribution is simulated. The mission in the pseudo-reality 
will be a success if all c weather vectors fall into the rectangles Ri,j where the demand ,
fixed
i jD  is 
not greater than the supply S. If the count of pseudo-realities with successful missions is L, then 
the Power Risk of the second power risk model is the number of unsuccessful missions B-L, 







This definition uses the frequentist approach to probabilities [141]. We have assumed that the 
PDF of the daily seawater temperatures and the air temperatures is described with two-
dimensional normal distribution [142]: 
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In the above formula: 














➢ Kq is the 2 x 2 covariance matrix 
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➢ The scaling constant Uq (for q=1,2,…,Q) has reciprocal value of: 
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Here, mq,sw and ,q sw  are the mean and the standard deviation of the random variable “sea  water 
temperature at the q segment”, and the mq,air and ,q air  are the mean and the standard deviation 
of the random variable “air temperature at the q segment”. The , ,q sw airr  is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the two random variables (“seawater temperature at the q segment” and 
“air temperature at the q segment”). The mean values are real numbers, whereas the standard 
deviations are positive real numbers, and a correlation coefficient is a real number between -1 
and +1. The introduced constant Uq≥1 ensures that for segment q the volume under the density 
surface over the area of DomainW is one; that volume represents the probability of the weather 
vector in segment q to be in the area of DomainW . 
 
The second model may be formulated given:  
➢ cq, mq,sw, mq,air, ,q sw , ,q air , , ,q sw airr (for q=1,2,…,Q) and B 
➢ The power demand-supply data 
       
Find: The Mission Power Risk, Riskmodel2 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation to find Riskmodel,2 can be performed using the following algorithm: 
 
1. Calculate the scaling constants Uq for q=1,2,…,Q 
2. Initialize L=0 (count of pseudo-realities without failures) 
3. Repeat for each pseudo-reality b (for b=1,2,…,B) 
3.1. Repeat for each segment q, for q=1,2,…,Q 
3.1.1. Repeat for each day k, for k=1,2,…,cq 
3.1.1.1. Generate a random weather vector w  from ( )qPDF w  




icurr jcurrD S , then declare a failure and go to step 4. 
3.1.2. End of the cycle for day k   
100 
 
3.2. End of the cycle for the segment q 
4. L=L+1 (count the pseudo-reality as a success) 
5. End of the cycle for pseudo-reality b 
6. Calculate the risk of the model Riskmodel2=(B-L)/B 
 
The only point which needs additional explanations is 3.1.1.1. In reality, this generation is 
realized using the rejection method via the following steps: 
 
1. A random variate ( ),cand cand candsw airw t t= is generated from the untruncated normal density 
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2. Reject the candidate vector if it does not belong to DomainW: 
 
,min ,max ,min ,maxIf ,  or ,  then, go to step 1
cand cand
sw sw sw air air airt T T t T T         
 
3. Set the generated weather vector:  
 
( ),cand cand candsw airw w t t= =  
 
The Riskmodel2 is calculated using the MATLAB function Risk_simulate_eval_dist.m. The 
text of the function is given in Appendix C. It takes as input the power demand-supply data 
from Power_demand_supply.m as well as the parameters cq, mq,sw, mq,air, ,q sw , ,q air , , ,q sw airr  
(for q=1,2,…,Q) and B. The output of the function is Riskmodel2. For illustrative purposes, we 
calculated the power risk of a mission that has Q=4 segments. The four segments are c1, c2, c3 
and c4. These four segments represent c1=4 days, c2=5 days, c3=3 days and c4=2 days, 
respectively. For the first segment, the parameters of the two-dimensional truncated 

















0C, 3, ,sw airr =0.4. For the fourth segment, the 




0C, 4, ,sw airr =0.5. The 
hypothetical power supply was set to 220 kW. The performed calculations have shown 
B=10000 pseudo realities. However, the Riskmodel2 was 0.3614. The output of the function is 
shown in Appendix C. A complete report from the first three pseudo realities, which is the 
function's output, is given in Appendix C after the function. There is a power failure in the first 
pseudo-reality on day 4 of segment 1, in the second pseudo-reality on day 4 of segment 2. 
However, there was no power failure in the third pseudo-reality. 
8.5 Third Power Risk Model 
This model is an analytical version of the second model for the particular case when the two-
dimensional distribution for any segments is a truncated bi-normal distribution. This model 
uses the first power risk model Q times to solve the problem set up in the second power risk 
model.  
 
The main idea is straightforward. For each day of the q-the segment of the mission, the risk 
can be calculated using the first model: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , , ,CDF , CDF , CDF , +CDF ,margin margin margin margin margin margin margin margini j q q sw i sw j q sw i sw j q sw i sw j q sw i sw jP t t t t t t t t+ + + += − − , 
 
for i=1, 2,…,n; j=1, 2,…,m; q=1,2,…,Q 
 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1
PDF PDF , ,
1
exp , for Domain  
22
0 , for Domain




w t t f t t
U

















( ) ( )
( )2CDF ,
PDF =PDF , =
q sw air









For more explanations on CDFq and PDFq, see the Second Power Risk Model. 
















The mission Power Risk can be calculated considering that a successful mission means the 











= − −  
The second model may be formulated given:  




, , ,q sw air
r
 (for q=1,2,…,Q)  
➢ The power demand-supply data 
 
Find: The Mission Power Risk, Riskmodel3 
1. Calculate the scaling constants Uq for q=1,2,…,Q 
2. Repeat for each segment q, for q=1,2,…,Q 
2.1. Set msw=mq,sw, mai=mq,air,r, ,sw q sw = , ,air q air = , and ,sw airr = , ,q sw airr  
2.2. Use the First Power Risk model to calculate the daily risk in segment q: 
model1qRisk Risk=  
3. Calculate the Mission Power Risk of the model Riskmodel3 
 
The Riskmodel3 is calculated using the MATLAB function Risk_generalized_model.m. The 
source code and the function are included in Appendix D. It takes the power demand-supply 
data as input from Power_demand_supply.m as well as the parameters cq, mq,sw, mq,air, ,q sw , 
,q air , , ,q sw airr  (for q=1,2,…,Q). The output of the function is the Riskmodel3 and the power risk 
for each of the segments. For illustrative purposes, the power risk of a mission with the same 
parameters as the one described at the end of section 8.4 is calculated. The output for Riskmodel3 
was 0.3703. The output of the function is shown in Appendix D. The power risk for each of 
the segments is given in Appendix D after the function. As evident, the Third Power Risk model 
results practically coincide with those from the Second Power Risk model. However, the 
function Risk_simulate_eval_dist.m. with 10000 pseudo realities calculated the results in 
8.37 seconds, while the Risk_generalized_model.m. calculated the results in 0.074 seconds, 
which is more than 100 times faster.  
8.6 Mission power risk against the hypothetical power supply 
The Riskmodel3 is calculated using the MATLAB function Risk_generalized_model.m. The 
source code and the function are included in Appendix D. It takes the power demand-supply 
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data as input from Power_demand_supply.m as well as the parameters cq, mq,sw, mq,air, ,q sw , 
,q air , , ,q sw airr  (for q=1,2,…,Q). The output of the function is the Riskmodel3 and the power risk 
for each of the segments. For illustrative purposes, the power risk of a mission with the same 
parameters as the one described at the end of section 8.4 is calculated. The output of Riskmodel3 
was 0.3703. The output of the function is shown in Appendix D. The power risk for each of 
the segments is given in Appendix D after the function. As evident, the Third Power Risk model 
results practically coincide with those from the Second Power Risk model. However, the 
function Risk_simulate_eval_dist.m. with 10000 pseudo realities calculated the results in 
8.37 seconds, while the Risk_generalized_model.m. calculated the results in 0.074 seconds, 
which is more than 100 times faster.  
 
The mission power risks for several different values of the hypothetical power supply can be 
calculated using the Second and Third Power Models. In this way, the mission power risk as a 
function of the hypothetical power supply can be obtained, which is useful to determine the 
investment in a separate mission. This relation is evaluated with the MATLAB function 
PowerSupply_Risk_curve.m. The source code of the function is included in Appendix E. It 
takes as input the power demand-supply data from Power_demand_supply.m as well as the 
parameters cq, mq,sw, mq,air, ,q sw , ,q air , , ,q sw airr  (for q=1,2,…,Q), and B. The important input 
parameter is the array PowerSupplyH_v which contains the values of the hypothetical power 
supplies for which the power risks will be calculated with the second and the third power 
models. The function generates graphical output, as shown in the sections of Figure 56. For 
illustrative purposes, the power risk curve of a mission with the same parameters (as the one 
described at the end of section 8.4 for hypothetical power supply for any whole kW from 160 
till 270) is calculated. The output of the function is shown in Appendix E. The resulting 
functions are shown in Figure 56, obtained for different pseudo realities (50, 100, 1000 and 
10000). 
 
The simulation curves approach the analytical curve (a-b) with 50 and 100 pseudo-realities, 
although the difference between the two methods is easily visible. There is no practical 
difference between the curves under 1000 pseudo realities. At 10000 pseudo realities, the two 
curves coincide, so 1000 pseudo realities are sufficient to achieve precision. Such a power 
supply curve is useful for decision-makers to determine the suitable condition or additional 












Figure 56: (a-d) Model risk between the Hypothetical Power Supply (kW) and Mission Power Risk (%): 
(a) with 50 pseudo realities; (b) with 100 pseudo realities; (c) with 1000 pseudo realities;  
(d) with 10000 pseudo realities 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter developed a new methodology in order to address the winterisation of four-ship 
systems in the harsh polar regions while working within the IMO guidelines established as part 
of the polar code. The two models whereby the power risk was assessed can be found in 
Appendix A. The first model distributed extreme weather vectors according to a truncated bi-
normal distribution. The power risk is analytically derived as the integration of the truncated 
bi-normal PDF over the critical region, denoted as the weather vector region where power 
failure will occur. The second model divided the vessel’s route into an arbitrary number of 
segments, where each segment consists of several days with the daily weather vector 
distributed according to a segment truncated bi-normal distribution. The power risk is derived 
using a computer simulation of 10000 pseudo-missions. A pseudo-mission consists of daily 
weather vectors being randomly generated according to the known specific segment truncated 
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bi-normal distributions. The mission is considered a success if all the weather vectors appear 
outside the critical region. For both models, the power risk is calculated as a function of ambient 
temperatures. The power grid is calculated using the MATLAB function 
Power_demand_supply.m. The power risk analysis function is included in Appendix A through 
E and was developed using MATLAB. 
 
To estimate the probability of power risk, the models developed in this chapter take a wide 
range of factors into consideration, including vessel dynamics, operational and environmental 
factors, and human factors, and is, therefore, able to provide an early warning. As such, the 
proposed methodology may assist in real-time decision-making and allow for appropriate 





Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this research as well as a number of 
recommendations for further work. 
9.1. Summary of Work 
The methodological aim of this thesis is to develop different winterisation models for MV-
Bluefin research vessel systems operating in harsh environmental conditions. Specific analysis 
can be found in the related chapter: 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the IAATO [3], an organisation founded by private-sector operators to 
practice and promote ecologically sustainable and environmentally responsible tourism in the 
Antarctic region. This review was done in light of the legislation set out by the ATS, the IMO 
and the POLAR VIEW (which is a chapter of the Polar code) [5-9], and the IACS [14]. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ The identification of ATS legislation which currently regulates all activities conducted 
below 60°S; 
➢ The review of POLAR VIEW, as well as IACS and IAATO; and  
➢ The evaluation of the SAR exercise undertaken by IAATO with the MRCC based in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. This was undertaken in an effort to mitigate the distinct lack 
of infrastructure in regions where the polar code is highly applicable. 
 
Chapter 2 concluded that the regulation of tourist activities in the Antarctic region below 60°S 
occurs in a number of different ways and through a number of different bodies, including the 
IAATO, the Antarctic Treaty itself, the Protocol on Environmental Protection (Madrid 
Protocol), which forms part of the ATS, as well as the POLAR VIEW (which is a chapter of 
the Polar code). Furthermore, DNV aims to develop environmental sections supplemental to 
the polar code, which would ban the use of heavy fuel oil [5, 25]. The inter-governmental and 
inter-agency management of polar regions presents a unique challenge, and SAR exercises and 
related initiatives are essential in building relationships, trust and understanding. 
 
Chapter 3 reviewed the literature, published statistical data and reported accidents in order to 
determine the number of accidents occurring, the type of accidents occurring, the vessel most 
likely to be involved in an accident, as well as any casualties resulting in such accidents. Thus, 
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Chapter 3 aimed to provide recommendations such that the polar code may be applied as safely 
as possible for vessels operating in the Antarctic region.  
This was achieved through: 
➢ A review of both the type of vessel involved, as well as the nature of the accident which 
occurred in Antarctic waters, including collapse, explosion, foundering, or sinking; 
➢ The evaluation of the historical frequency of such accident events; and 
➢ An identification of any vessels which may have been lost as a result of the accident. 
 
The unique challenges presented by the polar regions requires highly specialised equipment, 
experienced and knowledgeable crew members, as well as expensive and comprehensive 
insurance. Despite taking all precautions, however, the harsh environment presents an almost 
insurmountable hazard resulting in a vast number of accidents, with 68.5% in global scale 
occurring as a result of human error or direct human action, and 20% occurring as a result of 
system or equipment failure. In the case of a vessel such as Australian icebreaker the RSV 
Nuyinya, human error may be compounded in that a wide range of activities occur on board as 
well as the vessel participating in a number of internal and external missions, thus increasing 
the risk of an accident occurring which was marked by the European Maritime Safety Agency 
with the recommendation that additional training is provided to staff members and crew in 
order to reduce human error.  
 
Chapter 4 reviewed the operations, routes, and winterization of a variety of polar vessels in 
the Antarctic region as well as the frequency and duration of their missions in an effort to assist 
vessels in transiting through the harsh Southern Ocean. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ A review into the most common routes taken by vessels throughout the region, as well 
as differentiating between destinations across three summer seasons, with the most 
common destinations including the Antarctic Peninsula, the Ross Sea, South George, 
the Weddell Sea, and the Southern Ocean; 
➢ The survey of vessel types travelling throughout the region between 2016 and 2019; 
➢ The analysis of statistical data collected during the 2016 summer season regarding 
vessel accidents and casualties in the Southern Ocean; 
➢ The identification of key stakeholders, and the subsequent mapping of relationships and 
dependencies in the Antarctic region; and 
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➢ The identification of accident trends within the Southern Ocean, specifically within the 
predefined areas 103 and 104 respectively based on the sea state divided. 
 
Chapter 4 concluded that despite the hazardous conditions posed by the region, the Antarctic 
Peninsula was the most attractive tourist destination, with a yearly total of 322 trips made by a 
variety of vessels, while the Ross Sea is the most common destination for research vessels, 
resupply vessels and fishing vessels. Comparatively, South Georgia and the Weddle Sea were 
much less attractive to all sectors. The harsh physical conditions which would have been 
endured by the vessels have been documented in this chapter, and it has been found that the 
environmental conditions may not influence the characteristics of the subsurface formations in 
the Antarctic regions. The delicate elements involved in the operation of the vessel, however, 
could be adversely affected by both salinity and temperature. In the predefined areas 103 and 
104, the salinity in the Antarctic region ranged between 33.8 ppt and 34.7 ppt, such that the 
Antarctic bottom water had a salinity of 34.7 ppt at a temperature of -0.4 oC, while the Antarctic 
circumpolar water had a salinity of 34.6-34.7 ppt at a temperature of 0-2.0 oC.  
 
Chapter 5 critiqued the polar code, developed by DNV, which regulates the operation of 
vessels in polar regions. The two stages considered by this thesis are those which identify the 
critical components which are negatively affected by low-temperatures and icing conditions 
and the subsequent drafting and implementation of guidelines; as well as the application of 
safety functions and techniques for both machinery space and auxiliary machinery. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ A review into DNV’s classification of vessels undergoing winterisation, which applies 
to all stages of the commission, design, construction, and operation; 
➢ An evaluation of the guidelines establishes as part of the polar code, as well as all 
additional requirements regarding the structural integrity of the hull and machinery 
space; 
➢ A review into the Statutory Navigation Requirements for Polar Vessels;  
➢ A description, including technical details, of the SWCS and the SWCCS; 
➢ The use of the Failure Mode and the Effect Analysis (FMEA) methodology in 
providing recommendations for the operation of the MV-Bluefin research vessel in 
polar climates; 
➢ The analysis of the Seawater Central Cooling System Chest (SWCCSC) aboard the 
MV-Bluefin, and the identification of weak points; and 
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➢ An evaluation of the effects of winterisation on the SWCS. 
 
Chapter 5 concluded that the safety of polar vessels relies on the guidelines laid out in the polar 
code, including construction, design, equipment, maintenance, and operations of the vessel, as 
well as the overarching environmental protections. Such guidelines and regulations have 
allowed for human activity and the use of ARVs in previously inaccessible, harsh, and hostile 
polar regions. While still undergoing development, the requirements outlined by all relevant 
and authoritative bodies have ensured that vessels operating in the polar regions are fit for their 
intended use, thereby reducing the rate of accidents or failures. This can be seen in that all 
machinery installations must prove to be functional under a wide range of anticipated 
environmental conditions, including ice and snow accretion or accumulation, ice and snow 
ingestion from seawater, the increased viscosity of liquids as a result of various freezing stages, 
and the temperature of seawater intake that can be recommended for this study. 
 
It is recommended that sea bays and sea boxes adhere to the following design characteristics: 
1. Reduce ice, snow, or slush ingestion with the implementation of a strainer plate at the 
inlet with perforations measuring 20 mm in diameter; 
2. Submerged as deeply as possible; 
3. Locate both sea bays and boxes on either side of the ship respectively; 
4. The suctions from the sea bay should equal 20% of the total open area to the sea; 
5. Clear sea inlets through the use of low-pressure steam or air system; and 
6. Ensure that a vent with a cross-sectional area greater than or equal to the pipes is open 
to the atmosphere. 
Ice blockages can be prevented further by implementing a vertical plate weir, which allows 
entering ice to float, thereby reducing the risk of ingestion through the strainer. This, however, 
does result in ice accumulation at the top of the tank, requiring means of clearing it. 
 
Chapter 6 provided an overview of the MV-Bluefin’s capacity to transport passengers, operate 
in polar regions, demonstrate the heat tracing and insulation system, preserve or increase the 
pipes' temperature. This was to evaluate the various winterisation systems best onboard the 
vessel and ensure their compliance with the polar code. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ The evaluation of the critical equipment aboard the MV-Bluefin and their application 
to the polar code; 
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➢ A comparison of the vessel’s specifications with the guidelines laid out in the polar 
code to determine whether the MV-Bluefin meets the requirements for winterisation; 
➢ The identification and assessment of potential issues arising aboard the MV-Bluefin 
as a direct result of the hostile polar temperatures; 
➢ The identification of the optimal SWCS for the winterisation requirements of the MV-
Bluefin; and 
➢ A review into the onboard systems and whether they align with the polar code and 
other related guidelines. 
 
Chapter 6 concluded that the systems onboard the MV-Bluefin vessel do not all align with the 
recommendations set out by the polar code, with particular cause-for-action associated with the 
temperature-sensitive sea chest systems, the auxiliary system required for heat tracing, the 
SWCS, as well as the SS. Thus, modification is required in order to mitigate potential system 
failure. 
 
Chapter 7 evaluated the power requirement of the MV-Bluefin to safeguard against system 
failure in the face of hostile polar temperatures and identify potentially vulnerable systems. 
Thus, Chapter 7 developed an innovative numerical model to classify the effects of harsh 
temperatures on various systems where the power is assumed constant below that point 0oC. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ The development of a numerical model based on seawater and air temperature 
respectively, which aims to estimate the energy required for the systems aboard the 
MV-Bluefin to maintain an internal temperature of 18°C despite outside 
temperatures; and 
➢ An estimate of the power demand (W) for each system aboard the MV-Bluefin 
identifies trends and mitigates future risks (the power is assumed constant below that 
point -2oC). 
 
Chapter 7 concluded; those systems aboard the MV-Bluefin are adversely affected by the 
ambient temperature, in that the power demand decreases in line with the temperature of the 
cooling fluid. For the fluid to maintain in a liquid state at a temperature of 12°C, 28.25W are 
required. Thus, it is recommended that the fluid not fall below a temperature of -2°C with a 
power demand of 25W in order to avoid freezing and subsequent systems failure where the 
power is assumed constant below that point -2oC. 
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Chapter 8 evaluated the additional risk of winterisation in the Antarctic regions in the form of 
a risk analysis, calculated on a two-dimensional weather vector grid where the first coordinate 
relates to SW temperature and the second coordinate relates to ambient air temperature. These 
are calculated as additional to the standard failure risk of the MV-Bluefin, the probability of 
power failure is denoted as power risk. This was modelled in MATLAB. 
This was achieved through: 
➢ The calculation of power demand as a function of ambient temperatures, through the 
use of randomised temperature measurements; and 
➢ An estimation of power risk probability is identified when power demand exceeds 
the power supply from the MV-Bluefin generators. 
 
Chapter 8 developed a new methodology to better address the winterisation of four-ship 
systems in the harsh polar regions while working within the IMO’s Polar Code guidelines. The 
two models whereby the power risk was assessed can be found in Appendix A. The first model 
distributed extreme weather vectors according to a truncated bi-normal distribution. The power 
risk is analytically derived as the integration of the truncated bi-normal PDF over the critical 
region, denoted as the weather vector region where power failure will occur. The second model 
divided the vessel’s route into an arbitrary number of segments, where each segment consists 
of several days with the daily weather vector distributed according to a segment truncated bi-
normal distribution. The power risk is derived using a computer simulation of 10,000 pseudo-
missions. A pseudo-mission consists of daily weather vectors being randomly generated 
according to the known specific segment truncated bi-normal distributions. The mission is 
considered a success if all the weather vectors fall outside the critical region. For both models, 
the power risk is calculated as a function of ambient temperatures. The risk analysis function 
is included in Appendix A through E and was developed using MATLAB. 
 
Chapter 8 takes a wide range of factors into consideration, including vessel dynamics, 
operational and environmental factors, and human factors to estimate the probability of power 
risk to provide an early warning. As such, the proposed methodology may assist in real-time 




9.2. Discussion and Findings 
The Antarctic region, defined by Article VI of the AT as the area below 60°S, has been subject 
to increased ship traffic in recent years in the form of research, tourism, and bioprospecting. 
As such, scrutiny must be placed on both the legislation governing the region and activities 
occurring within it and the vessel and crew's ability and capacity to ensure safe passage through 
the notorious Southern Ocean. This thesis aims to understand how the aforementioned 
legislation applies to vessels operating in the region and the risks posed to vessels, their 
operating systems, and the lives on board while specifically referencing the MV-Bluefin, the 
Australian Maritime College’s 35m-long flagship training vessel. 
 
The Southern Ocean presents unique challenges to mariners and vessels alike, with the harsh 
temperatures, icing conditions, and salinity often resulting in damage to the operating systems, 
the accidental collapse, explosion, foundering, or sinking of the vessel, and potentially causing 
the subsequent loss of human lives. In an effort to mitigate such risks, DNV outlined the polar 
code related to the construction, design, equipment, maintenance, and operations of the vessel 
and has resulted in fewer casualties in the Antarctic region. This thesis, however, has made a 
number of additional recommendations to reduce the rate of accidents further and has 
demonstrated that the polar code is insufficient in safeguarding against system failure in the 
face of hostile polar temperatures. The two models described in Chapter 8 aim to provide the 
crew with a means of early detection to assist in real-time decision-making and allow for 
appropriate preventative measures to enhance the vessel's safety and operation. 
 
This thesis has also demonstrated that the MV-Bluefin does not adhere to the winterisation 
requirements set out by the polar code and has identified several complex systems, including 
the temperature-sensitive sea chest systems, the auxiliary system required for heat tracing, the 
SWCS, as well as the SS. Therefore, it is recommended that modification of the MV-Bluefin 








9.3. Future Work 
Further research may be undertaken in a number of areas, including the following: 
Uncertainty analysis: Uncertainty analysis can be integrated as part of the data analysis and 
recommendations. 
Improved data collection: The study may be expanded with the use of more accurate and 
detailed data measurements, that are collected and stored for scientific research. 
Operating condition: In future studies, we can concentrate on exploring other conditions of 
vessels in harsh environments.  
Study of natural hazards: Future studies can explore the impact of various natural hazards in 
vessel operations in harsh environments. 
Expert elicitation: The existing methodology may be expanded with the use of expert 
knowledge relevant to the problem at hand in order to further improve approaches and 
technique. 
Other approaches: As a direction for future studies, we can compare the proposed 
methodology from this thesis with other statistical approaches and perhaps achieve 
improvements as a result of the comparisons. 
9.4. Conclusion 
The operation of vessels in and around the Antarctic and Arctic regions has always been a 
matter of concern for the IMO as a result of harsh and inhospitable weather conditions, a 
distinct lack of infrastructure, remoteness and isolation from land, darkness and the distinct 
lack of accurate charts relative to other areas of the globe, as well as the challenges presented 
by communication systems and other navigational aids. As such, the identification of safety 
and risk power level indications, along with their performance, is crucial. 
 
This thesis has considered the MV-Bluefin’s winterization in the context of the vital seawater 
(SW) cooling system, which transfers waste heat away from the operating systems in an effort 
to better assist the vessel in withstanding the harsh climatic conditions. In the context of the 
MV-Bluefin, the power demand of the vessel is calculated for a grid of two-dimensional 
weather vectors―SW temperature as the first coordinate and air temperature as the 
second―where the power demand of the MV-Bluefin may exceed the available power supply 
from the generators as a direct result of the extreme temperature fluctuations. Identified as a 
power risk, the probability of the aforementioned failure is additional to the vessel's standard 
failure risk. This thesis has developed two models for assessing such power risk. 
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According to a truncated bi-normal distribution, the first model distributes the extreme weather 
vector, with the power risk analytically derived as an integration of this PDF over the critical 
region, which is identified as the weather vector area where the power failure is expected to 
occur. Conversely, the second model divides the vessel’s mission into an arbitrary number of 
segments, where each segment consists of several days with the daily weather vector 
distributed according to a segmented truncated bi-normal distribution. The power risk is thus 
derived through the computer simulation of 10,000 pseudo-missions, which consist of daily 
weather vectors according to known specific and segmented truncated bi-normal distributions. 
A pseudo-mission is only considered to be successful if all weather vectors fall outside the 
critical region. For selecting a suitable ice-class for the MV-Bluefin vessel to operate in the 
polar areas, recommendations from DNV cold climate expertise should be considered. 
However, recommended ice-class notations can be used for the MV-Bluefin Research Vessel 
developed by DNV to mitigate unwanted risks and several issues highlighted in this study. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis has provided recommendations for the operation of vessels in harsh 
climates in light of the findings that the delicate elements involved in the vessel’s operation in 
polar regions may adversely be affected by salinity and both ambient air temperature and 
seawater temperature. As such, a numerical model was developed to estimate the vessel’s 
energy requirement to maintain an internal ambient temperature suitable for both the success 
of the mission and the safeguarding of lives. It was subsequently demonstrated that the MV-
Bluefin is adversely affected by SW and air temperature which is ill-equipped to ensure safe 
passage throughout the polar region, being incapable of exerting the required 225kW to 
maintain a safe 18°C internal temperature, as well as the 25W to operate the SWCS safely, the 
50W to maintain the LOS, the 25.75W to ensure adequate fuel viscosity in the FOS, and the 
240W to ensure adequate heating of the vessel. 
 
Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated that the MV-Bluefin is incapable of adhering to the 
winterisation requirements set out by the polar code or the suggestions put forward by the 
numerical model presented in Chapter 7 of this work. As well as identifying a number of 
especially complex systems, this thesis recommends immediate modification of the MV-
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Appendix A: Power Demand and Supply 
function [SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,Code_m] = 
Power_demand_supply(flagplot) 
% Power_demand_supply calculates the pawer deman and the power supply of 
winterize Bluefin 
% 
% [SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,Code_m] = 
Power_demand_supply(flagplot) 
    
    % Units 
    Power_Unit_str='kW'; 
    Temperature_Unit_str='deg C'; 
    % Power Supply 
    NumGen=2; 
    PowerOneGen=86; 
    PowerSupply=NumGen*PowerOneGen; 
    % Power Demand 
    SeawaterT_v=[-2 0 4 6 8 10 12]'; 
    AirT_v=[-27 -22 -18 -15 -10 -5 0]; 
    nsT=length(SeawaterT_v); 
    maT=length(AirT_v); 
    SeawaterT_m=SeawaterT_v*ones(1,maT); 
    AirT_m=ones(nsT,1)*AirT_v; 
    PowerDemand_total_m=zeros(nsT,maT); 
    % Cooling Seawater System 
    PDcss_sT_v=[13.79 13.79 12.96 11.40 9.772 9.760 7.208]'; 
    PDcss_m=PDcss_sT_v*ones(1,maT); 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDcss_m; 
    % Lubrication Oil System 
    PDlos_sT_v=[27.58 27.58 25.93 22.81 19.55 19.52 14.42]'; 
    PDlos_m=PDlos_sT_v*ones(1,maT); 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDlos_m; 
    % Fuel Oil System 
    PDfos_sT_v=[6.012 6.012 5.651 4.969 4.260 4.225 3.142]'; 
    PDfos_m=PDfos_sT_v*ones(1,maT); 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDfos_m; 
    % Accommodation Isulation System 
    PDais_aT_v=[90.55 75.11 66.84 55.25 47.37 47.31 34.93]; 
    PDais_m=ones(nsT,1)*PDais_aT_v; 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDais_m; 
    % Costant Demand Consumers 
    PDcdc=51.11; 
    PDcdc_m=PDcdc*ones(nsT,maT); 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDcdc_m; 
    % Air Demand Consumers 
    PDadc_aT_v=[25.41 24.29 23.03 21.93 20.75 19.73 18.62]; 
    PDadc_m=ones(nsT,1)*PDadc_aT_v; 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDadc_m; 
    % Seawater Demand Consumers 
    PDsdc_sT_v=[31.5 31.5 30.15 29.56 28.78 27.65 26.43]'; 
    PDsdc_m=PDsdc_sT_v*ones(1,maT); 
    PowerDemand_total_m=PowerDemand_total_m+PDsdc_m; 
    % Code calculation 
    Code_m=PowerDemand_total_m<=PowerSupply; 
    % Type Output 
    if flagplot==1 
        clc; 
        for i=1:nsT 
            for j=1:maT 
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                disp(' '); 
                fprintf(1,'Conditions: Seawater Temperature=%.1f %s & Air 
Temperature=%.1f %s\n'... 
                    
,SeawaterT_m(i,j),Temperature_Unit_str,AirT_m(i,j),Temperature_Unit_str); 
                fprintf(1,'Power Demand=%.0f %s & Power Supply=%.0f 
%s\n'... 
                    
,PowerDemand_total_m(i,j),Power_Unit_str,PowerSupply,Power_Unit_str); 
                if Code_m(i,j) 
                    fprintf(1,'The Power Supply is enough to satify the 
Power Demand\n'); 
                else 
                    fprintf(1,'Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to 
satify the Power Demand\n'); 
                end 
            end 
        end                




= Power_demand_supply(1)  
 
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=246 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=220 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=207 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=198 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=-2.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=184 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
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Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=246 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=220 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=207 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=198 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=0.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=184 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=242 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=225 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=216 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=203 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 




Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=194 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=193 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=4.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=236 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=219 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=210 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=188 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=6.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=173 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 




Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=213 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=203 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=191 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=182 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=181 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=8.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=167 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=228 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=212 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=202 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=189 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=180 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
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Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=10.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=166 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-27.0 deg C 
Power Demand=218 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.0 deg C 
Power Demand=202 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-18.0 deg C 
Power Demand=192 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-15.0 deg C 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.0 deg C 
Power Demand=170 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
Power Demand=169 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satify the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: Seawater Temperature=12.0 deg C & Air Temperature=0.0 deg C 
Power Demand=156 kW & Power Supply=172 kW 

















1 -2 -27 246 172 N 
2 -2 -22 229 172 N 
3 -2 -18 220 172 N 
4 -2 -15 207 172 N 
5 -2 -10 198 172 N 
6 -2 -5 197 172 N 
7 -2 0 184 172 N 
8 0 -27 246 172 N 
9 0 -22 229 172 N 
10 0 -18 220 172 N 
11 0 -15 207 172 N 
12 0 -10 198 172 N 
13 0 -5 197 172 N 
14 0 0 184 172 N 
15 4 -27 242 172 N 
16 4 -22 225 172 N 
17 4 -18 216 172 N 
18 4 -15 203 172 N 
19 4 -10 194 172 N 
20 4 -5 193 172 N 
21 4 0 179 172 N 
22 6 -27 236 172 N 
23 6 -22 219 172 N 
24 6 -18 210 172 N 
25 6 -15 197 172 N 
26 6 -10 188 172 N 
27 6 -5 187 172 N 
28 6 0 173 172 N 
29 8 -27 229 172 N 
30 8 -22 213 172 N 
31 8 -18 203 172 N 
32 8 -15 191 172 N 
33 8 -10 182 172 N 
34 8 -5 181 172 N 
35 8 0 167 172 Y 
36 10 -27 228 172 N 
37 10 -22 212 172 N 
38 10 -18 202 172 N 
39 10 -15 189 172 N 
40 10 -10 180 172 N 
41 10 -5 179 172 N 
42 10 0 166 172 Y 
43 12 -27 218 172 N 
44 12 -22 202 172 N 
45 12 -18 192 172 N 
46 12 -15 179 172 N 
47 12 -10 170 172 Y 
48 12 -5 169 172 Y 
49 12 0 156 172 Y 
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Appendix B: Function and Output for the First Power Risk 
Model 
function [Power_risk,P_m] = 
Risk_norm_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,mu_swT,sig_swT,mu
_aT,sig_aT,cor_swT_aT,flagplot) 
% Risk_norm_dist calculates the Power risk if the distribution is truncated bi-
normal  
% 
% [Power_risk,P_m] = 
Risk_norm_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,mu_swT,sig_swT,mu
_aT,sig_aT,cor_swT_aT,flagplot) 
     
    % default values 
    if nargin<10 || isempty(flagplot) 
        flagplot=true; 
    end 
    if nargin<9 || isempty(cor_swT_aT) 
        cor_swT_aT=0.5; 
    end 
    if nargin<8 || isempty(sig_aT) 
        sig_aT=30; 
    end 
    if nargin<7 || isempty(mu_aT) 
        mu_aT=-1; 
    end 
    if nargin<6 || isempty(sig_swT) 
        sig_swT=30; 
    end 
    if nargin<5 || isempty(mu_swT) 
        mu_swT=7; 
    end 
    % Units 
    Power_Unit_str='kW'; 
    Temperature_Unit_str='deg C'; 
    % Formation of the rectangles 
    SeawaterT_min=-2.5; 
    SeawaterT_max=20;  
    SeawaterT_v=SeawaterT_m(:,1); 
    AirT_min=-50; 
    AirT_max=30; 
    AirT_v=AirT_m(1,:); 
    nsT=length(SeawaterT_v); 
    maT=length(AirT_v); 
    SeawaterT_mar_v=[SeawaterT_min; mean([SeawaterT_v(1:(nsT-1)) 
SeawaterT_v(2:nsT)],2); SeawaterT_max];   
    AirT_mar_v=[AirT_min mean([AirT_v(1:(maT-1)) ; AirT_v(2:maT)],1) AirT_max]; 
    Code_m=PowerDemand_total_m<=PowerSupply; 
    % Calculation of the rectangele probabilities 
    mu_v=[mu_aT;mu_swT]; 
    S_m=[sig_aT^2 sig_aT*sig_swT*cor_swT_aT;sig_aT*sig_swT*cor_swT_aT sig_swT^2]; 
    CDF_mar_v=NaN(nsT+1,maT+1); 
    for i=1:(nsT+1) 
        for j=1:(maT+1) 
            CDF_mar_v(i,j) = mvncdf([AirT_mar_v(j);SeawaterT_mar_v(i)],mu_v,S_m); 
        end 
    end 
    P_m=NaN(nsT,maT); 
    for i=1:nsT 
        for j=1:maT 
            P_m(i,j)=CDF_mar_v(i+1,j+1)+CDF_mar_v(i,j)-CDF_mar_v(i+1,j)-
CDF_mar_v(i,j+1); 
        end 
    end 
    P_m=P_m/(sum(sum(P_m))); 
    % Power risk calculation 
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    Power_risk=1-sum(sum(P_m.*Code_m)); 
    % Type Output 
    if flagplot==1 
        clc; 
        for i=1:nsT 
            for j=1:maT 
                disp(' '); 
                fprintf(1,'Conditions:\n') 
                fprintf(1,'%.1f %s<Seawater Temperature<%.1f %s\n'... 
                    
,SeawaterT_mar_v(i),Temperature_Unit_str,SeawaterT_mar_v(i+1),Temperature_Unit_str)
; 
                fprintf(1,'%.1f %s<Air Temperature<%.1f %s\n'... 
                    
,AirT_mar_v(j),Temperature_Unit_str,AirT_mar_v(j+1),Temperature_Unit_str); 
                fprintf(1,'Probability for the weather to be in the 
rectangle=%6.3f%%\n',100*P_m(i,j)); 
                fprintf(1,'Power Demand=%.0f %s & Power Supply=%.0f %s\n'... 
                    
,PowerDemand_total_m(i,j),Power_Unit_str,PowerSupply,Power_Unit_str); 
                if Code_m(i,j) 
                    fprintf(1,'The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power 
Demand\n'); 
                else 
                    fprintf(1,'Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy 
the Power Demand\n'); 
                end 
            end 
        end  
        disp(' '); 
        fprintf(1,'Power Risk=%6.3f%%\n',100*Power_risk); 









-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.453% 
Power Demand=246 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.432% 
Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 




-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.367% 
Power Demand=220 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.446% 
Power Demand=207 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.583% 
Power Demand=198 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.593% 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-2.5 deg C<Seawater Temperature<-1.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 2.856% 
Power Demand=184 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
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-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 2.817% 
Power Demand=246 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.856% 
Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.732% 
Power Demand=220 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.895% 
Power Demand=207 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.179% 
Power Demand=198 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.207% 
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Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 5.980% 
Power Demand=184 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 2.672% 
Power Demand=242 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.835% 
Power Demand=225 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.720% 
Power Demand=216 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.888% 
Power Demand=203 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 




2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.181% 
Power Demand=194 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.224% 
Power Demand=193 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 6.288% 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.688% 
Power Demand=236 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.540% 
Power Demand=219 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
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-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.469% 
Power Demand=210 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.582% 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.781% 
Power Demand=188 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.817% 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 4.329% 
Power Demand=173 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.607% 
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Power Demand=229 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.523% 
Power Demand=213 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.457% 
Power Demand=203 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.571% 
Power Demand=191 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.771% 
Power Demand=182 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.812% 
Power Demand=181 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 




7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 4.413% 
Power Demand=167 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.520% 
Power Demand=228 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.504% 
Power Demand=212 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.443% 
Power Demand=202 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.556% 
Power Demand=189 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
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-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.756% 
Power Demand=180 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 0.802% 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 4.473% 
Power Demand=166 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 5.698% 
Power Demand=218 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.981% 
Power Demand=202 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 1.770% 
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Power Demand=192 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 2.254% 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 3.120% 
Power Demand=170 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle= 3.377% 
Power Demand=169 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Conditions: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Probability for the weather to be in the rectangle=20.182% 
Power Demand=156 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 





Table B1. Probability for the two-dimensional temperature vector to fall within each 






Probability for falling 
within the rectangle 
1 -2 -27 0.0145 
2 -2 -22 0.0043 
3 -2 -18 0.0037 
4 -2 -15 0.0045 
5 -2 -10 0.0058 
6 -2 -5 0.0059 
7 -2 0 0.0286 
8 0 -27 0.0282 
9 0 -22 0.0086 
10 0 -18 0.0073 
11 0 -15 0.0089 
12 0 -10 0.0118 
13 0 -5 0.0121 
14 0 0 0.0598 
15 4 -27 0.0267 
16 4 -22 0.0083 
17 4 -18 0.0072 
18 4 -15 0.0089 
19 4 -10 0.0118 
20 4 -5 0.0122 
21 4 0 0.0629 
22 6 -27 0.0169 
23 6 -22 0.0054 
24 6 -18 0.0047 
25 6 -15 0.0058 
26 6 -10 0.0078 
27 6 -5 0.0082 
28 6 0 0.0433 
29 8 -27 0.0161 
30 8 -22 0.0052 
31 8 -18 0.0046 
32 8 -15 0.0057 
33 8 -10 0.0077 
34 8 -5 0.0081 
35 8 0 0.0441 
36 10 -27 0.0152 
37 10 -22 0.0050 
38 10 -18 0.0044 
39 10 -15 0.0056 
40 10 -10 0.0076 
41 10 -5 0.0080 
42 10 0 0.0447 
43 12 -27 0.0570 
44 12 -22 0.0198 
45 12 -18 0.0177 
46 12 -15 0.0225 
47 12 -10 0.0312 
48 12 -5 0.0338 
49 12 0 0.2018 
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Appendix C: Function and Output for the Second Power Risk 
Model 
function [Power_risk] = 
Risk_simulate_eval_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,Npr,mu_s
wT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
% Risk_simulate_eval_dist calculates the Power risk if the distribution is extreme 
value consisting of Mdist normal distributions   
% 
%  [Power_risk] = 
Risk_simulate_eval_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,Npr,mu_s
wT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
     
    % default values 
    if nargin<12 || isempty(flagplot) 
        flagplot=true; 
    end 
    if nargin<11 || isempty(n_v) 
        n_v=[4; 5; 3; 2]; 
    end 
    if nargin<10 || isempty(cor_swT_aT_v) 
        cor_swT_aT_v=[.5; .6;.4;.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<9 || isempty(sig_aT_v) 
        sig_aT_v=[5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<8 || isempty(mu_aT_v) 
        mu_aT_v=[-10; -12; -8; 5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<7 || isempty(sig_swT_v) 
        sig_swT_v=[3; 4; 4.5 ;3]; 
    end 
    if nargin<6 || isempty(mu_swT_v) 
        mu_swT_v=[6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6]; 
    end 
    nprmax=3; 
    % Units 
    Power_Unit_str='kW'; 
    Temperature_Unit_str='deg C'; 
    % Formation of the rectangles 
    SeawaterT_min=-2.5; 
    SeawaterT_max=20;  
    SeawaterT_v=SeawaterT_m(:,1); 
    AirT_min=-50; 
    AirT_max=30; 
    AirT_v=AirT_m(1,:); 
    nsT=length(SeawaterT_v); 
    maT=length(AirT_v); 
    SeawaterT_mar_v=[SeawaterT_min; mean([SeawaterT_v(1:(nsT-1)) 
SeawaterT_v(2:nsT)],2); SeawaterT_max];   
    AirT_mar_v=[AirT_min mean([AirT_v(1:(maT-1)) ; AirT_v(2:maT)],1) AirT_max]; 
    Code_m=PowerDemand_total_m<=PowerSupply; 
    % Initialisation of the simulation 
    Mdist=length(n_v); 
    mu_c=cell(Mdist,1); 
    S_c=cell(Mdist,1); 
    for mdist=1:Mdist 
       mu_aT=mu_aT_v(mdist); 
       mu_swT=mu_swT_v(mdist); 
       cov11=sig_aT_v(mdist)^2; 
       cov22=sig_swT_v(mdist)^2; 
       cov12=sig_aT_v(mdist)*sig_swT_v(mdist)*cor_swT_aT_v(mdist); 
       mu_c{mdist}=[mu_aT;mu_swT]; 
       S_c{mdist}=[cov11 cov12;cov12 cov22]; 
    end 
    YN_v=true(Npr,1); 
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    % simulation 
    if flagplot==1 
       clc; 
    end 
    for npr=1:Npr 
        if flagplot==1 && npr<=nprmax 
            disp(' '); 
            fprintf(1,'Pseudo-reality #%i\n',npr); 
        end 
        for mdist=1:Mdist 
            if flagplot==1 && npr<=nprmax 
                disp(' '); 
                fprintf(1,'Segment #%i (Pseudo-reality #%i)\n',mdist,npr); 
            end 
            n_cur=n_v(mdist); 
            Data_m=NaN(n_cur,2); 
            for k=1:n_cur 
                while 1==1 
                    wea_v=mvnrnd(mu_c{mdist},S_c{mdist}); 
                    if wea_v(1)<AirT_min 
                    elseif wea_v(1)>AirT_max 
                    elseif wea_v(2)<SeawaterT_min 
                    elseif wea_v(2)>SeawaterT_max 
                    else 
                       Data_m(k,:)=wea_v; 
                       break; 
                    end                        
                end 
            end 
            i_v=interp1(SeawaterT_mar_v,(1:(nsT+1))',Data_m(:,2),'previous'); 
            j_v=interp1(AirT_mar_v,1:(maT+1),Data_m(:,1),'previous'); 
            for w=1:n_v(mdist) 
                if flagplot==1 && npr<=nprmax 
                    disp(' '); 
                    fprintf(1,'Day #%i (Segment #%i ; Pseudo-reality 
#%i)\n',w,mdist,npr);                   
                    fprintf(1,'Weather Conditions:\n') 
                    fprintf(1,'Seawater Temperature=%.1f %s & Air Temperature=%.1f 
%s\n'... 
                        
,Data_m(w,2),Temperature_Unit_str,Data_m(w,1),Temperature_Unit_str); 
                    fprintf(1,'The weather vector belongs to the rectangle:\n') 
                    fprintf(1,'%.1f %s<Seawater Temperature<%.1f %s\n'... 
                        
,SeawaterT_mar_v(i_v(w)),Temperature_Unit_str,SeawaterT_mar_v(i_v(w)+1),Temperature
_Unit_str); 
                    fprintf(1,'%.1f %s<Air Temperature<%.1f %s\n'... 
                        
,AirT_mar_v(j_v(w)),Temperature_Unit_str,AirT_mar_v(j_v(w)+1),Temperature_Unit_str)
; 
                    fprintf(1,'Power Demand=%.0f %s & Power Supply=%.0f %s\n'... 
                        
,PowerDemand_total_m(i_v(w),j_v(w)),Power_Unit_str,PowerSupply,Power_Unit_str); 
                    if Code_m(i_v(w),j_v(w)) 
                        fprintf(1,'The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power 
Demand\n'); 
                    else 
                        fprintf(1,'Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to 
satisfy the Power Demand\n'); 
                    end 
                end 
                if Code_m(i_v(w),j_v(w))==false 
                   YN_v(npr)=false; 
                   break 
                end 
            end 
            if YN_v(npr)==false 
                break 
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            end 
        end     
        if flagplot==1 && npr<=nprmax 
            disp(' '); 
            if YN_v(npr)==true 
                fprintf(1,'No power failure in the pseudo-reality #%i\n',npr); 
            elseif YN_v(npr)==false 
                fprintf(1,'Power failure in the pseudo-reality #%i\n',npr); 
            end 
        end          
    end 
    Power_risk=1-sum(YN_v)/Npr; 
    if flagplot==1 
        disp(' '); 
        fprintf(1,'Power Risk=%6.3f%%\n',100*Power_risk); 
    end 
end 
 
>>PowerSupply=220;mu_swT_v=[ 6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6];sig_swT_v=[ 3; 4; 4.5 ;3]; 
>>mu_aT_v=[ -10; -12; -8; 5]; sig_aT_v=[ 5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5];  








Segment #1 (Pseudo-reality #1) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #1) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=5.6 deg C & Air Temperature=-12.8 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Power Demand=197 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #1) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=4.9 deg C & Air Temperature=-8.0 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=194 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 




Day #3 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #1) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=7.9 deg C & Air Temperature=-11.4 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=182 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #4 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #1) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=4.1 deg C & Air Temperature=-28.4 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-50.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-24.5 deg C 
Power Demand=242 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  




Segment #1 (Pseudo-reality #2) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=4.3 deg C & Air Temperature=-13.9 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-16.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-12.5 deg C 
Power Demand=203 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=8.9 deg C & Air Temperature=-4.4 deg C 
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The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=181 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #3 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=7.4 deg C & Air Temperature=-6.3 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=181 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #4 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=10.3 deg C & Air Temperature=-7.6 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=180 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Segment #2 (Pseudo-reality #2) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.6 deg C & Air Temperature=-9.2 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=188 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  




Seawater Temperature=9.6 deg C & Air Temperature=-4.2 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #3 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.4 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.9 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=188 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #4 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #2) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=3.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-22.1 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-24.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-20.0 deg C 
Power Demand=225 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
Failure: the Power Supply is not enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  




Segment #1 (Pseudo-reality #3) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=8.1 deg C & Air Temperature=-1.5 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
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Power Demand=167 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=7.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-3.4 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #3 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.8 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.3 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #4 (Segment #1 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.6 deg C & Air Temperature=-16.7 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-20.0 deg C<Air Temperature<-16.5 deg C 
Power Demand=210 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Segment #2 (Pseudo-reality #3) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=5.4 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.3 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
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-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=188 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=10.9 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.1 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
9.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<11.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=179 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #3 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=8.3 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.3 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
7.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<9.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=181 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #4 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.5 deg C & Air Temperature=-5.0 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #5 (Segment #2 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=4.6 deg C & Air Temperature=-10.4 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
150 
 
Power Demand=194 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Segment #3 (Pseudo-reality #3) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #3 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=12.1 deg C & Air Temperature=-0.7 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
11.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<20.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Power Demand=156 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #3 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=7.0 deg C & Air Temperature=-7.1 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-7.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-2.5 deg C 
Power Demand=187 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #3 (Segment #3 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=4.2 deg C & Air Temperature=-8.5 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
2.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<5.0 deg C 
-12.5 deg C<Air Temperature<-7.5 deg C 
Power Demand=194 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Segment #4 (Pseudo-reality #3) 
  
Day #1 (Segment #4 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=0.9 deg C & Air Temperature=0.8 deg C 
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The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
-1.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<2.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Power Demand=184 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  
Day #2 (Segment #4 ; Pseudo-reality #3) 
Weather Conditions: 
Seawater Temperature=6.9 deg C & Air Temperature=1.7 deg C 
The weather vector belongs to the rectangle: 
5.0 deg C<Seawater Temperature<7.0 deg C 
-2.5 deg C<Air Temperature<30.0 deg C 
Power Demand=173 kW & Power Supply=220 kW 
The Power Supply is enough to satisfy the Power Demand 
  






Appendix D: Function and Output for the Third Power Risk 
Model 
function [Power_risk,Power_risk_v] = 
Risk_generalized_model(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,mu_swT_v,
sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
% Risk_generalized_model analytically calculates the Power risk if the distribution 
is an Extreme Value consisting of Mdist normal distributions   
% 
%  [Power_risk,Power_risk_v] = 
Risk_generalized_model(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,mu_swT_v,
sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
     
    % default values 
    if nargin<11 
        flagplot=false; 
    end 
    if nargin<10  || isempty(n_v) 
        n_v=[4; 5; 3; 2]; 
    end 
    if nargin<9  || isempty(cor_swT_aT_v) 
        cor_swT_aT_v=[.5; .6;.4;.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<8  || isempty(sig_aT_v) 
        sig_aT_v=[5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<7 || isempty(mu_aT_v) 
        mu_aT_v=[-10; -12; -8; 5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<6 || isempty(sig_swT_v) 
        sig_swT_v=[3; 4; 4.5 ;3]; 
    end 
    if nargin<5 || isempty(mu_swT_v) 
        mu_swT_v=[6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6]; 
    end 
    % Initialisation of the simulation 
    Mdist=length(n_v); 
    Power_risk_v=NaN(Mdist,1); 
    for mdist=1:Mdist 
       mu_swT=mu_swT_v(mdist); 
       sig_swT=sig_swT_v(mdist); 
       mu_aT=mu_aT_v(mdist); 
       sig_aT=sig_aT_v(mdist); 
       cor_swT_aT=cor_swT_aT_v(mdist); 
       Power_risk= 
Risk_norm_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupply,mu_swT,sig_swT,mu
_aT,sig_aT,cor_swT_aT,0); 
       Power_risk_v(mdist)=Power_risk; 
    end 
    Power_risk=1; 
    for mdist=1:Mdist 
        Power_risk=Power_risk*(1- Power_risk_v(mdist)).^n_v(mdist); 
    end 
    Power_risk=1-Power_risk; 
    if flagplot==1 
        disp(' '); 
        for mdist=1:Mdist 
            day_beg=sum(n_v(1:(mdist-1)))+1; 
            day_end=sum(n_v(1:mdist)); 
            fprintf(1,'Power Risk for each of the days between %i and %i: 
%6.3f%%\n',day_beg,day_end,100*Power_risk_v(mdist)); 
        end 
        disp(' '); 
        fprintf(1,'Mission Power Risk: %6.3f%%\n',100*Power_risk); 




>>PowerSupply=220;mu_swT_v=[ 6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6];sig_swT_v=[ 3; 4; 4.5 ;3]; 
>>mu_aT_v=[ -10; -12; -8; 5]; sig_aT_v=[ 5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5];  






Power Risk for each of the days between 1 and 4:  1.843% 
Power Risk for each of the days between 5 and 9:  6.671% 
Power Risk for each of the days between 10 and 12:  1.419% 






Appendix E: Power Supply Risk Curve 
function [Power_riskHa_v,Power_riskHs_v] = 
PowerSupply_Risk_curve(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupplyH_v,Npr,mu
_swT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
% PowerSupply_Risk_curve calculates and plots the Mission Power risk against the 
hypothetical Power Supply in PowerSupplyH_v   
% 
%  [Power_riskHa_v,Power_riskHs_v] = 
PowerSupply_Risk_curve(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,PowerSupplyH_v,Npr,mu
_swT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,flagplot) 
     
    % default values 
    if nargin<12 || isempty(flagplot) 
        flagplot=false; 
    end 
    if nargin<11 || isempty(n_v) 
        n_v=[4; 5; 3; 2]; 
    end 
    if nargin<10 || isempty(cor_swT_aT_v) 
        cor_swT_aT_v=[.5; .6;.4;.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<9 || isempty(sig_aT_v) 
        sig_aT_v=[5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<8 || isempty(mu_aT_v) 
        mu_aT_v=[-10; -12; -8; 5]; 
    end 
    if nargin<7 || isempty(sig_swT_v) 
        sig_swT_v=[3; 4; 4.5 ;3]; 
    end 
    if nargin<6 || isempty(mu_swT_v) 
        mu_swT_v=[6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6]; 
    end 
    % Units 
    Power_Unit_str='kW'; 
    Lcurve=length(PowerSupplyH_v); 
    Power_riskHa_v=NaN*PowerSupplyH_v; 
    Power_riskHs_v=NaN*PowerSupplyH_v; 
    for i=1:Lcurve 
        PowerSupplyt=PowerSupplyH_v(i); 
        
Power_riskHa_v(i)=Risk_generalized_model(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,Pow
erSupplyt,mu_swT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,0); 
        
Power_riskHs_v(i)=Risk_simulate_eval_dist(SeawaterT_m,AirT_m,PowerDemand_total_m,Po
werSupplyt,Npr,mu_swT_v,sig_swT_v,mu_aT_v,sig_aT_v,cor_swT_aT_v,n_v,0); 
    end 
    % Type 
    if flagplot==1 
       clc; 
       for i=1:Lcurve 
           fprintf(1,'when the Power Supply is %.2f %s, then the Mission Power Risk 
is %6.3f%% (analytically) or %6.3f%% (with %i pseudo-realities)\n'... 
               
,PowerSupplyH_v(i),Power_Unit_str,100*Power_riskHa_v(i),100*Power_riskHs_v(i),Npr); 
       end 
    end 
    % plot 
    figure(1); 
    close(1); 
    figure(1); 
    h_v=NaN(2,1); 
    h_v(2)=plot(PowerSupplyH_v,Power_riskHs_v,'b-'); 
    hold on 
    h_v(1)=plot(PowerSupplyH_v,Power_riskHa_v,'r-','LineWidth',2); 
    xlabel_str=sprintf('Hypothetical Power Supply in %s',Power_Unit_str); 
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    xlabel(xlabel_str); 
    ylabel_str=sprintf('Mission Power Risk in %%'); 
    ylabel(ylabel_str); 
    title_str=sprintf('Mission Power Risk as a function of the Power Supply'); 
    title(title_str); 
    legend2_str=sprintf('Simulational (%i pseudo-realities)',Npr); 
    legend_str_c={'Analytical';legend2_str}; 
    legend(h_v,legend_str_c,'Location','NorthEast'); 
end 
 
>> PowerSupplyH_v=[160:1:270];PowerSupply=220;mu_swT_v=[ 6 ; 4 ; 3 ;6]; 
>>sig_swT_v=[ 3; 4; 4.5 ;3];mu_aT_v=[ -10; -12; -8; 5]; sig_aT_v=[ 5; 6 ; 6 ; 4.5];  






when the Power Supply is 160.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is 100.000% 
(analytically) or 100.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 161.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is 100.000% 
(analytically) or 100.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 162.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is 100.000% 
(analytically) or 100.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 163.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is 100.000% 
(analytically) or 100.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 164.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is 100.000% 
(analytically) or 100.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
………………………………………………………………… 
when the Power Supply is 268.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is -0.000% 
(analytically) or  0.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 269.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is -0.000% 
(analytically) or  0.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
when the Power Supply is 270.00 kW, then the Mission Power Risk is -0.000% 
(analytically) or  0.000% (with 1000 pseudo-realities) 
 
